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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, I study the macroeconomic
and welfare consequences of introducing a universal healthcare system to replace the ex-
isting employer-based set-up in the U.S., paying particular attention to the reform’s labor
market effects. To study the policy, I develop an incomplete asset markets model with la-
bor market frictions and medical expenditure risk over the life cycle. First, I compare the
model-implied partial equilibrium employment responses to public health insurance gen-
erosity to existing empirical evidence. The model partially reconciles the puzzlingly wide
range of estimates found in three microeconomic experiments conducted in Tennessee, Ore-
gon, and Wisconsin. Next, I use the model to understand the general equilibrium effects
of switching to universal healthcare. I find that it results in higher reservation wages and
a corresponding reduction in firm vacancy creation, both of which lead to a quantitatively
large decline in the job finding rate. The negative impact of the lower job finding rate
outweighs the insurance benefits of generous public health coverage, resulting in substan-
tial welfare losses among low-wealth households for whom employment is most valuable.
In the second chapter (joint with Serdar Birinci), we investigate how unemployment in-
surance generosity should vary with the business cycle. We find that the optimal policy
is countercyclical. Not only does the policy smooth the consumption of job losers, but
also provides insurance against aggregate risk by reducing the need for excess savings dur-
ing recessions. Meanwhile, the moral hazard effects of generous benefits are attenuated
in recessions because jobs are scarce and thus, the forgone value of job search is low. In
the third chapter (joint with Anmol Bhandari, Serdar Birinci, and Ellen McGrattan), we
study survey data used for measuring business income and valuations. We document large
inconsistencies between survey data and aggregated administrative data for statistics such
as the level and distribution of business income, and the number of returns. These in-
consistencies are attributable to both non-representative samples and measurement errors.
Non-representativeness results from undersampling businesses with low income owners.
Measurement errors emerge because respondents do not use relevant financial documents
as basis for their responses while some survey questions suffer from framing problems.
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Chapter 1
“Medicare for All”: The
Macroeconomic and Welfare
Consequences of Expanding Public
Health Insurance
1.1 Introduction
The United States health insurance system relies heavily on coverage provided through
employer-sponsored plans, which is in stark contrast to other industrialized countries that
have long since introduced a publicly financed universal healthcare system. Given the high
costs associated with purchasing individual non-group private plans and the limited cover-
age of public health insurance such as Medicaid, being employed is essentially a prerequisite
to having access to affordable health insurance for most Americans. Furthermore, the cur-
rent system compounds the effects of employment risk by exposing job losers not only to
earnings losses but also a potential loss of health insurance coverage. Recently, proposals
to transition toward a universal healthcare system (“Medicare-for-all”) have gained much
attention in the policy agenda. However, the tight link between health insurance and em-
ployment implies that any expansion of public health insurance will inevitably have effects
on the labor market behavior of individuals and firms. The purpose of this paper is to
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quantify the macroeconomic and welfare effects of shifting to a universal healthcare system,
paying particular attention to the reform’s effects on the labor market. I use a structural
model whose features can jointly account for the puzzlingly wide range of estimates on
labor supply responses to public health insurance generosity found in three microeconomic
experiments conducted in Tennessee, Oregon, and Wisconsin. I find that transitioning to
a universal healthcare system results in a large decline in job-finding rates due to lower job
creation by firms. The negative impact of a lower job-finding rate results in substantial
welfare losses for low-wealth households for whom employment is most valuable.
The main contribution of this paper is to study the interaction of household labor supply
and firm labor demand decisions in response to government provision of health insurance.
The expansion of public health insurance alters the value of non-employment relative to
employment, which in turn governs non-employed individuals’ job search and acceptance
decisions, and employed individuals’ quit decisions. At the same time, any changes in
reservation wages, job acceptance rates, and turnover rates affect the value of a vacancy
and a filled job. Firms react to this by endogenously adjusting the level of job creation.
As a result, while universal healthcare can insure against employment risk and health
expenditure risk, these insurance benefits may be offset by potential incentive costs in the
labor market.
To study the reform, I develop a general equilibrium lifecycle model with incomplete asset
markets with the following key features. First, individuals are subject to medical ex-
penditure risk which can be partially insured primarily through employer-provided health
insurance (EPHI), supplemented by a limited government-funded means-tested program
(Medicaid). This provides a suitable framework to quantify the extent of medical expendi-
ture risk over the lifecycle as well as mechanisms in place to insure against them. Second,
jobs are found in a frictional labor market characterized by random search where house-
holds make endogenous job acceptance and quit decisions while firms offer a compensation
package comprising of a wage and possibly a health plan and decide on the level of vacan-
cies to post. This general equilibrium labor market set-up accounts for the possibility that
generous public health insurance can raise reservation wages, lower job-filling rates, and
raise quit rates, thereby inducing firms to respond by lowering vacancies. Furthermore,
the framework can be used to study the effects of health insurance reform on aggregate
2
job finding rates, equilibrium unemployment, and capital stock. Last, the model features
complementarity in production and two-sided heterogeneity where workers differ in terms
of their skill and match with jobs that differ in productivity. This feature allows me to
study how healthcare reform affects not only the amount of job vacancies in equilibrium
but also the allocation of workers to firms among vacancies that are filled. These features
are important to the welfare evaluation of a universal care system that aims to delink
health insurance coverage from employment.
The model is calibrated to a benchmark United States health insurance system pre Afford-
able Care Act (ACA). Importantly, this involves targeting the distribution of individuals
who are eligible for Medicaid and the joint distribution of wages and access to employer-
provided health insurance since these directly affect the insurance benefits and incentive
costs of expanding publicly-provided healthcare. The model is then validated against quasi-
experimental evidence on labor supply elasticities to changes in the generosity of public
health insurance programs. Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo (2014) exploit the un-
expected discontinuation of Tennessee’s Medicaid (TennCare) expansion program in 2005
to identify the causal effect of public health insurance and they find large effects on labor
supply. Dague, DeLeire, and Leninger (2017) use the Wisconsin BadgerCare enrollment
cap in 2009 and find large but more modest effects, while Baicker, Finkelstein, Song, and
Taubman (2014) use the Oregon Medicaid expansion in 2008 and find no effect. Conduct-
ing the same experiments using my model by introducing an expansion/discontinuation of
coverage to a subpopulation that closely matches the enrollee/disenrollee demographics in
each experiment, my model predicts effects in between the range of estimates in the liter-
ature. Furthermore, the model generates a reasonably large amount of dispersion across
the experiments because of differences in the income- and asset- distribution of the tar-
geted population. Finally, I also find substantial heterogeneity in labor supply responses
to public health insurance generosity that are qualitatively consistent with the empirical
findings, where older, less healthy, and unemployed workers are more responsive to policy.
It is important for the model to generate a reasonable labor supply elasticity with respect
to health insurance coverage in order to properly measure the incentive costs of the policy
reform.
Next, I use the calibrated model to understand the general equilibrium effects of switching
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to a single-payer system. I conduct the policy experiment by introducing a universal
healthcare system that is funded through a proportional increase in taxes. I find that the
reform results in a substantial decline in the aggregate job finding rate from 45 percent
to 31 percent and concomitantly, a higher non-employment rate and longer unemployment
spell durations. The decline in the aggregate job finding rate is caused, in part, by higher
reservation wages of individuals that become more selective in the range of jobs they
accept, and a slightly higher quit rate among workers who either look for better jobs
or leave the labor force. This results in a general equilibrium effect coming from lower
vacancy creation by firms for whom the value of posting a vacancy is now much lower
due to lower acceptance and higher turnover rates. Along the transition, however, there
is an initial increase in vacancies resulting from increased firm profits coming from the
withdrawal of employer-provided health insurance plans from the compensation package.
Over time, reservation wages and quit rates rise to overturn this and eventually, job-finding
rates decline substantially. Finally, due to increased public insurance against health risk,
there is a sizable decrease in the capital stock and an increase in interest rates resulting
from lower precautionary savings. Lower capital stock results in a net decrease in output
per worker, despite productivity gains brought by higher average match quality due to
increased job selectivity and switching.
The universal healthcare system results in a small ex-ante welfare gain of less than one
percent additional lifetime consumption. The reason why aggregate welfare gains are small
despite the large scale of the policy change is the substantial heterogeneity in ex-post
welfare gains and losses in the population alive during the policy change. I find welfare
losses accrue mostly to wealth-poor individuals for whom lower aggregate job-finding rates
and longer unemployment durations are most costly since these households have severely
limited ability to self-insure against consumption fluctuations caused by unemployment
risk. In addition to wealth-poor individuals, welfare losses also accrue mostly to younger,
healthier, and Medicaid-eligible households for whom the insurance benefits of universal
care is small compared to its distortionary effects on taxation and the labor market.
Given that welfare losses mostly accrue to wealth-poor and low-income individuals, a nat-
ural question to ask then is if there are welfare improving ways to fund the universal
healthcare reform. I explore alternative ways to fund the welfare reform by varying the tax
4
burden of funding the policy reform across individuals with different income levels. Unsur-
prisingly, I find that the optimal revenue-generation scheme involves a highly progressive
system where high income households bear the brunt of the additional taxes.
Related literature This paper contributes to a growing literature that studies the effects
of health insurance reform on labor markets and the macroeconomy. These studies have
focused on the effects of various ACA provisions (Pashchenko and Porapakkarm 2013,
Aizawa and Fang 2015, Tsujiyama 2015, Jung and Tran 2016a, and Nakajima and Tuzemen
2016, Aizawa 2017), an evaluation of Medicaid for the poor and Medicare for the elderly
(Attanasio, Kitao, and Violante 2010; Hansen, French and Jones 2011; Hansen, Hsu and Lee
2014; De Nardi, French and Jones 2016; Conesa et al. 2018), as well as the introduction of
socialized health insurance (Jung and Tran 2016b). My paper contributes to this literature
along two dimensions. First, I emphasize how the policy reform changes household labor
market decisions and elicits a corresponding change in firm vacancy creation. I show that
the reform’s general equilibrium effect in the labor market is critical in determining the
distribution of welfare gains and losses. Second, incorporating capital accumulation and
sorting between worker skill and firm productivity allows me to study how health insurance
reform endogenously affects productivity. I show that the change in aggregate productivity
is interestingly small due to offsetting effects coming from better sorting but lower capital
accumulation and job finding rates.
This paper is also related to a strand of literature that quantifies the effects of an employer-
based health insurance system on and individual job choices. Dey and Flinn (2005) estimate
an equilibrium model of employer-provided health insurance and wage determination and
find little evidence inefficiencies in job-mobility. However, the role of health in their model
is limited to a utility benefit and increased job productivity, whereas I explicitly incorpo-
rate health risk in a model of risk-averse households so that employer-provided benefits
have an important consumption-smoothing role against these shocks. This mechanism
drastically amplifies the value of employer-provided benefits for the households, and as
a result, they accept jobs even if the wage offer is relatively lower. Chivers, Feng, and
Villamil (2016) build a model of occupational choice to study the effects of employer ben-
efits on entrepreneurship. They find that agents with high managerial ability but poor
health status choose to be workers rather than entrepreneurs due to the high insurance
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value of employer-provided health insurance. Instead of focusing entrepreneurial choice,
my framework analyzes how public health insurance coverage affects workers’ allocation
into different jobs and how this affects firm labor demand.
Another active area of research is the use of quasi-experimental evidence to measure the
effects of public health insurance on the labor supply and earnings of households. Garth-
waite, Gross, and Notowidigdo (2014) exploit the sudden loss of Medicaid coverage of over
170,000 Tennessee residents to measure the effects of employer-based health benefits on
employment and earnings. They find that the disenrollment resulted in a 4.6 percentage
points increase in the employment rate of all childless adults, equivalent to around a 60
percentage points change in employment among disenrollees. Other papers have found
smaller effects. Dague, DeLaire, and Leininger (2017) study a sudden imposition of an
enrollment cap in Wisconsin’s BadgerCare Plus Core Plan. Specifically, they compare the
employment outcomes of Medicaid applicants before and after the enrollment cut-off. They
find that applicants who received Medicaid were 5 percentage points less likely to be em-
ployed relative to the control group of waitlisted applicants who eventually did not receive
coverage. Baicker, Finkelstein, Song, and Taubman (2014) conduct a randomized study
using data from the 2008 Oregon Medicaid expansion implemented via a lottery. They find
that Medicaid enrollment leads to a (statistically insignificant) decline in employment of 1.6
percentage points relative to the control group.1 In this paper, I run similar experiments
that underlie the results of existing empirical evidence by holding taxes and prices fixed
and targeting a similar subpopulation in the model. The model predicts large labor supply
elasticities that are lower than those found by Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo (2014)
but much higher than those found by Dague, DeLaire, and Leininger (2017) and Baicker,
Finkelstein, Song, and Taubman (2014). Consistent with their findings on heterogeneous
elasticities, I also find that older, less healthy, and unemployed households are more re-
sponsive to health insurance generosity. Furthermore, my paper builds on this empirical
1Another strand of the empirical literature measures the effect of health insurance coverage on worker
turnover and job choice. Madrian (1994) uses the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey to estimate
the relationship between employee turnover and health insurance coverage and finds that workers with
employer-provided health benefits are 25 percent less likely to switch jobs. This result is also supported by
Gruber and Madrian (1994) who show that policies that mandate extended coverage after job separation
alleviate this “job lock” phenomenon.
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literature by being able to study the effects of large-scale health insurance reform using a
unified framework that endogenizes job-to-job and non-employment-to-employment tran-
sitions as well as general equilibrium responses involving firm vacancy posting decisions.
Thus, the framework is designed to both generate key empirical predictions on the hetero-
geneous effects of employer-based health coverage on labor market transitions and at the
same time understand how they endogenously add up to affect macroeconomic aggregates
such as aggregate productivity and employment.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the model. Section 1.3 describes
the data and the calibration of the model. Section 1.4 discusses the the model’s validation
against quasi-experimental evidence and other non-targeted moments. Section 1.5 explains
the welfare implications of the policy reform, and describes welfare-improving revenue
generation through progressive taxation. In Section 1.6, I describe extensions to the model
and various robustness checks. Finally, Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 Households
Time is discrete and runs forever. The economy is populated by T+TR overlapping genera-
tions of households. In each period, a new generation of households is born. Households can
participate in the labor market for T periods, after which they spend TR periods perma-
nently in retirement. Agents survive up until the next period with conditional probability
ϕt, which depends on age t. Death occurs deterministically at age T + T
R + 1.
Agents are risk-averse and have access to a risk-free asset used to insure against idiosyn-
cratic employment shocks and medical expenditure shocks, and to fund consumption during
retirement. Households own and rent out capital to firms for use in production. Capital
depreciates at rate δ and has a return r. The state vector of working-age households
contains their age t ∈ [1, T ], employment status l ∈ {W,U,N} where W denotes being
employed, U denotes being unemployed, and N denotes non-participation, wealth hold-
ings a ∈ A ≡ [a, a¯] ⊆ R, health status h ∈ H ≡ {h, . . . , h¯}, Medicaid non-financial
eligibility n ∈ {0, 1} where n = 1 indicates fulfillment of these requirements, and skill
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x ∈ X = {x, . . . , x¯}. In addition, employed households are further characterized by hav-
ing employer-provided group insurance g ∈ {0, 1}, where g = 1 indicates EPHI coverage,
and the productivity of the firm they are matched with y ∈ Y ≡ {y, . . . , y¯}. The state
vector of retired households consists only of their age t ∈ [T + 1, T + TR], wealth a, and
health status h.
Preferences
Agents discount the future at rate β ∈ (0, 1). Preferences of households at age t are given
by
U (ct, lt, ht) = u (ct)− 1lt∈{W,U}νt (ht)
where ct is consumption, lt is employment status, and ht is health in age t. The term
ν is an age- and health-dependent utility cost of either working or actively looking for
employment. Thus, non-participants do not incur this utility cost for all h and t.
Health and health insurance
Health h is stochastic in the model and evolves according to the Markov chain Γht (h
′).
The probability of transitioning into good or bath health depends on both age and current
health status. Health affects the utility cost of participating in the labor market νt (ht), as
described in the previous section, and required medical expenditures mt (h) which depend
on both health status and age.
Households have access to various insurance mechanisms to partially insure against medical
expenditure risk. Households that are offered a job also receive an offer of EPHI with
probability ρ (x) which depends on their skill type. Employed households matched with
jobs with no EPHI and non-employed households may be eligible for public health insurance
through Medicaid if they fall below an asset threshold amc and income threshold zmc , and
meet non-financial eligibility requirements. Non-financial eligibility requirements capture
the fact that Medicaid eligibility requires applicants to fall under designated eligibility
categories such as being disabled, pregnant, or having children. Non-financial eligibility
n ∈ {0, 1} is met with probability γn in each period. Working-age households who do not
have access to EPHI or Medicaid are considered uninsured.2 Retirees are automatically
2In the baseline model, I abstract from private health insurance markets as the main focus of this study
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enrolled in publicly-funded Medicare program. The insurance status i of agents can thus
be summarized by
i (n, g, a, z) =

Medicaid if a < amc, z < zmc, n = 1, g = 0, t ≤ T
EPHI if g = 1, t ≤ T
Medicare if t > T
uninsured otherwise
where a is the asset holdings and z is the total household gross income, that will be defined
later, while amc and zmc are the respective asset and income thresholds of the Medicaid
program.
Let Ψj be the fraction of medical expenses covered by insurance type j ∈ {gr, mc, mr}
where gr denotes group EPHI, mc denotes Medicaid, and mr denotes Medicare. Out-of-
pocket medical expenses can thus be summarized by:
oopt (h, n, g, a, z) =

mt (h) (1−Ψmc) if i (n, g, a, z) = Medicaid
mt (h) (1−Ψgr) if i (n, g, a, z) = EPHI
mt (h) (1−Ψmr) if i (n, g, a, z) = Medicare
mt (h) if i (n, g, a, z) = uninsured
Taxes, transfers, and public programs
The government runs five insurance programs: Medicaid, Medicare, social security, un-
employment benefits, and a safety net program to guarantee a consumption floor. The
Medicaid program is available to working-aged households that do not have access to pri-
vate health insurance coverage and meet eligibility requirements. The Medicare program,
on the other hand, automatically enrolls retirees. The Social Security program pays re-
tirees a benefit bR until the household’s death. Unemployment benefits b are paid to
active job-seekers. Finally, the government guarantees households a consumption floor
c using transfer T flr to represent the option of households to resort to other safety net
is to understand effects of public and employer-provided health insurance policies on the labor market.
Moreover, the fraction is people who purchase non-group private health insurance is small in the United
States due to expensive prices of it.
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government programs when they are subject to extraordinarily high medical expenditures.
Government programs are funded with a consumption tax τc and a progressive income tax
schedule T p (z) which depends on total household gross income z.
Evolution of skill
A household is born with skill x drawn from distribution Γx. Employed and non-employed
households experience stochastic accumulation or depreciation of skills as in Ljungqvist
and Sargent (1998). In particular, an employed household’s skill increases by ∆x with
probability piWt while a non-employed household’s skills depreciate by ∆U with probability
piU in each period. Formally,
x′ =
x+ ∆x with probability piWtx with probability 1− piWt
when employed.
x′ =
x−∆x with probability piUx with probability 1− piU
when unemployed. Relative to Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), I add an extra feature by
allowing the probability of human capital accumulation when employed piWt to be age-
dependent. It follows the recursion piWt =
(
1− χW )piWt−1 to capture a potential slowdown
in skill accumulation over the lifecycle. Introducing household skill heterogeneity and on-
the-job accumulation generates a motive for households to decide which jobs to accept and
which jobs to leave. These decisions ultimately determine the distribution of match quality
in equilibrium.
Matching in the labor market
The labor market is characterized by random search. There is a continuum of profit-
maximizing firms owned by risk-neutral entrepreneurs that post vacancies.3 Each period,
3Alternatively, one could assume that firms are owned by the risk averse households. In that case, we
would have to solve for i) a portfolio choice problem of the households, and ii) fixed-point of distributing
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vacancies and unemployed workers are randomly matched according to an aggregate match-
ing function. The aggregate matching function M (u, v) represents that number of matches
when there are u unemployed workers searching for jobs and v vacancies posted. Let θ = vu
be the market tightness. Assuming that M (·) exhibits constant-returns-to-scale, we can
define the probability of filling a vacancy as q (θ) = M(u,v)v = M
(
1
θ , 1
)
and the probability
of receiving a job offer as p (θ) = M(u,v)u = M (1, θ). When a firm-worker pair meet in
the labor market, match quality y is drawn from distribution Γy and is known to both
parties. A worker may then decide to accept or reject the job offer. Each period a match
exogenously dissolves with probability γ.
Household optimization
Working-age households can either be employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force
(non-participants).
Define sN = sU = (a, h, n, x) be the relevant state vector for a non-employed household of
age t. The value of non-employment for such household is given by
U t (sU ) = max
dl∈{0,1}
{dlUt (sU ) + (1− dl)Nt (sU )}
where Ut is the value of unemployment, Nt is the value of non-participation, and dl repre-
sents the decision to participate in or leave the labor force.
Define sW = (a, h, n, x, g, y) be the relevant state vector of an employed household of age
t. The value of having a job offer with characteristics (y, g) in hand is given by
W t (sW ) = max
da∈{0,1}
{
daWt (sW ) + (1− da)U t (sU )
}
where Wt is the value of employment and da represents the decision to accept or reject the
job-offer.
An unemployed household receives unemployment benefits b. It chooses consumption vs
savings and incurs disutility from actively looking for work. In the next period, it enters
the labor market to search for jobs. With probability p (θ), an job offer characterized by
match quality y and EPHI offer g is received and a choice of whether to accept or reject
dividends to them. Assuming that firms are owned by risk-neutral entrepreneurs simplifies the computation
of the model along these dimensions.
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the offer is made. If the household decides to reject the job offer, it can either remain
unemployed or leave the labor force in the next period. With 1 − p (θ) probability, no
job offer arrives, and again the household can choose to continue looking for jobs as an
unemployed next period or leave the labor force. We can now write the problem of the
unemployed as:
Ut (sU ) = max
a′≥a
u (c)− νUt (h) + ϕtβEh′,n′,x′
[
p (θ)Ey′,g′W t+1
(
s′W
)
(1.1)
+ (1− p (θ))U t+1
(
s′U
) |h, n, x]
s.t. (1 + τc) c+ a
′ ≤ b− oopt (h, n, g, a, z) + (1 + r − δ) a
− T p (z) + T flr (h, n, g, a, z)
z = b+ (r − δ) a
T flr (h, n, g, a, z) = max
{
0, (1 + τc) c+ oopt (h, n, g, a, z)− b+ T p (z)
− (1 + r − δ) a+ a
}
A household that does not participate in the labor force is not eligible for unemployment
benefits b. After choosing consumption vs savings, it can decide to enter unemployment or
remain out of the labor force. The problem of the non-participant is given by
Nt (sN ) = max
a′≥a
u (c) + ϕtβEh′,n′,x′
[
U t+1
(
s′U
) |h, n, x] (1.2)
s.t. (1 + τc) c+ a
′ ≤ oopt (h, n, g, a, z) + (1 + r − δ) a− T p (z) + T flr (h, n, g, a, z)
z = (r − δ) a
T flr (h, n, g, a, z) = max
{
0, (1 + τc) c+ oopt (h, n, g, a, z) + T
p (z)
− (1 + r − δ) a+ a
}
Finally, an employed household earns a wage income of w (x, y) which depends on his skill as
well as the match quality of the job he is employed in. The household chooses consumption
vs savings this period and incurs a utility cost associated with working. At the beginning
of the next period, with probability γ, the match is dissolved and the household must
decide to either search for a job or move out of the labor force. If the match does not
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exogenously dissolve, the household can decide to either remain in the same job or quit
into either unemployment or non-participation. The value of not separating from a match
is given by
W˜t (sW ) = max
ds∈{0,1}
{
dsWt (sW ) + (1− ds) U¯t (sU )
}
where ds represents the choice of whether to stay in the current job or quit into non-
employment. Then, the problem of the employed household can be written as:
Wt (sW ) = max
a′≥a
u (c)− νWt (h) + ϕtβEh′,n′,x′
[
(1− γ) W˜t+1
(
s′W
)
+ γU t+1
(
s′U
) |h, n, x]
(1.3)
s.t. (1 + τc) c+ a
′ ≤ w (x, y)− oopt (h, n, g, a, z) + (1 + r − δ) a
− T p (z) + T flr (h, n, g, a, z)
z = w (x, y) (1− τ) + (r − δ) a
T flr (h, n, g, a, z) = max
{
0, (1 + τc) c+ oopt (h, n, g, a, z)− w (x, y) + T p (z)
− (1 + r − δ) a+ a
}
(1.4)
Households automatically enter retirement at age T + 1. Let sR = (a, h) be the relevant
state for retired households aged t > T . Retirees receive social security payments bR every
period until death. They also decide consumption vs savings but are no longer able to re-
enter the labor market. Retirees are automatically enrolled into Medicare and are assumed
to be ineligible for Medicaid.4 The problem of the retired household for T < t ≤ T + TR
can be written as follows:
Rt (sR) = max
a′≥a
u (c) + ϕtβEh′
[
Rt+1
(
s′R
) |h] (1.5)
s.t. c+ a′ ≤ bR + oopt (h, 0, 0, a, z) + (1 + r − δ) a
z = bR + (r − δ) a
while for t = T + TR + 1, Rt = 0.
4There are cases when Medicaid can supplement Medicare but we abstract from this case.
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1.2.2 Firms
Value of a matched firm
Firms post vacancies in order to match with the unemployed seeking for jobs. A firm
offers a compensation package consisting of predetermined wage rule w (x, y) and health
insurance plan g ∈ {0, 1}. Firms that offer health insurance pay a fraction (1− ωh) of
the group plan premium wh and pass on the rest of the cost to the worker. Firms face
idiosyncratic costs to providing health insurance i ∈ {1, H} where H > 1. This cost is
modeled to be multiplicative to group health insurance premium wh and is drawn from
a distribution Γ (x) which depends on the worker skill x that the firm is matched with.5
The firm internalizes the job acceptance decision of the worker when it decides on whether
or not it will offer health insurance. A match is formed when the worker accepts the
job. Then, the firm rents capital and uses one unit of labor to produce F (x, y, k) units
of output. In the next period, if the worker decides to stay in the job, the match persists
with 1− γ probability.
The value of a firm with productivity y and health insurance administrative cost i making
an offer to an unemployed household aged t with state sU can then be written as follows:
J¯t
(
sU , y, i
)
= max
g∈{0,1}
{
da (t, sU , g = 0) Jt (sW , g = 0) , da (t, sW , g = 1) Jt (sW , g = 1)
}
(1.6)
JT+1 = 0
where g represents the firm’s decisions to offer health insurance or not. The value of a
5This is a rudimentary way to capture the fact that (1) some firms do not offer health insurance and (2)
low-paying jobs are less likely to have EPHI. Dey and Flinn (2005) incorporate heterogeneity in households’
strength of preference for health insurance coverage while Nakajima and Tuzemen (2016) allow firms to
have idiosyncratic preference for offering health insurance. In the calibration of the model, H is set to be
large enough such that firms with a high administrative cost choose not to offer health insurance.
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matched firm that offered health insurance is given by
Jt (sW , g = 1) = max
k
F (x, y, k)− w˜ (x, y)− whi − rk (1.7)
+ ϕtEh′,n′,x′
[
1
1 + r
(1− γ) ds
(
t+ 1, s′W
)
Jt+1
(
s′W , g = 1
) ∣∣∣h, n, x]
w˜ (x, y) = w (x, y)− ωhwhi
a′ = a′t (sW )
JT+1 = 0
while a matched firm that did not offer health insurance is given by
Jt (sW , g = 0) = max
k
F (x, y, k)− w (x, y)− rk (1.8)
+ ϕtEh′,n′,x′
[
1
1 + r
(1− γ) ds
(
t+ 1, s′W
)
Jt+1
(
s′W , g = 0
) ∣∣∣h, n, x]
a′ = a′t (sW )
JT+1 = 0
where F (x, y, k) = A (x, y) f (k) = [αxρ + (1− α) yρ] 1ρ kψ. Here, I assume that health
insurance contracts are with commitment and that output is shared between the firm and
the worker so that w (x, y) = ωF (x, y, k) where ω ∈ (0, 1) is the worker’s piece-rate.6
Value of posting a vacancy
Firms pay a fixed cost κ in order to post a vacancy. With q (θ) probability (the job-filling
rate), the firm meets a worker from the pool of job-seekers. The match quality y is then
revealed to the firm-work pair and the firm draws a health insurance administrative cost
shock i. After the firm makes a compensation offer, the worker can decide to either accept
the job or not as indicated by decision rule da,t (sW ). The value of posting a vacancy can
6I make this assumption to simplify wage determination as in Nakajima (2012), Menzio, Telyukova,
and Visschers (2016) and Herkenhoff (2017). In a set-up where workers and firms bargain over wages, these
wages become a function of all individual characteristics of the worker and firm. This is computationally
burdensome as it requires another fixed-point problem to be solved as in Krusell, Mukoyama, and Sahin
(2012).
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be written as follows:
Vf = −κ+
∫
(i,y)
q (θ) ∫
sU
1
1 + r
J¯t (sU , y, i) dµ
U (sU )
 dµJ (i, y) (1.9)
where µU is the distribution of unemployed households. Unmatched firms can enter the
labor market and post vacancies by paying the cost, and so the free entry condition implies
that in equilibrium, the value of a posting vacancies is driven down to zero Vf = 0.
Group health insurance premium
Firms purchase health insurance plans from insurance firms that act competitively. I
assume that all active firms offering health insurance pool the medical risk of all covered
employees across all firms. Thus, the zero-profit condition for insurance firms implies that
the group insurance premium can be written as:
wh =
∑
t
∑
j µ
W (t, hj , g = 1)mt (h) Ψ
gr
µW (g = 1)
where µW (t, hj , g = 1) is the measure of employed households aged t, with health status hj ,
and possess employer-provided health insurance. This implies that total premia collected
is equal to the average medical expenditure of all covered employees.
1.2.3 Government
Let s ≡ (t, a, h, n.g, x, y) be the household’s state vector. The government budget constraint
is given by
τc
∫
c (s) dµ (s) +
∫
z (s)T p (z (s)) dµ (s) =
∫
t≤T
[
b× 1{l=U} (1.10)
+ Ψmcmt (h)× 1{a<amc, z<zmc}dµ (s)
]
+
∫
t>T
[bR (e) + Ψ
mrmt (h)] dµ (s)
+
∫
T flr (s) dµ (s)
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where the left-hand-side represents total consumption tax and income tax collected and the
right-hand-side represents government spending on unemployment insurance and Medicaid
for working-age households, social security and Medicare fore retired households, and the
consumption floor guarantee for all households.
1.2.4 Stationary equilibrium
A recursive stationary equilibrium consists of a set of value functions
{Wt (sW ) , Ut (sU ) , Nt (sN )}t∈[0,T ], {Rt (sR)}t∈[T+1,T+TR],
Vf ,
{
J¯t (sU , y, i) , Jt (sW )
}
t∈[0,T ],
a set of policy functions
{
a′t (sW ) , a′t (sU ) , a′t (sN ) , ds,t (sW ) , da,t (sW ) , dl,t (sN )
}
t∈[0,T ]
,
{a′t (sR)}t∈[T+1,T+TR], interest rate r, health insurance premium wh, vacancies v, unem-
ployment rate u, market tightness θ, and the distribution of agents across individual states
µ such that:
1. Household optimization: Given aggregate market tightness θ, interest rate r, wage
rule w (x, y), and government policy
{
T p, τc, b, b
R, Ψmc, amc, zmc, γn, Ψmr, T flr
}
,
the value functions
{Wt (sW ) , Ut (sU ) , Nt (sN )}t∈[0,T ], {Rt (sR)}t∈[T+1,T+TR], solve (1.1), (1.2), (1.3),
and (1.5), and
{a′t (sW ) , a′t (sU ) , a′t (sN ) , ds,t (sW ) , da,t (sW ) , dl,t (sN )}t∈[0,T ] ,
{a′t (sR)}t∈[T+1,T+TR] are the associated optimal decision rules.
2. Firm optimization: Given interest rate r, wage rule w (x, y), insurance premium
wh, the unemployed worker’s job acceptance decision rule {da,t (sW )}t∈[0,T ], and the
employed worker’s quit decision rule {ds,t (sW )}t∈[0,T ], the value functions{
J¯t (sU , y, i) , Jt (sW )
}
t∈[0,T ] solves (1.6), (1.7), and (1.8) with associated health
insurance offer decision rule dg (sU , y, i). Given job-finding rate q, the distribution
of unemployed µU , V satisfies (1.9).
3. Free entry of firms: The number of vacancies posted v satisfies the free entry condition
V = 0.
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4. Asset market clearing: The asset market equilibrium condition
K =
∫
aidi
holds where K =
∫
x,y k (x, y) dµ
J (x, y) and k (x, y) satisfies firm optimization r =
F ′k (x, y, k) given r.
5. Matching: The job-finding rate p and job-filling rate q is determined by market
tightness θ as described in the model section.
6. Health insurance market: The employer health insurance premium is given by
wh =
∑
t
∑
j µ
W (t, hj , g = 1)mt (h) Ψ
gr
µW (g = 1)
7. Government budget constraint: Consumption tax τc and income tax T
p (z) balances
the government budget constraint given in (1.10).
8. Consistency: µ (s) is the invariant distribution implied by job-finding rate p (θ), ex-
ogenous job separation probability γ, and household optimal decision rules.
1.3 Data and Calibration
1.3.1 Data
MEPS
To correctly measure the level of health risk individuals face, I need data on the distribution
and transition of medical expenditures as well as health status over the lifecycle. To obtain
this, I use waves 1999 to 2014 of the Household Component of the Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey (MEPS) where in each panel, biannual interviews are conducted for up to
two and a half years. This provides detailed information not only on health insurance
coverage (both public or private) but also self-reported health status and medical expendi-
tures. Medical expenditures are further broken down into various sources such as private
insurance, Medicaid, etc. I use this data to calibrate the level of medical risk as well as
health insurance coverage ratios over the life cycle in the model. Appendix A.1 provides
detailed explanation on sample selection and construction of each of these data moments.
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SIPP
The United States Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) is
a longitudinal survey that follows individuals for a duration of up to five years, with inter-
views being held in four-month intervals called waves. In each interview, respondents are
asked questions about their income, employment/labor force status, government transfer
receipts, and source of health insurance coverage (if any) over the previous four months not
including the interview month. Topical modules that are administered on a less frequent
basis but contain information on respondents’ wealth holdings are also available. I use the
SIPP to compute various calibration inputs and other non-targeted moments to validate
the model against among which include (1) earnings distribution, (2) employment rates
and labor market transitions, (3) access to and participation in employer-provided health
insurance, (4) access to and participation in publicly-funded health insurance, and (4) self
insurance in the form of asset holdings. Unless otherwise stated, all calibration targets
computed from the SIPP are derived from the 2004 panel. Appendix A.1 provides detailed
explanation on sample selection and construction of each of these data moments.
1.3.2 Calibration
Demographics A period in the model is one quarter. An individual is born at age 25
and lives to a maximum of 60 years. During the first 40 years of life, agents can participate
in the labor market or choose to leave the labor force. Retirement is mandatory at age
65. Agents spend 20 years in retirement and live until age 84 after which death occurs
for all agents. This implies that T = 160 and TR = 80. The survival probabilities ϕt are
chosen to match the average survival probability of males and females as reported in the
2006 Social Security Administration life tables. The survival probabilities imply a ratio of
workers to retirees is of 3.0 in the model.
Health and medical expenditures I use the 1999 to 2014 waves of Medical Expendi-
ture Panel Survey (MEPS) data to estimate medical expenditure shocks, following Jeske
and Kitao (2009). I restrict the sample to household heads aged 25 to 84. The number
of health states is set to three in the model h ∈ {excellent, average, poor}. For each age,
I divide the sample into three medical expenditure bins:{50%, 40%, 10%}. I consider an
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agent whose medical expenditures is below the median of the distribution of medical ex-
penditures for his age as having excellent health while an agent whose medical expenditures
is above the 90th percentile of distribution for his age as having poor health. To obtain
the function mt (h), for each health status bin h, I fit mean medical expenditures over age
t with a cubic function of age.7 It has been well-documented that the MEPS understates
medical expenditures when compared data from the National Health Expenditure Account
(NHEA) (Selden, 2001). To address this, I scale medical expenses so that the ratio of
total medical expenditure to GDP is 13% which is consistent with levels reported in the
NHEA in 2006 as in Pashenko and Porapakkarm (2013). The medical expenditure function
mt (h) is plotted in Figure 1.1. The health transition matrix Γ
h
t (h
′) is set by calculating
the fraction of agents that are age t with health status h who move into bin h′ in the next
period.
Health insurance The coinsurance rates 1−Ψj for insurance type j ∈ {gr, mc, mr} are
estimated from the same MEPS sample. I divide the sample into working-age population
(age 25 to 64) and a retiree population (age 65 to 84). First, I compute coinsurance rates
for the working-age population. To compute coinsurance rates for EPHI, I first restrict the
sample to those that report being covered exclusively under EPHI for more than six months
during the year.8 Since the MEPS provides a breakdown of total medical expenditures by
source of payment, I am able to identify the amount of medical expenditures covered by
the respondent’s group plan. I find that the fraction of total medical expenditures covered
by EPHI is 65 percent in the data. Thus, I set Ψgr = 0.65. I implement the same
procedure for Medicaid and set Ψmc = 0.80. The retired population in the U.S. receive
substantial health coverage from both the Medicare and Medicaid programs. An average
of 30 percent of retiree medical expenditures is covered by Medicaid while 60 percent is
covered by Medicare.9 Hence, I set the retiree health insurance coverage rate in the model
to be Ψmr = 0.90. The fraction of health premiums firms passed onto the worker by firms
7Medical expenditures are in 2006 dollars and is scaled by the ratio of mean wages (1.49) in the model
to mean wages in the MEPS ($35,417).
8The resulting estimates are robust to alternative values of this threshold.
9In computing for aggregates program statistics, I attribute publicly funded retiree medical expenditures
to the Medicaid and Medicare programs accordingly.
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Figure 1.1: Lifecycle medical expenditures by health status
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Note: This figure plots the average medical expenditures by health status estimated from the 1999-2004 waves of
the MEPS. Dashed lines represent the raw data and solid lines are obtained by fitting the raw data with a cubic
function of age. I convert these amounts in the data into model units using the ratio of mean wages in the model
and mean wages in the MEPS.
ωh is set to be 0.24 from Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013).
Medicaid recipients are required to meet certain financial eligibility requirements. The
income threshold zmc of Medicaid is set to be 65% of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) which
is the median value among all states in 2006. The asset threshold is estimated to match
the fraction of working-aged population receiving Medicaid of 9.2% while the probability
of meeting non-financial eligibility requirements is set to match the fraction of uninsured
households with non-positive wealth which is 32%, both moments being calculated from
the SIPP. Finally, the distribution of health insurance administrative cost shocks Γ (x) is
used to target the joint distribution of EPHI coverage and wages from the SIPP.
Preferences I specify preferences to take the following form: u (ct) =
c1−σt
1−σ and νt (ht) =
νb + νm (h)× t . I set risk aversion parameter σ to be equal to 3 which is within the range
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commonly used in the life-cycle literature. The cost of participating in the labor force (being
employed or looking for work) is parameterized to be linear in age with a slope that varies
with health. The constant νb is used to target an average labor force participation rate
(LFPR) of 79% while the slope parameter νm (h) is used to target labor force participation
over the lifecycle across individuals with different levels of health. The LFPR and its age
profile by health status bin is calculated from the CPS using information on self-reported
health status and labor force participation.10 The parameters {νm (h1) , νm (h2) , νm (h3)}
are set to match the ratio of LFPR of young and old households for each health bin.
Specifically, I choose these three parameters to match the ratio of LFPR of those aged 25-
29 to LPPR of those aged 60-64 for each of the three health bin. Finally, discount factor
β is set to match the median value of asset holdings relative to quarterly before-tax labor
income distribution calculated from the SIPP 2004 Panel Wave 6 topical module covering
2005.
Government taxes and transfers I parameterize T p (z) to be piece-wise linear as in
McGrattan and Prescott (2017). This is constructed by linearizing T p (z) on AGI income
intervals
[
zj , z¯j
]
, j = 1, . . . , I as follows:
T p (z) ' T p′j (z¯) z −
{
T p
′
j (z¯)− T pj (z¯) /z¯
}
z¯ (1.11)
= βTaxj z + α
Tax
j
where z¯ is the midpoint in each bracket. The term T p
′
i (z¯) is simply the local marginal
tax rate at z¯ and T pi (z¯) /z¯ is simply the local average tax rate at z¯. I compute for each
bracket’s marginal and average tax rates using data from the CPS March Supplement from
2007 with estimates for 2006 and the National Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER)
10Respondents report being in excellent, very good, good, fair or poor health. For comparability to the
model, I let “excellent” and “very good” correspond to h = excellent, “good” and “fair” correspond to
h = average, and poor correspond to h = poor. For the 2007 CPS March Supplement, the fraction of adults
age 25-64 reporting excellent/very good health is 63 percent, good/fair health is 25 percent, poor health
is 12 percent, with labor force participation rates of 86 percent, 78 percent, and 43 percent respectively.
The fact that the bin size for h = excellent and h = average do not correspond exactly with the model has
little effects on the calibration because the LFPR between the two groups is very similar. The fraction of
individuals who report poor health matches well with the fraction h = poor in the model.
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Figure 1.2: Estimated income tax function
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Note: This figure plots after-tax income as a function of before-tax income resulting from the income tax schedule
estimated using the 2007 CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC). Details of the procedure can be
found in the main text and in Appendix A.1.
TAXSIM program. Figure 1.2 plots the estimated tax function. Details of this calculation
can be found in the Appendix A.1.
Consumption tax τc is set to match a ratio of government spending to GDP of 19.7 percent
as reported in the 2006 National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). Unemployment
insurance benefit b and social security payments bR are set to match the ratio of aggregate
unemployment benefits to GDP of 0.22 percent and 3.93 percent respectively. Finally, the
consumption floor c is used to target that 29% of the population have with non-positive
wealth as calculated from the SIPP 2004 Panel Wave 6 topical module covering 2005.
Firms, production technology and wages I use the following production function
F (x, y, k) = A (x, y) kψ
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where the TFP term A (x, y) is a CES aggregator of worker skill x and firm productivity
y:
A (x, y) = [αxρ + (1− α) yρ] 1ρ
I set α = 0.60 and the complementarity parameter ρ = −0.90.11 This implies an elasticity of
substitution of 0.53, i.e. worker skill and firm productivity are complements in production.
Capital is set to depreciate at a quarterly rate of δ = 0.015 which implies an annual
depreciation rate of 6 percent. The exponent to capital ψ is used to target a capital output
ratio of 3.2 calculated from the NIPA and Flow of Funds (FoF) for the year 2006. Here, I
assume that the stock of capital includes (1) private fixed assets, (2) inventories, and (3)
real estate/land. I assume that wages are paid as a piece-rate of output ω so that
w (x, y) = ωF (x, y, k)
The parameter ω is set to be the ratio of wages and salaries to GDP in 2006 which is 0.44
from the NIPA. Finally, the firm productivity distribution Γy is restricted to be an approx-
imation of a Weibull distribution with mean 1, scale parameter λy and shape parameter γy.
The scale parameter λy is set to 2, while the shape parameter γy is set to match average
an average tenure of 18 quarters. The length of tenure is informative of the distribution of
firm productivity. A distribution where there is high certainty of drawing high productivity
firms would encourage workers to quit more often, thus shortening tenure.
Labor market The labor market matching function is M (v, S) = uv
[uζ+vζ]
1/ζ as in den
Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000). This CES functional form of the matching function
implies that both the job finding rate f (θ) = θ (1 + θγ)−1/γ and the vacancy filling rate
q (θ) = (1 + θγ)−1/γ are between 0 and 1. The elasticity of the matching function ζ is set
to be 0.95, well within the range of estimates used in the literature.12
11I assume that worker skill and firm productivity are complements in production. The complementarity
parameter is set to be ρ = −0.90 which is the value estimated by Lise, Meghir, and Robin (2016) for college
graduates.
12See Schaal (2017) and Mitman and Rabinovich (2015). Also note that the matching elasticity parameter
is typically estimated using data on cyclical movements of the unemployment-employment (UE) rate and
aggregate labor market tightness as in Shimer (2005) and Menzio and Shi (2011). Since the model is
stationary, I do not attempt to estimate this parameter as in Menzio, Telyukova, and Visschers (2016).
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The vacancy cost κ is calibrated to match the average unemployment rate of 4.8 percent,
while the probability of exogenous separation γ is used to target the average employment-
unemployment (EU) transition of 1.4 percent, both of which are calculated from the 2004
Panel of the SIPP for years 2005-2007.
Worker skill The incremental skill increase while employed and skill decrease while
unemployed is set to be ∆x = 0.1. The initial skill accumulation probability piW0 is used
to match the economy-wide p90-p10 wage ratio of 6.30. Skill growth deceleration over the
lifecycle is determined by parameter χ. This parameter is used to match the concavity of
the lifecycle profile of log wages as in Jung and Kuhn (2018).
The initial distribution of skills that newborn agents draw from is restricted to be an
approximation of a Weibull distribution with mean 1, scale parameter λx and shape pa-
rameter γx. These two parameters are used to jointly match (1) the ratio of age 25 mean
wage to the economy-wide mean wage of 0.68 and (2) the p90-p10 ratio of age 25 wages
of 5.6. All wage moments are calculated from the SIPP 2004 Panel for the year 2006,
averaged across all months.
Borrowing Limit a Kaplan and Violante (2014) calculate the median value of the credit
limit to quarterly labor income ratio for households aged 22 to 59 as 74 percent using Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF) data. I choose the borrowing limit parameter a so that the
median value of the ratio of a to after-tax quarterly labor income in the model is 0.74.
1.3.3 Calibration results
The results of the calibration are summarized below. Internally calibrated parameters are
shown in Table 1.1 while externally calibrated parameters are shown in Table 1.2.
1.4 Validation
In this section, I discuss the model’s implications for several important but non-targeted
data moments. I first compare the model’s predicted labor supply elasticity with respect to
the generosity of public health insurance with available quasi-experimental evidence. I also
validate the model against differential lifecycle job finding rates between individuals with
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Table 1.1: Internally calibrated parameters
Parameter Explanation Value Target Data Model
Health insurance
amc Asset threshold 4.8 Medicaid take-up 9.2% 8.3%
γn Non-fin elig. 0.89 Uninsured non-pos. wealth 32% 28%
Γ (x) Admin cost -
EPHI by
[
.5, .75, .85,
[
.6, .72, .83,
wage quintile .9, .9
]
.9, .95
]
Preferences and borrowing constraints
νb Disutil, level 1.2 Labor force part. 79% 75%
νm (h) Disutil, slope [.002, .003, .007]
LFPR25,29
LFPR60,64
by h [1.3, 1.4, 2.5] [1.1, 1.2, 1.7]
β Discount factor 0.992
Median
0.78 0.78
asset-to-inc
a Borrowing limit 1.33
Median
0.74 0.74
credit-lim-to-inc
Taxes and transfers
c Cons. floor 0.3
Frac. with
0.29 0.31
non-pos. wealth
b Unemp ben 0.28 UI/GDP ratio 0.22 0.28
bR Social security 0.8 SS/GDP ratio 3.93 4.26
τc Cons. tax 3.4% G/GDP ratio 19.07 19.07
Firms, wages, and production technology
ψ Capital exponent 0.34 Cap-output ratio 2.9 3.4
γy Firm dist. shape 3.2 Tenure 18 22
Labor Market
κ Vacancy cost 0.82 Unemp rate 4.8% 4.9%
γ Job destruction 0.012 E-U rate 1.4% 1.5%
Skill Accumulation
λx Worker dist. scale 1.3
Wage25
Wageall
0.68 0.43
γx
Worker dist.
1.8
Wage25
5.6 4.8
shape p90-p10
piW0 Prob. skill growth 0.2 Wage p90-p10 6.30 4.54
Note: For the explanations of parameter choices and data moment constructions please refer to the main text and
Appendix A.1.
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Table 1.2: Externally calibrated parameters
Parameter Explanation Value Data
Health insurance
Ψmc, Ψgr, Ψmr Coinsurance rates [.80, .65, .90] MEPS
mt (h) Medical expenditures - MEPS
Γht (h
′) Health transition - MEPS
ωh Premium share 0.24 Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013)
zmc Medicaid inc threshold 0.8 65% of FPL in 2006
Preferences
σ Risk aversion 3 -
Taxes and transfers
T p (z) Income tax sched. - CPS, NBER Taxsim
Firms, wages, and production technology
λy Firm dist. scale 2 -
α Share of skill 0.60 Lise, Meghir, and Robin (2016)
ρ Complementarity param −0.90 Lise, Meghir, and Robin (2016)
δ Capital depreciation 0.015 Annual depreciation 6 pct.
Labor market
ζ Matching func elasticity 0.95 -
Skill Accumulation
∆x Skill gain/loss 0.1 -
χ Skill growth dep. 0.008 Jung and Kuhn (2018)
Note: For the explanations of parameter choices and data moment constructions please refer to the main text and
Appendix A.1.
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and without health coverage. These moments are relevant because they are informative
of the incentive costs of expanding health insurance coverage which come in the form of
higher reservation wages and consequently, lower job-finding rates and employment rates.
Second, I present how the model compares to the data on the consequences of job loss
which include the likelihood of losing health insurance, the consumption drop, and the
persistence of earnings losses. In addition, I also validate the model against other moments
of the asset-to-income distribution. The magnitude of the negative consequences of job
loss and the amount of self-insurance available to individuals are key to measuring the
insurance benefits of delinking health insurance with employment status. For example, if
the probability of losing health insurance in the model were to be too large relative to the
data, then the insurance benefit of universal healthcare would be overstated. The following
sections present the results of these exercises.
1.4.1 Labor supply elasticity to public health insurance generosity
I first validate my model against quasi-experimental evidence obtained by papers that study
the effect of public health insurance coverage on the labor market behavior of households.
These studies treat sudden expansions or contractions of health insurance by governments
as natural experiments to measure how outcome variables such as employment and earn-
ings respond to such changes in the generosity of public health insurance programs. It is
important for the model to generate a reasonable labor supply elasticity with respect to
health insurance coverage in order to properly measure the incentive costs of the policy
reform. Furthermore, the magnitude of household response to policy also affect the extent
to which firms will adjust vacancies. Finally, to the extent possible, I also compare the
model’s predictions on the heterogeneous labor supply responses of households that differ
in age, health status, and employment.
Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo (2014) exploit the unexpected discontinuation of Ten-
nessee’s Medicaid (TennCare) expansion program in 2005 to identify the causal effect
of public health insurance on labor supply and find large effects. Dague, DeLeire, and
Leninger (2017) use the Wisconsin BadgerCare enrollment cap in 2009 and find large but
more modest effects, while Baicker, Finkelstein, Song, and Taubman (2014) use the Oregon
Medicaid expansion in 2008 and find no effect.
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My model predicts large labor supply responses, the magnitude of which lie in between the
range of estimates in the literature. Furthermore, the model finds that the composition of
the subpopulation targeted in these experiments explain to some degree the dispersion in
estimates found in the data. Finally, I also find substantial heterogeneity in labor supply
responses to public health insurance generosity that are qualitatively consistent with the
empirical findings, where older, less healthy, and unemployed workers are more responsive
to policy.
Tennessee disenrollment
Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo (2014) exploit a reform in Tennessee’s Medicaid sys-
tem (TennCare) to study the labor supply effects of public health insurance. In 2005,
TennCare’s expansion was abruptly discontinued, leading to the loss of health insurance
of approximately 170,000 adults (roughly 4 percent of the state’s non-elderly population).
The discontinuation was essentially a reversion of eligibility requirements back to that of
traditional Medicaid. Thus, TennCare disenrollment affected a subpopulation that was
not traditionally eligible for Medicaid – childless adults who also had higher incomes than
income eligibility threshold. They find that for the population of childless adults affected
by the disenrollment, a 7.3 percentage point decrease in the coverage rate resulted in a 4.6
percentage point increase in employment rate. This is equivalent to around a 60 percentage
point increase in employment among disenrollees stemming from the loss of public health
coverage.
In order to implement such policy change in my model, I first solve a stationary equilibrium
to match Tennessee’s employment rate of 64 percent and public health coverage rate of
23 percent for childless adults aged 25-64 in 2004, pre-reform.13 I match public coverage
rates by increasing the Medicaid threshold zmc to 400 percent of FPL and by increasing
the non-financial eligibility probability γn.14 Employment rates are matched by adjusting
vacancy posting cost κ. To make the exercise comparable to the TennCare reform, I first
13Data is obtained from the 2005 CPS March Supplement.
14TennCare allowed families with income up to 400 percent of the FPL to enroll and receive premium
subsidies (Conover and Davies, 2000). According to Wooldridge et al. (1996), more than 40 percent of
TennCare enrollees had incomes above 100 percent of the FPL, while 6.3 percent had incomes between 200
and 400 percent of FPL in 1995.
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implement a sudden disenrollment modeled as an unexpected decrease in the Medicaid
threshold down to 100 FPL and a decrease of the non-financial eligibility shock γn such
that public coverage declines by 7.3 percentage points. This mimics a reversion towards
traditional Medicaid with strict income requirements and non-financial eligibility rules.
Second, I hold taxes and prices fixed after the policy change given that it only affected a
small fraction of state population. I then compare the change in employment rate predicted
by the model to those found by Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo (2014). The first row
of Table 1.3 shows that the experiment in my model results in a 2.7 percentage points
increase in employment rates – large but lower than the 4.6 percentage points increase
found in the study.15 The model implied response equivalent to more than a 30 percent
increase in the employment rate among disenrollees.
Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo (2014) also study the impact of disenrollment on the
employment rates of different age- and health- subgroups. They find that the labor supply
of older and less healthy adults were more elastic to changes in the public health insurance
coverage. As seen in Table 1.3, the model captures these dimensions of heterogeneity
qualitatively albeit with less dispersion in elasticities across the subpopulations.16
Wisconsin enrollment cap
Dague, DeLaire, and Leininger (2017) study a sudden imposition of an enrollment cap
in Wisconsin’s BadgerCare Plus Core Plan – a Medicaid expansion program which in-
cluded non-traditional Medicaid beneficiaries such as households with incomes below 200
FPL, which is a more relaxed threshold. Public enrollment began in July 2009 but was
abruptly terminated in October of the same year due to budgetary constraints. Applica-
tions received after October 09, 2009 were put on a waitlist but most were never granted
coverage in the end. Using a regression discontinuity design, they compare the employ-
ment outcomes of applications before and after the cut-off and find that applications who
15The sample of disenrollees in Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo (2014) consist of individuals who
were required to actively participate in “re-verification” process to determine if they were eligible for
Medicaid. This implies that their sample may have a stronger preference for health insurance – a feature
the model abstracts from.
16For the subpopulation “Age 21-39”, I simulate the model only for agents between 25 and 39 as agents
are born at age 25.
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Table 1.3: Tennessee disenrollment policy and its effects on employment
Employment rate (pp) GGN (2013) Model
State level 4.6 2.7
Heterogeneity by age
Age 21-39 1.0 1.5
Age 40-64 6.0 3.1
Heterogeneity by health status
Excellent health 2.0 2.3
Good/poor health 5.3 3.4
Note: In 2005, Tennessee’s Medicaid system’s (TennCare) expansion was abruptly discontinued, leading to
the loss of health insurance of approximately 170,000 adults (roughly 4 percent of the state’s non-elderly
population). This table compares the effects of this policy change on the i) state level employment rate
and ii) employment rates of different age- and health-subgroups, estimated by Garthwaite, Gross, and
Notowidigdo (2014) for childless adults and estimated by my model.
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received Medicaid were 5.2 percentage points less likely to be employed relative to the
control group of waitlisted applications who eventually did not receive coverage. They also
study the heterogeneous effects of Medicaid coverage to a subset of applicants and find
a larger magnitude of labor supply responses among older and unemployed households.
The first column of Table 1.4 reports findings of Dague, DeLaire, and Leininger (2017) on
the percentage point employment rate differences between applicants before and after the
enrollment cap.
I implement a similar experiment in my model in the following steps. I first take my sample
as uninsured agents with income below 200 FPL. I simulate the enrollment cap by unex-
pectedly enrolling a fraction of the sample into Medicaid by changing their household state
variables from insured by Medicaid to uninsured (treatment group), and leaving the rest as
uninsured (control group). I then run a regression of a dummy variable of employment one
year after the policy on a dummy variable of Medicaid eligibility using model-simulated
data to estimate the difference in employment outcomes between the treatment and control
group. I also run the same regression on subpopulations of the sample by age and employ-
ment status. The second column of Table 1.4 shows that my model predicts an average
labor supply that is twice the estimates of Dague, DeLaire, and Leininger (2017). However,
consistent with their findings, the model predicts larger elasticities for older workers and
the unemployed. This also suggests that it is the unemployment-employment margin that
is largely affected by the generosity of public health insurance programs.
Oregon lottery
In 2008, the state of Oregon implemented a limited expansion of its Medicaid program.
Using a lottery, around 30,000 low-income uninsured adults from a roughly 90,000-long
waitlist were given the opportunity to apply for coverage. Baicker, Finkelstein, Song,
and Taubman (2014) use this lottery to conduct a randomized study on the effects of
public health insurance on labor supply. To enroll in Medicaid, lottery winners must have
completed the application process and met eligibility criteria such as being aged 19 − 64,
otherwise ineligible for Medicaid or other public health insurance programs, uninsured for
six months, have income below the FPL and own assets below $2000. Using administrative
data on those who participated in the lottery, they find that Medicaid enrollment leads to
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Table 1.4: Wisconsin enrollment cap and its effects on employment
Emp. rate (Treatment vs. Control) DDL (2013) Model
All Sample −5.2 −11.8
Heterogeneity by age
Age ¡35 3.4 −4.9
Age 35-55 −10.2 −13.7
Age ¿55 −17.6 −25.1
Heterogeneity by employment
Employed 3.8 −8.1
Unemployed −7.0 −23.7
Note: In 2009, the enrollment to Wisconsin’s BadgerCare Plus Core Plan abruptly terminated due to budgetary
constraints. This table compares the effects of this policy change on i) the employment rate of the treatment group
who received Medicaid relative to the control group who missed the application period (and did not receve Medicaid)
and ii) the employment rate of the treatment group relative to the control group when the sample is divided into
different age- and employment- subgroups estimated by Dague, DeLaire, and Leininger (2017) and estimated by my
model.
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a (statistically insignificant) decline in employment of 1.6 percentage points relative to the
control group.
Oregon’s 2008 expansion essentially relaxed its non-financial eligibility rules since it allow
uninsured individuals to apply as long as they met pecuniary income- and asset tests. To
conduct a similar experiment in the model, I unexpectedly grant Medicaid coverage to a
subset of uninsured households whose income fall below 100 FPL and assets a < 0.34 but
are excluded from coverage in the model simply because of failing non-financial eligibility
requirements.17 The households in the treatment group are thus comprised of low-income
and low-asset households who unexpectedly receive Medicaid coverage. I take as control
group low-income, low-asset households who are excluded from Medicaid because of non-
financial eligibility requirements. This can be interpreted as individuals in the waitlist who
are not drawn from the lottery or lottery winners who are not granted Medicaid.18 I then
run a regression of a dummy variable of employment on a dummy variable of unexpected
receipt of Medicaid using model-simulated data to estimate the difference in employment
outcomes between the treatment and control group.19
I find that the unexpected receipt of Medicaid results in a decline of employment rate by 8.1
percent relative to the control group, which is larger than estimates obtained by Baicker,
Finkelstein, Song, and Taubman (2014). This may be possibly because, as Garthwaite,
Gross, and Notowidigdo (2014) points out, the policy change in Oregon was implemented
during the Great Recession, when the effects of such policy change on labor markets may be
mitigated due to lower job finding rates affecting employment outcomes of non-recipients.
Finally, notice that the estimated elasticities by the model for the Oregon experiment
(8.1%) is much lower than the estimates for the Wisconsin experiment (12%) and for the
17I convert the asset threshold in the Oregon experiment into model units by first calculating the ratio
of the asset threshold $2000 to mean quarterly wages in the MEPS for 2006 which is $8854.25. This ratio
is 0.23. I then set the model asset threshold for the Oregon experiment to be the same fraction of mean
wages in the model which is equivalent to 0.34.
18I experiment with the income composition of the control group to account for the possibiltiy that (1)
lottery applicants and (2) lottery winners who did not receive Medicaid may have slightly higher income
than lottery winners who receive Medicaid (since they meet income and asset thresholds). Including those
below 200 FPL in the control group raises the estimate to 10.5% .
19I do not need to implement the same two-stage regression as in Baicker, Finkelstein, Song, and Taub-
man (2014) since being selected in the lottery is equivalent to Medicaid coverage in the model.
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Tennessee experiment (35%). This is because the treatment group in the Oregon experi-
ment are comprised of individuals with very low income (below 100 FPL with negligible
wealth) compared to the Wisconsin experiment (below 200 FPL) and Tennessee experi-
ment (below 400 FPL). In the model, individuals with very low income and wealth are less
elastic to policy change because for them, the value of employment is very high. Thus,
the model partially reconciles the large dispersion in estimates of employment responses to
health reform through heterogeneity in the income and wealth of the subpopulation being
treated.
1.4.2 Job finding rate differences depending on health insurance
The extent to which job-finding (UE) rates vary depending on an individual’s health in-
surance coverage is informative of the value of a job given that it is a primary source of
health insurance. A key mechanism in the model is that uninsured agents will have lower
reservation wages and shorter unemployment durations as they are less selective of jobs.
I validate the model against data on life-cycle job-finding rates from the SIPP 1996-2008
Panels. I restrict my sample to individuals between the ages of 25 and 64 who do not own a
business or derive income from self-employment. I classify the individual as employed (E)
if he/she reports having a job and either working or not on layoff, but absent without pay
and as unemployed (U) if he/she reports either having no job and actively looking for work
or having a job but currently laid off. An individual experiences a UE transition in a given
month if he/ is unemployed at the beginning of the quarter and employed at the beginning
of next quarter. I then identify the insurance status of the unemployed throughout their
unemployment spell. To do so, I consider the respondent uninsured during a quarter if
he/she indicates not being covered by either Medicare, Medicaid, military-related health
insurance, or private health insurance. Individuals are considered to be without coverage
during their unemployment spell if they are uninsured for more than 50 percent of their
unemployment duration.20 Figure 1.3 compares the quarterly job finding (UE) rates over
the lifecycle of unemployed with and without health insurance coverage both in the model
and in the data. It shows that, in the data, the unemployed without health insurance cov-
erage exhibit much higher job finding rates consistently over the lifecycle. Moreover, job
20Results are robust to other reasonable values of this threshold.
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Figure 1.3: Lifecycle job finding (UE) rates by health insurance coverage
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Note: This figure compares the quarterly job finding (UE) rates over the lifecycle of unemployed with and without
health insurance coverage both in the model and in the data. The data UE profile is calculated using the SIPP
1996-2008 Panels. Details of the calculation can be found in the main text and in Appendix A.1.
finding rates of unemployed with and without health insurance coverage decline over the
lifecycle. The model also generates a similar magnitude of the observed difference in job
finding rates between insured and uninsured unemployed. Although the job finding rates
of both groups are typically decreasing over the lifecycle in the model, job finding rates of
the uninsured increase near retirement since the need for a job with health insurance is
stronger given higher medical expenditures.
1.4.3 Effects of job loss on HI, earnings, and consumption
In this section, I validate the model against data on the consequences of job loss on health
insurance coverage, earnings, as well as consumption. In order to measure the effects of
job loss on these variables, I use the SIPP 2004 Panel to estimate the following distributed
lag regression:
Yit = αi + γt + βXit +
10∑
k=−2
δkD
k,
it + it, (1.12)
36
where Yit is the outcome variables of interest (health insurance coverage, earnings, as well
as consumption) for individual i in period t, αi are coefficients on individual fixed effects, γt
are coefficients on quarterly fixed effects, Xit is a set of explanatory variables that includes
education, marital status, number of children below 18, and a quadratic of age, and the
error it represents random factors. The indicator variables D
k
it identify all individuals k
quarters prior to or after a job loss, where k = 0 is the quarter of job loss. For instance,
D4it = 1 for individual i who experiences job loss at time t − 4, and zero otherwise. The
treatment group consists of individuals who experience at least one job loss during the
survey time frame. On the other hand, the control group consists of individuals who never
lost their jobs. Thus, Dkit = 0 for all quarters t for individuals who belong to the control
group. The coefficients {δk}k∈{−2,...,10} measure the effect of job loss on consumption k
quarters prior-to or after the incident relative to individuals who do not experience any
job loss.
I once again restrict the sample to individuals between the ages of 25 and 64 who do not
own a business or derive income from self-employment. To identify job displacements, I
use a question in the SIPP that asks the respondent for the main reason he/she stopped
working for an employer. A job displacement is defined to be a transition out of employment
caused by a layoff, employer bankruptcy, sale of employer’s business, or slack work/business
conditions.
I then run the same regression in the model, this time only controlling for a quadratic in
age. In order to preserve comparability with the data, I only consider employment to non-
employment transitions caused by the exogenous separation. The model implied effects of
job loss are then compared with those estimated from the SIPP.
Health insurance and job loss In the SIPP, I classify a respondent as uninsured during
a given month if he/she reports not being enrolled in Medicaid, Medicare, a military-related
health plan, or a private health plan. Panel A of Figure 1.4 plots the estimated values for
{δk}k∈{−2,...,10} in the regression specified in Equation 1.12 when Yit is an indicator of health
insurance coverage. According to the data, upon job loss, there is a 30 percentage points
decrease in the probability of having health insurance coverage. This decline in probability
of being insured is persistent and remains low even 10 quarters after job displacement.
Moreover, displaced individuals have 8 percentage points lower probability of being insured
37
Figure 1.4: Effects of job loss
 Ƒ  Ə  Ƒ  Ɠ  ѵ  Ѷ  Ɛ Ə
 ƒ Ɣ
 ƒ Ə
 Ƒ Ɣ
 Ƒ Ə
 Ɛ Ɣ
 Ɛ Ə
 Ɣ
 Ə
  ;
 u 1
 ; m
 | -
 ] ;
  
 o b
 m |
  
 _ -
 m ]
 ;
  ĺ   ; - Ѵ | _   m v  u - m 1 ;   o v v
 Ƒ  Ə  Ƒ  Ɠ  ѵ  Ѷ  Ɛ Ə
    - u | ; u v   = | ; u   o 0   o v v
 Ɛ Ə Ə
 Ѷ Ə
 ѵ Ə
 Ɠ Ə
 Ƒ Ə
 Ə
  ;
 u 1
 ; m
 |  
 _ -
 m ]
 ;
  ĺ   - u m b m ] v  	 u o r
  o 7 ; Ѵ
 	 - | -
 Ƒ  Ə  Ƒ  Ɠ  ѵ  Ѷ  Ɛ Ə
 Ƒ Ə
 Ɛ Ɣ
 Ɛ Ə
 Ɣ
 Ə
  ;
 u 1
 ; m
 |  
 _ -
 m ]
 ;
  ĺ   o m v  l r | b o m  	 u o r
Note: This figure compares the consequences of job loss on health insurance coverage, earnings and consumption
in the model and the data. In the data, I estimate the effects of job loss on health insurance loss (Panel A) and
earnings loss (Panel B) from SIPP 2004 Panel using a distributed lag regression model. A range of estimates from
the literature on consumption drop upon job loss is presented in Panel C. Same distributed lag regression models for
each case are estimated using model simulated data.
even before their job displacement relative to the individuals in the control group. As seen
in the same figure, the model predicts a slightly larger drop in the probability of being
insured upon job displacement. This may be because of the fact that I do not model
potential coverage coming from a family member’s plan or the purchase of private non-
group health insurance markets. I explore these extensions in Section 1.6. Furthermore,
while the recovery of the probability is a bit faster in the model, the model also generates
persistence in the drop of the probability.
Earnings and job loss To estimate the effect of job loss on earnings in the data, I use
SIPP data on respondents’ total earnings received from working in a job. Using earnings
and employment data, I estimate Equation 1.12 to obtain the level and persistence of
earnings drop after job loss. Panel B of Figure 1.4 plots the estimated coefficients as a
fraction of mean pre-displacement earnings so that it is expressed percentage terms. It
shows that both in the model and the data, earnings drop by as much as 100 percent in
the quarter of displacement and do not fully recover even 10 quarters after displacement.
The data, however, exhibits a higher degree of persistence in earnings losses over time.
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Consumption and job loss Finally, I compare the model-implied value of the aver-
age drop in consumption upon experiencing a job loss to available empirical estimates in
the literature. I use model-simulated data to estimate Equation 1.12 where the outcome
variable Yit is the log of consumption log cit. Panel C of Figure 1.4 plots the estimation
results. It shows that in the quarter of job loss, consumption drops 17 percent on average
and then slowly recovers over time. However, it still stays around 5 percent lower than its
pre-displacement level even 10 quarters after the displacement.
There exists a number of studies that measure the average drop in consumption incurred
at the moment of job loss from various data sources. Gruber (1997) finds a decline in food
expenditure of 6.8 percent using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1968
to 1987. Saporta-Eksten (2014) uses the 1999-2009 biennial waves of the PSID with more
detailed consumption data on consumption beyond food expenditures and estimates an 8
percent decline in the year during which job loss occurs. Stephens (2004) measures negative
impact of job loss on food expenditure in the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) and
the PSID and finds that it is between 12 percent (PSID) and 15 percent (HRS) when
an individual experiences a job loss between interviews. Browning and Crossley (2001)
report a 14 percent decline using Canadian Out of Employment Panel (COEP) survey
data. Finally, Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016) study the effects of job loss on
consumption in both the PSID and the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE) and find that
total food expenditures decline by 14 percent (PSID) and 21 percent (CE). Finally, Aguiar
and Hurst (2005) use scanner data and report a 19 percent decline in food expenditure
among the unemployed.
In conclusion, the model generates an estimate for the average decline in consumption upon
job loss that is in line with available empirical estimates in the literature
1.4.4 Asset-income distribution
In addition to monthly data on income and government transfers as well as weekly data on
employment status, the SIPP also contains data on respondents’ asset holdings. In each
SIPP panel, respondents provide information on various types of asset holdings during two
or three waves within the panel, usually one year or, equivalently, three waves apart. I use
Wave 6 of the 2004 panel of SIPP, which covers interview months October 2005 - January
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2006. Sample selection is the same as in previous sections.
In the model, there are two reasons for accumulating assets: i) precautionary savings
for employment and health risk, and ii) savings for retirement. Hence, in the data, I
consider two sources of savings along these dimensions: i) net liquid wealth because of its
immediate availability as a means to smooth consumption upon a negative financial shock,
and ii) retirement savings. The net liquid asset holdings of an individual are calculated
by adding transaction accounts (checking, saving, money market, call accounts), tradable
assets (mutual funds, stocks, bonds), vehicle equity, and then deducting unsecured debt.
Here, I follow Koehne and Khun (2015) and include net vehicle equity when calculating
net liquid asset holdings. The reason is that, as I have shown in the previous section,
income decreases substantially upon unemployment, and some unemployed could resort to
liquidating other forms of assets (i.e., the sale of vehicles) to smooth consumption upon
job loss. Retirement savings include the market value of saving instruments in the form of
a 401k, 403b, thrift plan, Individual Retirement Account (IRA), or KEOGH account.
To normalize wealth and better capture the level of self-insurance, I compute respondents’
asset-to-income ratio by dividing the sum of net liquid assets and retirement savings by
quarterly before-tax labor income. Table 1.5 shows the computed percentiles of the asset-to-
quarterly labor income distribution in the data and the model. The calibrated model comes
close to matching the empirical asset distribution. In particular, the model reasonably
captures the left tail of the distribution and at the same time closely matches the fraction
of the population holding non-positive wealth. Matching the left tail of the distribution
matters for my analysis because agents in this region of the distribution are the most
affected by changes in public health insurance coverage. Job losers with low wealth have
little to no capacity to self-insure or smooth consumption using their own liquid assets and
are thus very sensitive to changes in government transfer generosity.
1.5 Policy Reform
The shift to a universal healthcare system is implemented by introducing a government-run
public health insurance with no means-test for the working-age population. The coinsur-
ance rate of this system is set to be identical as the current Medicaid system. For the
baseline policy experiment, the universal reform is funded by a proportional increases in
40
Table 1.5: Percentiles of the distribution of asset holdings relative to quarterly before-tax
labor income
Percentiles Fraction of population
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th with non-positive wealth
Data −0.91 0 0.78 3.97 11.22 0.29
Model −1.2 0 0.78 2.76 13.94 0.31
Note: This table shows the asset to quarterly labor income distribution both in the data and in the model. The
empirical distribution is calculated using the SIPP 2004 Panel, where assets include net liquid assets (defined to
be the sum of net financial assets, and equity in vehicles), and the market value of retirement savings (401k, 403b,
thrift plan, Individual Retirement Account (IRA), or KEOGH account). Details of the calculation can be found in
Appendix A.1.
taxes. This is equivalent to setting the new income tax schedule to be
T p (z) =
(
βTaxj + ξ
)
z + αTaxj
where ξ is used to balance the government’s budget under the new policy. Financing the
universal healthcare system would require a proportional tax increase of ξ = 0.043 under
the new steady state.
In order to solve for the transition path, I begin with the stationary distribution of the
calibrated economy under the baseline employer-based health insurance system. I then
introduce an unexpected and permanent shift towards a universal healthcare system. Along
the transition, interest rates and market tightness adjust to clear the capital and labor
markets period by period. The increase in taxes are introduced gradually and phased-in.
I assume a linear increase in taxes from the moment of policy implementation at time 0
until the end of the transition period.21
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1.5.1 Macroeconomic effects
To understand the effects of the policy change, I first compare two steady states, one under
the baseline economy and another under the universal healthcare system. Table 1.6 shows
the impact of the policy on important macroeconomic outcomes. The shift to a universal
policy results in a substantial decline in job-finding rates from 45 percent to 31 percent.
This is driven by both an increase in individual reservation wages as well as a decrease in
firm vacancy posting, as evidenced by lower equilibrium market tightness. Consequently,
the unemployment rate and the duration of unemployment rise. Furthermore, quit rates
also increase but not substantially. This is due to the fact that quitting becomes less de-
sirable when aggregate job-finding rates are low and it is more difficult to find a new job
once an agent leaves employment. Now that health insurance is no longer tied to employ-
ment, a large fraction of workers decide to leave the labor force, leading a 6 percentage
point increase in non-participation rates. This implies that in the baseline economy, a large
number of agents work because of health insurance as they experience the phenomenon of
“employment lock”.
The provision of generous insurance against medical expenditure risk also weakens precau-
tionary saving motives. This leads to a higher cost of capital and a roughly 8% decline in
average capital stock. As a result, output per worker YL is lower despite the slight increase
in average match TFP A (x, y). Match quality does not rise by much despite better sort-
ing. This is because even if workers become more selective in their choice of jobs, increased
labor market frictions decrease incentives to quit from poorly matched jobs.
Given these large effects of the policy change on labor market outcomes, it is also insightful
to check the change in lifecycle labor market transition profiles of households. Figure 1.5
plots the change in the age profile of UE and EU rates resulting from the policy reform.
I find that while job-finding rates decline across all ages, the response in job finding rates
is much larger to older individuals who face higher medical expenditure risk. This makes
health insurance much more valuable to this subpopulation, thus explaining why they are
more elastic to changes in public health insurance generosity. Meanwhile E-U rates over
the lifecycle do not change as drastically due to the small response of quits as mentioned
previously.
21Details of the computation of transitional dynamics are discussed in Appendix A.2.
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Figure 1.5: UE and EU rates: Baseline vs. universal health insurance policy
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Note: This figure plots the age-profile of unemployment-employment (UE) and employment-unemployment (EU)
transitions predicted by the model under the baseline policy and under the universal healthcare policy.
Finally, Figure 1.6 plots the transition path of selected macroeconomic outcomes. Un-
employment rate initially declines because firms relinquish the role of providing health
insurance and thus no longer pay premiums to insurance providers. The increase in reser-
vation wages are gradual because households first accumulate savings to smooth consump-
tion when unemployment duration increases after they increase reservation wages. Thus,
initially, the benefit of lower expenses (no premiums) dominates rising reservation wages.
However, when reservation wages finally dominate the decline in premiums, the unem-
ployment rate and job-finding rate begin to increase. Furthermore, the initial increase in
savings is only temporary and savings as well as aggregate capital stock eventually decline.
Holding firm vacancy posting fixed In order to understand the importance of in-
corporating firm responses to household labor supply decisions resulting from the policy
change, I consider a shift to a universal heatlhcare system when I hold market tightness θ
constant after the policy reform. The last row of Table 1.6 shows these effects. Compared
to the case where firms are allowed to endogenously respond to the reform, the decline in
job-finding rates and the increase in unemployment rate is more muted given that these
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Figure 1.6: Transitional dynamics
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Note: This figure plots the transition path of various macroeconomic outcomes upon introducing the universal
healthcare system in the economy at period 0.
are purely driven by labor supply responses. In contrast, the change in non-employment
rate is not very different compared to the endogenous firm model. This is because the
non-employment margin is less affected by aggregate job-finding rate p (θ) which is the
primary channel through which firm reduction in vacancies affect labor markets. Quit
rates, on the other hand exhibit a much larger response when firm decisions are treated
as exogenous. Holding aggregate job-finding rates p (θ) constant makes quitting attractive
because it overstates the probability of meeting a firm and finding a better job. When
we incorporate the decrease in firm vacancies by allowing market tightness to adjust, quit
rates do not increase as much as workers become more reluctant to quit to search for better
jobs.
1.5.2 Welfare effects
In the section, I explore the welfare implications of shifting to a universal healthcare system.
I pay close attention to the heterogeneity of welfare gains or losses across different types
of agents. First, I discuss how I measure welfare gains/losses and then I elaborate on the
results.
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Welfare Calculation
I measure the welfare effects of any shifting to a universal healthcare system by answering
the following question: how much additional lifetime consumption must be endowed to all
agents in an economy under the current policy so that average welfare will be equal to an
economy where the policy reform is implemented? This welfare measure is defined by the
consumption equivalent under the veil of ignorance between an economy under the current
policy and the proposed reform.
Let V Pt (s, λ) be the value of an agent with age t and state s in economy P if his consumption
is multiplied by (1 + λ) for the remainder of his lifetime. Formally, this can be written as
V Pt (s, λ) = E
T+TR∑
j=t
βj−t
T+TR∏
k=j
ϕkU
(
cPj (s) (1 + λ) , l
P
j (s) , h
P
j (s)
)
where cPj refer to the consumption policy function, and l
P
j and h
P
j refer to employment and
health status at age j when λ = 0. Here, λ is the additional percent consumption given to
the agent every period in economy P .
Let b denote the baseline (current) policy and n denote the new (universal policy). We
can compute the additional percent lifetime consumption λ¯ that makes the average welfare
equal across these two economies using the following equation:∫
t,s
V bt
(
s, λ¯
)
µ (t, s) =
∫
t,s
V nt (s, 0)µ (t, s)
where µ (t, s) refers to the stationary distribution of agents who are alive when the policy
is implemented.
We can also compute for conditional (ex-post) welfare for any agent with age t and state
s by calculating λ (t, s) that solves
V bt (s, λ (t, s)) = V
n
t (s, 0)
This measure of welfare asks whether the agent with age t and state s will be better/worse
off in an economy under the policy reform and thus allows me to study its the heterogeneous
welfare impacts
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Welfare Results
I find that the policy reform results in an aggregate welfare gain of λ¯ = 0.33 percent in
lifetime consumption equivalents. However, this small welfare gain masks substantial het-
erogeneity in welfare outcomes across heterogeneous households. Table 1.7 computes the
welfare gains/losses from the health insurance policy reform when households are grouped
by their asset and employment states based on the stationary distribution before the pol-
icy change. I find that welfare gains mostly accrue to wealthier households while welfare
losses accrue mostly to poorer and non-employed households. This result is driven by three
reasons. First, poorer households suffer the most from worsened labor market conditions.
Being close to borrowing constrained, it is precisely for these households for whom an
extra quarter of non-employment is very costly given their inability to self-insure against
employment risk. Households with sufficient levels of wealth benefit from higher job se-
lectivity and the provision of health insurance because they are able to withstand lower
aggregate job finding rates by using their available savings to smooth consumption during
non-employment spells. Second, it is typically low-wealth and low-income households who
are already covered by Medicaid in the current system. This further reduces the insurance
benefits of providing universal healthcare to this population. Finally, a proportional in-
crease in taxes impose a larger utility cost on poorer households for whom the marginal
utility of consumption is much higher.
To further corroborate this result, I show the distribution of welfare gainers and losers
across various dimensions of heterogeneity in Table 1.8. First, note that welfare losers tend
to be younger, healthier, and unskilled. While this subpopulation benefits the least from
access to health insurance due to low medical expenditures, they bear the burden of lower
aggregate job finding rates. Beyond the effects of longer unemployment spells, the inability
to find jobs affects the ability of younger workers to accumulate skills and grow their wages
over the lifecycle. The opposite is true for retirees. Welfare losers tend to be older retirees
with less savings but face the higher taxes brought about by the policy reform.
1.5.3 Tax burden
Given the substantial welfare losses incurred by low-wealth and non-employed households,
a natural question to ask is: what revenue-generating scheme would be welfare-improving?
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I answer this question by first introducing a new healthcare tax schedule TH (z) to fund
the additional expenses needed to finance the universal healthcare program while holding
other tax rates (income tax TP (z) and consumption tax τc) fixed to their original schedules.
To feasibly study this, I parameterize the tax schedule as in Heathcote, Storesletten, &
Violante (2014) when implementing the policy reform:
TH (z) = z − λHz(1−τH)
where λH defines the level of taxation, τH defines the progressivity of the new tax, and z
denotes gross income. For any proposed progressivity level τH , I adjust λH to balance the
government’s budget. Finally, I solve for the optimal progressivity of the new health tax
τ∗H and its implied λ
∗
H that maximizes the ex-ante welfare of the economy.
I find that the optimal revenue scheme is given by τ∗H = 0.33, implying a highly pro-
gressive healthcare financing scheme. This financing scheme raises ex-ante welfare gains
to 0.54 percent of lifetime consumption. More importantly, Table 1.9 shows that welfare
losses for low-wealth households are ameliorated by shifting the tax-burden of financing
universal healthcare towards richer households. This serves as a way to compensate poorer
households for the decrease in aggregate job-finding rates caused by the labor supply re-
sponses of other agents in the economy. In practice, this result implies that a shift to a
universal healthcare system will lead to better welfare outcomes if the additional fund-
ing is sourced from higher-income/higher-wealth households as opposed to a proportional
increase in payroll taxes or value-added taxes.
1.6 Robustness
Family insurance and COBRA In the baseline model, job losers are partially insured
against the loss of health coverage only through either Medicaid or the consumption floor
guarantee of government. In reality, these households have access to other forms of in-
surance such as coverage through a family member/spouse or being eligible for coverage
through a former employer as mandated by the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985.22 The prevalence of obtaining insurance either from a
22COBRA requires employers with more than 20 employees and provides health insurance to its employ-
ees to offer former employees the option of continuing this coverage. The option of COBRA is only given
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family member or COBRA will have implications on the insurance benefits of expanding
public health insurance programs. If the health risk of job losers are already well insured
by inclusion into these mechanisms, then a universal healthcare system will provide small
insurance benefits to these group of people.
In order to understand the extent to which family health insurance and COBRA are used
to insure against the loss of coverage upon job loss, I use the SIPP 2004 Panel data to
measure the likelihood that a job loser will switch to a family member’s health plan or
participate in a health plan administered a former employer. A respondent is defined
to be covered under a family’s health insurance plan if he/she reports being (1) insured
through a private health insurance plan, (2) covered under someone else’s plan, and (3)
covered under someone inside the household. Participation in COBRA, on the other hand,
is identified in the SIPP by selecting non-employed respondents who report being insured
through a private health insurance plan sourced from a former employer. I estimate the
distributed-lag regression specified in Equation 1.12 twice: one where the outcome variable
of interest is a dummy on health insurance coverage by a family member and another for
health insurance coverage through a former employer. Sample selection and the definition
of a job displacement is similar to Section 1.4.3. Panel A of Figure 1.7 shows that displaced
workers have a modestly higher probability of being covered by a family member relative to
the non-displaced group. The relative probability of inclusion into a family health plan rises
and peaks to around 4 percent at eight quarters after displacement.23 One potential reason
behind this is positive assortative matching in marriage which would imply that individuals
who are predisposed to displacement are more likely to be married with spouses in low-
paying jobs with limited access to employer-provided health insurance. In contrast, Panel
B of Figure 1.7 shows that the relative probability of obtaining health insurance from a
to workers who voluntarily or involuntarily terminate employment for reasons not due to gross misconduct
or to workers who experience a cut in hours. However, COBRA participants generally pay for the entire
premium themselves as opposed to active employees whose premiums are partially paid for by the employer.
23Note that the small increase in the probability of family coverage does not necessarily mean that
enrollment in a family member’s health plan is not prevalent. It merely indicates that among individuals
who are displaced, the incidence of switching to family coverage upon job loss is not widespread. Indeed,
there exists workers who to begin with are already under a spouse’s plan and when displaced, remains to
be under a spouse’s plan. Dey and Flinn (2008) find that in two-earner households, health insurance is
often only purchased (through their employer) by one of the spouses.
48
Figure 1.7: Alternative health insurance coverage upon job loss: Family and COBRA
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Note: This figure plots the coefficients from a distributed lag regression of coverage under a family member’s health
plan (Panel A) and undera former employer, i.e. COBRA (Panel B) on job-loss controlling for education, marital
status, number of children below 18, age, as well as fixed- and year-effects. Dashed-lines are confidnece intervals.
Data is obtained from the SIPP 2004 Panel.
former employer (COBRA) is around 10 percent upon job loss. However, access to COBRA
quickly diminishes and becomes close to zero 6 quarters after job loss. This is reflects the
fact that continuation coverage through COBRA typically expires after 18 months.
I now explore the implications of extending the model to incorporate family health plans
and COBRA as alternative sources of health insurance during non-employment spells.
To discipline the extended models, I use the measured take-up of each source of health
insurance documented above.
First, I consider an extension of the baseline model that incorporates the possibility of
acquiring health insurance through a family member upon job loss. I model family insur-
ance as a random probability γf of receiving coverage upon job loss. This probability is
set to be constant at 4% and only given to individuals who are not covered by Medicaid
to approximate the above finding. The coinsurance rate is set to be the same as EPHI.
As a simplification, I assume that family coverage is granted throughout an individual’s
non-employment spell. The covered medical expenditures of all agents enrolled in family
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plan is added uniformly to the premium payments paid by all firm-worker pairs that offer
health insurance. This captures the fact that the cost of family coverage is borne jointly
by both employers and employees.
The first row of Table 1.10 shows the labor market and welfare effects of a universal
healthcare system in the model with family health insurance. Given the small utilization
of spousal health insurance, it is unsurprising that job-finding rates decline by a similar
magnitude under a universal healthcare system when compared with the baseline model
specification. Similar effects can also be observed for both unemployment rates and non-
employment rates. Aggregate welfare gain declines slightly due to the lower insurance
benefits expanded coverage provides while agents in the bottom quintile of the asset dis-
tribution still suffer substantial welfare losses as in the baseline results.
In the next exercise, I extend the baseline model by incorporating the option of continued
coverage. COBRA allows employees who are separated from their job to purchase health
insurance at more affordable group premiums through their former employer. However, this
option typically expires roughly six quarters after job loss. To mimic these regulations,
I model COBRA as an option to purchase group health insurance by paying the group
premium wh, first made available at the moment of job loss with probability γ
COBRA24.
However, this option expires permanently with probability eCOBRA = 16 . The second
row of Table 1.10 shows that the substantial decline in job-finding rates and increase in
unemployment rate is preserved but is slightly muted because the presence of COBRA
raises the value of non-employment under the current system (and thus lowers the relative
increase in the value of non-employment under the universal healthcare system). The effect
on non-participation rates is identical to that of the baseline model because COBRA’s
expiration provides little value to the long-term non-employed who are comprised mostly
of non-participants. Finally, welfare gains are also much lower, again, because of lower
insuranc benefits universal healthcare provides given expanded access to alternative health
insurance sources such as COBRA in the current set-up.
24The group premium wh is adjusted accordingly to account for COBRA participants who take up the
offer. The availability of the continuation coverage option occurs with probability γCOBRA = 0.32 to
match an average take-up rate of 11% at the moment of job loss and capture the fact that some types job
separations and employers do not fall within the scope of COBRA.
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Segmented markets In the baseline model specification, all workers and firms meet in
a single labor market. This implies that the labor market behavior of, say, high-skilled
workers affects job-finding probability of low-skilled workers, through its effects on firm
vacancies. The extent to which labor markets are segmented can limit such externalities
and introduce differential aggregate job-finding rate responses to the policy reform across
segmented markets. In order to understand if the labor market and welfare effects are
robust to the single-market assumption, I extend the model by segmenting labor markets
by skill x. The extended model features two markets: low skilled x ∈ [x, xˆ] and high skilled
x ∈ (xˆ, x¯]. Under this set-up, there are two free entry conditions and thus two equilibrium
market tightness θL and θH which may have differential responses to the policy reform.
To map the two markets in the model to the data, I pick the threshold xˆ to match the
ratio of mean wages of workers with at least a college degree and workers with less than a
college degree which is 1.86 for the year 2006 in the SIPP 2004 Panel. The distribution of
administrative cost shocks Γ (x) is set equal to the baseline calibration, implying that the
low-skilled market will have less access to EPHI. Table 1.11 shows that job finding rates
under both markets decline significantly, but much more so for the low-skilled markets.
This is explained by the fact that low-skilled workers comprise of low-income and low-
wealth agents and a large fraction of the population who are on the margin (and thus
exhibit high elasticity) fall within this market.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper studies the macroeconomic and welfare effects of shifting to a universal health-
care system, paying particular attention to the reform’s effects on the labor market. The
expansion of public health insurance changes the relative value of non-employment to em-
ployment, which in turn determines non-employed individuals’ job search and acceptance
decisions, and employed individuals’ quit decisions. On the other side of the labor market,
these changes in the behavior of households affect the value of a vacancy and a filled job
for firms. Thus, firms react to this by endogenously adjusting the level of job creation. As
a result, while universal healthcare can insure against employment risk and health expen-
diture risk, these insurance benefits may be offset by potential incentive costs in the labor
market.
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To study the reform, I build a general equilibrium lifecycle model with incomplete as-
set markets, employer-provided health insurance and a limited government-funded means-
tested health insurance, and frictional labor market with two sided-heterogeneity. The
model is calibrated to match the distribution of individuals who are eligible of Medi-
caid and the joint distribution of wages and access to employer-provided health insurance
since these directly affect the insurance benefits and incentive costs of expanding publicly-
provided healthcare. Then, I compare the model-implied labor supply elasticities with
respect to public health insurance generosity to existing estimates from quasi-experimental
studies. I find that the model is capable of partially reconciling the wide-range of estimates
found in experiments conducted in Oregon, Wisconsin, and Tennessee and is consistent with
heterogeneous elasticities across income, age, health, and employment status.
Using the calibrated model, I conduct a policy experiment by introducing a universal
healthcare system that is funded through a proportional increase in taxes. I find that the
reform results in a substantial decline in aggregate job finding rates from 45 percent to 31
percent and concomitantly, higher non-employment rates and longer unemployment spell
durations, mostly due to lower vacancy posting rates of firms. The universal healthcare
system results in a small ex-ante welfare gain of 0.3 percent additional lifetime consump-
tion. However, I find that welfare losses coming from labor market effects accrue mostly
to wealth-poor individuals for whom lower aggregate job-finding rates and longer unem-
ployment durations are most costly since these households have severely limited ability
to self-insure against consumption fluctuations caused by unemployment risk. Finally, the
optimal revenue-generation scheme involves a highly progressive system where high income
households bear the brunt of the additional taxes.
These conclusions arise from the labor market effects of health care reform. Naturally,
health policy would affect other dimensions of the economy. For example, this study
abstracts from endogenous health spending, health goods markets and prices, as well as
non-monetary benefits of health, all of which merit a careful study in future research.
52
Table 1.6: Macroeconomic effects of universal heatlh care
Baseline Universal Universal (Vacancies Fixed)
Labor Markets
Job-finding rate % 45 31 37
Market tightness θ = vu 7.6 3.3 7.6
Unemployment rate % 4.9 6.2 5.5
Unemployment spell duration 2.1 2.8 2.5
Quit rate % 0.50 0.53 0.58
Non-participation rate % 25 31 30
Capital and Productivity
Annual interest rate % 3.4 3.6 3.6
Average capital stock 5.7 5.3 5.4
Average match TFP 2.21 2.24 2.27
Output per worker YL 3.40 3.35 3.39
Note: This table compares the macroeconomic outcomes between two steady states: i) an economy under the baseline
health insurance system vs ii) an economy under the universal health care system.
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Table 1.7: Welfare gains/losses by wealth and employment status
Asset Groups
Employment a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
Employed −0.41 −0.13 0.28 0.75 1.4
Non-employed −2.1 −0.39 −0.01 1.4 1.9
Note: This table presents the welfare gains/losses from the health insurance policy reform across households who
are grouped by their asset and employment states, where a1 to a5 represents the quintiles of the wealth distribution,
based on the stationary distribution before the policy change.
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Table 1.8: Distribution of Welfare Gains and Losses
Gainers Losers
Working Age
Age 47.1 35.7
Assets 8.3 3.9
Fraction of Healthy % 67 84
Fraction of Medicaid Recipient % 3 14
Skill 1.6 0.7
Fraction of Unemployed % 2.1 6.6
Retired
Age 69.2 78.1
Assets 19.9 8.5
Fraction of Healthy % 54 49
Note: This table compares the characteristics of households who enjoy welfare gains from the policy reform to
characteristics of households who suffer welfare losses from the policy reform.
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Table 1.9: Welfare Gains/Losses by Wealth and Employment Status under Progressive
Financing
Asset Groups
Employment a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
Employed 0.1 −0.05 0.39 0.47 1.1
Non-employed 0.4 −0.07 0.46 0.93 1.5
Note: This table presents the welfare gains/losses from the health insurance policy reform under the optimal pro-
gressivity of taxation scheme across households who are grouped by their asset and employment states, where a1 to
a5 represents the quintiles of the wealth distribution, based on the stationary distribution before the policy change.
Table 1.10: Family health insurance plans and COBRA
Job-finding Unemp. Non-part. Ex-ante a < p20
rate rate rate welfare welfare
Family health insurance 32% 6.1% 31% 0.32 −1.29
COBRA 34% 5.9% 30% 0.26 −1.82
Table 1.11: Segmented markets
Baseline Universal
Job-finding rate (low skill) 0.49 0.32
Job-finding rate (high skill) 0.36 0.29
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Chapter 2
How Should Unemployment
Insurance Vary Over the Business
Cycle?
2.1 Introduction
The sharp increase in unemployment during the Great Recession was associated with dra-
matic expansions to the unemployment insurance (UI) program. While intended to provide
adequate insurance to the large pool of jobless individuals, the question of whether UI pol-
icy played a quantitatively significant role in slowing the recovery of employment remains
at the center of discussion.1 Alongside this positive debate, an equally important policy
question emerges: how then should UI policy vary over the business cycle? Addressing this
question will shed light on how UI policy must adjust to economic fluctuations, especially
during economic downturns.
Our main contribution to the growing literature on optimal UI over the business cycle is to
study the endogeneous interaction between precautionary savings and changes in UI policy
1For example, Hagedorn et al. (2016) find that a generous UI policy during the recession is partly
responsible for the drastic and sustained rise in unemployment that followed. On the other hand, Chodorow-
Reich and Karabarbounis (2017) show that the extensions have had limited influence on macroeconomic
outcomes.
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over recessions and expansions, a mechanism that we show is crucial to correctly measure
the welfare benefits and costs of any proposed policy. This is because the level of wealth
determines not only the insurance value of any public transfer but also its incentive costs,
since the labor market behavior of individuals holding different levels of assets responds
in varying degrees to changes in the level of generosity of these programs. Moreover, as
wealth holdings and the strength of precautionary saving motives vary over the business
cycle, they inevitably influence the cyclicality of the insurance benefits and incentive costs
of UI payments. It is precisely the cyclicality of the net benefits of UI that will determine
how benefit generosity should vary over the business cycle.
We address this question using a heterogeneous agent job search model that incorporates
labor productivity driven business cycles and incomplete asset markets. To overcome the
computational difficulties encountered in models of this nature, we show that the model’s
market structure admits a block recursive equilibrium, a subset of recursive equilibria
where the endogenous distributions generated by the model are not part of the state space
(Menzio and Shi 2010, 2011). This allows us to compute the optimal UI policy in a model
with aggregate shocks and saving decisions.
We find that the optimal UI policy is countercyclical. In particular, when the aggregate
labor productivity is at its mean, it features a 30 percent replacement rate for 4 quarters.
When aggregate labor productivity is depressed by 3.5 percent, however, it offers more
generous benefits of a 54 percent replacement rate for 10 quarters, financed by higher
labor income taxes. Compared to a UI policy that mimics the policy implemented by
the U.S. government during the Great Recession, the optimal policy represents an ex-ante
welfare gain of 0.58 percent additional lifetime consumption.
The countercyclicality of the optimal policy is explained by how the insurance benefits of
extra UI payments expand during recessions relative to expansions while relative incentive
costs contract. Two important insurance benefit channels expand during recessions: (1)
consumption insurance against unemployment risk and (2) consumption insurance against
aggregate labor productivity risk. First, generous benefits insure against unemployment
risk by alleviating the consumption drop experienced by job losers. This is especially
important in recessions when unemployment rises and spells are prolonged. Second, it also
insures against aggregate risk since it reduces the burden of having to engage in (costly)
58
precautionary savings during economic downturns. Recessions trigger a strong need to
accumulate a buffer stock of savings, which in turn entails a concomitant reduction in
consumption. In the absence of public insurance, this makes consumption fluctuate heavily
with the business cycle. However, this effect is mitigated when individuals are promised
more generous payments for future unemployment spells.2 Remarkably, this results in
sizeable welfare gains not only for job losers but also for those who are employed.
Insurance benefits come with a trade-off: generous UI payments during recessions decrease
the job finding rates of the unemployed through a decline in job search effort and an increase
in the wages that they seek. This results in longer unemployment durations. However, we
show that these costs are relatively lower in recessions for two reasons: (1) the value of
job search is low during recessions, and (2) borrowing constraints impose discipline on the
unemployed’s job search behavior. First, the value of job search during recessions is low
because, to begin with, jobs are difficult to find and available jobs offer relatively lower
wages. Hence, even if generous benefits were to discourage job search during a recession,
the forgone search effort would not have been very productive anyway. Second, a reduction
in wealth holdings during recessions induces the unemployed to find a job more quickly as
they get closer to becoming borrowing constrained. In this sense, the presence of borrowing
constraints is a device to discipline the job search behavior of the unemployed. For both
of these reasons, the incentive costs associated with generous benefits are partially offset
in recessions.3
These channels remain active even under a high level of the opportunity cost of employment
calibration. In this case, we find that while the mean replacement rate and duration of
the optimal policy reduce to a 19 percent replacement rate for one quarter, the degree
of countercyclicality remains roughly similar. As fluctuations in consumption are less
pronounced under this calibration, the government implements a low replacement rate for
short durations when aggregate labor productivity is at its mean value. Still, insurance
benefits expand and incentive costs contract in recessions. Thus, the government finds it
optimal to transfer funds from expansions toward recessions. The resulting optimal policy
2This channel is consistent with Engen and Gruber’s (2001) empirical finding that UI payments crowd
out private savings.
3This result is consistent with Kroft and Notowidigdo (2016), who empirically find that the moral
hazard cost of UI is procyclical.
59
in this case provides ex-ante welfare gains of 0.25 percent lifetime consumption, which
is less than half of the welfare gains provided by the optimal policy under the baseline
calibration of the opportunity cost of employment.
We quantify various sources of ex-ante welfare gains of the optimal policy and find that
most of them are attributable to changes in consumption patterns, whereas the welfare
gains from economizing on relatively unproductive search during recessions are negligible.
These changes in consumption patterns can potentially increase ex-ante welfare for three
reasons: (1) an increase in consumption levels, (2) a decrease in consumption volatility,
and (3) a reduction in consumption inequality across individuals. We find large welfare
gains due to an increase in the average consumption level along the transition path after
the implementation of the optimal UI policy. This is because agents decumulate savings
and consume more of their labor income when public insurance is generous, and this effect
dominates the increase in labor income taxes. Steady state welfare decomposition reveals
that long-run welfare gains are attributable mostly to reduced consumption uncertainty,
but at the cost of lower consumption levels. The reduction in the consumption level is due
to higher taxes and lower wealth holdings once the economy converges to a new steady
state, although this change is not large enough to overturn uncertainty gains. Finally,
welfare gains due to a reduction in consumption inequality are small because the optimal
policy has two offsetting effects on consumption inequality. On the one hand, the redistri-
bution of labor income from workers to the unemployed creates more equal consumption
paths across heterogeneous agents. On the other hand, the optimal policy increases wealth
inequality in the stationary distribution. This is because while most of the individuals in
the economy under the optimal policy reduce their savings, the response of the agents in
the top percentiles of the distribution is very small. The rise in wealth inequality, in turn,
increases consumption inequality among heterogeneous agents. We find that these two
opposing effects quantitatively cancel each other out and thus result in negligible welfare
gains attributable to a decline in consumption inequality.
Next, we analyze the heterogeneous welfare effects of the optimal policy. Unsurprisingly,
the unemployed who are eligible for UI benefits gain significantly, with the poor within
this group enjoying the largest welfare gains, since each additional dollar of benefit pay-
ments is more valuable to them. Workers also enjoy a sizeable welfare gain, albeit to a
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smaller degree due to two opposing effects. Although they are the primary financers of the
increased government expenditures because of the generous policy, they also experience
large consumption smoothing benefits over the business cycle. Similarly, gains are also
much larger among poor workers for whom a reduction in precautionary savings diverted
toward consumption is most beneficial. Finally, the unemployed who are ineligible for UI
gain the least because they will enjoy benefits only if they find a job and become eligible
through the loss of that job. They are also adversely affected by lower job finding rates
during recessions without the insurance that UI provides.
When solving for the optimal UI policy, we follow a large strand of literature that uses
calibrated models to study the optimal policy for a restricted class of policy instruments.4
The model simultaneously matches the liquid asset-to-income distribution and salient fea-
tures of the labor market prior to the Great Recession. The policy instruments in our
welfare analysis are restricted to take the form of the UI replacement rate and UI payment
duration as functions of current aggregate labor productivity, and a constant labor income
tax used to balance the government’s budget for any proposed UI program.
Related Literature Our paper contributes to the growing literature on optimal UI over
the business cycle. Recent papers in this literature are Landais et al. (2017), Jung and
Kuester (2015), Mitman and Rabinovich (2015). However, in these models, risk-averse
agents do not have access to asset markets for self-insurance purposes.5 This assumption
has several important implications for the level and cyclicality of the insurance benefits
and incentive costs of any proposed UI policy. First, the insurance value of UI payments
for job losers is overstated because public insurance is the only way of smoothing con-
sumption upon job loss. Second, since the elasticity of search effort and the wage choice
of the unemployed are both decreasing in wealth holdings, a model that abstracts from
self-insurance altogether also overestimates the level of the moral hazard costs associated
4See Hansen and Imrohorog˘lu (1992), Acemoglu and Shimer (2000), Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2002), Wang
and Williamson (2002), Krusell et al. (2010), Koehne and Kuhn (2015), and Eeckhout and Sepahsalari
(2015).
5In addition to this difference, there are other important modeling differences between our paper and
these papers. For example, Jung and Kuester (2015) and Landais et al. (2017) do not consider UI expiration.
See Mitman and Rabinovich (2015) for a discussion on the implications of these assumptions.
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with introducing a more generous UI policy. Third, disregarding asset markets completely
eliminates the interaction between self-insurance and public insurance. Importantly, the
decline in precautionary saving motives as a response to a generous UI policy contributes
to the expansion of insurance benefits of UI in recessions because it also provides con-
sumption insurance against aggregate risk. The novelty of our analysis is to study this
endogenous response of the asset distribution to changes in UI policy over the business
cycle, which is crucial for the true measurement of the cyclicality of insurance benefits
of UI. Among these papers, our model is closest to Mitman and Rabinovich (2015) with
two differences: our model 1) allows for self-insurance through incomplete asset markets,
and 2) features directed search, making the model still tractable due to block recursivity
even under the presence of incomplete asset markets, whereas job search is random in their
model. In terms of welfare exercise, Mitman and Rabinovich (2015) are able to solve a
Ramsey problem to obtain the optimal UI policy as a function of the entire history of past
aggregate shocks, whereas we use our calibrated model to study the optimal policy for a
restricted class of policy instruments that only depend on the current period realization of
the aggregate shock in order to maintain tractability.
Another strand of literature studies the optimal design of UI policy under the presence
of asset markets. However, these papers use models that do not incorporate either unem-
ployment risk (Kroft and Notowidigdo 2016) or aggregate risk (Hansen and Imrohorog˘lu
1992, Acemoglu and Shimer 2000, Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. 2002, Wang and Williamson 2002,
Lentz 2009, Krusell et al. 2010, Koehne and Kuhn 2015, and Eeckhout and Sepahsalari
2015) or both features (Shimer and Werning 2008, Chetty 2008).6 Absent unemployment
risk, assets have no role for precautionary savings purposes, and they are simply used for
consumption smoothing until the single spell ends and a permanent job is found.7 Im-
portantly, we show in our model that saving decisions interact with the changes in UI
policy because wealth is a substitute for UI payments for self-insurance purposes. The
6Although the baseline model in Krusell et al. (2010) incorporates aggregate fluctuations, they study
the welfare effects of changes in UI policy in a steady-state experiment. The baseline model in Chetty
(2008) has no unemployment risk, but he presents an extension to incorporate it, and he shows that his
main results hold under extra assumptions.
7Typically, in these models, all agents are initially unemployed, and they decide when to accept a
permanent employment offer. These models are often called single-spell models.
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changes in saving decisions in turn significantly affect the search effort and wage choices
of the unemployed as well as the consumption patterns of everyone in the economy. On
the other hand, a model in which aggregate risk is absent makes the insurance value of
UI time-invariant. In our framework with aggregate risk, the strength of precautionary
saving motives significantly varies with the level of unemployment risk over the business
cycle. Incorporating this feature is especially important to understand the optimality of
time-varying UI policy.8
Finally, other papers investigate the impact of the Great Recession extensions of UI du-
ration on macroeconomic outcomes.9 Pei and Xie (2016) relax the perfect commitment
assumption and analyze the effects of time-consistent policy over the business cycle in a
model with search frictions but risk averse agents are not allowed to save or borrow. They
find that while benefit extensions resulted in higher unemployment, it provided welfare
gains ex post compared to a no-extensions policy. We show that even when government
can commit perfectly to its UI policy, the optimal policy is countercyclical when we account
for changes in precautionary saving motives over the cycle. Two recent papers study this
question in a framework with search frictions and incomplete markets. First, Nakajima
(2012) carefully models UI extensions during the Great Recession and its subsequent re-
covery using a model with business cycle dynamics and then measures the effect of these
extensions on the unemployment rate. He does not, however, study the welfare effects of
these changes in UI policy. We extend his model to a general equilibrium model in which
the government finances the UI benefits and use the model to study how UI policy must
vary over the business cycle. Second, Kekre (2017) studies the macroeconomic and welfare
effects of UI extensions during the Great Recession in a model with nominal rigidities and
8Our paper has other important features compared to these papers in the literature. In terms of
modeling, previous papers (except for Krusell et al. 2010 and Eeckhout and Sepahsalari 2015) use partial
equlibrium models of the labor market. In these models, the changes in aggregate conditions of the economy
or in UI policy do not affect firm hiring decisions and offered wages. In terms of welfare analysis, Shimer
and Werning (2008) use an optimal contracting approach to study the optimal variation of UI over the
unemployment duration. Chetty (2008) and Kroft and Notowidigdo (2016) find a locally optimal UI policy
in a welfare exercise that can be used only to calculate the marginal welfare effects of small changes in the
UI benefit level, relative to the observed UI benefit level in the data.
9See Hagedorn et al. (2016), Mitman and Rabinovich (2014), and Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis
(2017), among many others.
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constraints on monetary policy but without business cycle dynamics in the real business
cycle tradition. In his model, when the unemployed have a higher marginal propensity
to consume than the employed, generous UI policy increases the aggregate demand for
consumption both in the current period and in the previous period because individuals
endogenously reduce precautionary savings when they expect generous public transfers in
the future. As a result, he finds that UI extensions reduced the unemployment rate and
provided welfare gains during the Great Recession. Rather than only focusing on discre-
tionary UI policy changes during the Great Recession, we solve for the optimal UI policy
over the business cycle and find that it should be countercyclical even when business cycles
are completely exogenous and that UI policy has no role on smoothing these fluctuations
through its impact on aggregate demand. Complementary to his findings, we also show
that the endogenous response of precautionary savings to changes in UI generosity is key
to understanding the true welfare benefits and costs of UI benefits.
On the theoretical side, our model is a heterogeneous agent general equilibrium directed
search model of the labor market with aggregate labor productivity driven business cycles
as in Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011). The market structure enables us to overcome the
computational difficulties of solving a model of this type by utilizing the block recursive
equilibrium. We extend their framework by incorporating asset markets as in Herkenhoff
(2017) to study the optimal UI over the business cycle with endogenous wealth distribution.
To the best of our knowledge, our model is the first to study this question in a model
with endogenous wage determination, search frictions, incomplete markets, and aggregate
fluctuations.
This paper is organized as follows. We present our model in Section 2.2. Then, Section
2.3 describes the calibration strategy and model fit. Section 2.4 explains the calculation
of the welfare effects of various UI policies. Section 2.5 contains the main results. In
Section 2.6, we provide a detailed discussion on our results and conduct robustness checks.
Section 2.7 provides preliminary evidence from the micro-data that support the model’s
main mechanism. Finally, Section 2.8 concludes.
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2.2 Model
This section first introduces the environment of the model in Section 2.2.1. We then lay
out the problem of the household and firm in Section 2.2.2 and Section 2.2.3, respectively.
Next, we explain the government’s UI policy in Section 2.2.4. Finally, Section 2.2.5 defines
the equilibrium of the model and characterizes the job search behavior of the unemployed.
2.2.1 Environment
Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, .... Individuals are infinitely lived and ex-ante
identical, with preferences given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u (ct)− 1U
[
ν (st)
]]
where u (· ) is a strictly increasing and strictly concave utility function over consumption
level c that satisfies Inada conditions, 1U is an indicator function that takes the value of
one if the agent is unemployed, and ν (· ) represents the disutility associated with search
effort of the unemployed and is a strictly increasing and strictly convex function of search
intensity s. Moreover, βt is a stochastic variable that is idiosyncratic - i.i.d. across agents
- and describes the cumulative discounting between period 0 and period t. In particular,
βt+1 = β˜βt, where β˜ is a five-state, first-order Markov process as in Krusell et al. (2009).
The heterogeneity in discount rates allows us to match important features of the empirical
asset distribution, as we will discuss in Section 2.3.1.
In the model, individuals are heterogeneous in terms of their labor market status, asset
holdings, labor market earnings, and stochastic discount rate. An agent can be classified
into one of the following labor market statuses: a worker W , an unemployed individual
who is eligible for unemployment insurance benefits UE, or an unemployed individual who
is ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits UI.10
10Farber et al. (2015) find that UI extensions reduced the labor force exits by 20 to 30 percent during
2008-2011 and 2012-2014 respectively. Notice that even if our model does not incorporate a labor force
participation margin, we find that the optimal policy is countercyclical. As a result, given that UI genorosity
increases labor force participation, the welfare gains from the optimal policy actually constitute a lower
bound in our model.
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The labor market features directed search. Unemployed individuals direct their search
effort s ∈ [0, 1] toward wage submarkets indexed by w. Once matched with a firm within
submarket w, the household is paid a fixed wage w every period until the match exogenously
dissolves, as in Menzio and Shi (2010).11 Unemployed individuals who are eligible for
UI benefits receive a fraction of the wage they received during their last employment,
whereas the unemployed ineligible do not receive any benefits. In order to finance the
unemployment insurance program, the worker and unemployed eligible pay a fraction τ
of their wages/benefits to the government every period. In addition to labor earnings,
all households have access to incomplete asset markets where they can save/borrow at an
exogenous interest rate r.12 On the other side of the labor market, firms decide the wage
submarket in which to post a vacancy. Once matched with a worker, the firm-worker pair
operates a constant returns to scale technology that converts one indivisible unit of labor
into final consumption goods. All firm-worker pairs are assumed to be identical in terms
of their production efficiency; that is, the amount of production only depends on aggregate
labor productivity.
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of each time period t, aggregate
labor productivity p and the idiosyncratic discount rate β for each agent realize. The period
labor productivity level p completely determines 1) the UI replacement rate φ (p) ∈ [0, 1]
and the stochastic UI expiration rate e (p) ∈ [0, 1], and 2) the exogenous job separation
rate δ (p) ∈ [0, 1]. This implies that δ (p) fraction of those who were workers in t − 1 lose
their jobs and must spend at least one period being unemployed. Among those who lose
their job, e (p) fraction become ineligible for unemployment benefits. After the realization
of the exogenous shocks, there are two stages in each time period t where agents make
endogenous decisions.
First, in the labor market stage, firms decide the wage submarket in which to post a
11In Section 2.6.1, we extend our baseline model to endogenize the quit decisions of workers and explore
the quantitative implications of this assumption on our main results.
12We could endogenize the interest rate by modeling an asset market in which financial intermediaries
post asset returns in different locations and individuals look for saving/borrowing opportunities in these
different locations depending on their state variables. This is similar to Herkenhoff (2017). In our baseline
model, we abstract from this and assume a constant and exogenous interest rate. In Section 2.6.1, we
explore the quantitative implications of this assumption.
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vacancy, while the unemployed choose a wage submarket w within which to look for a job.
Second, the production and consumption stage of time t open where each firm-worker pair
produces p units of consumption goods, wages are paid to workers, UI benefits are paid
to eligible unemployed as a fraction φ (p) of their previous wages, and any unemployed
receive the monetized value of non market activities h.13 The households then make their
saving/borrowing decision. Finally, prior to time t+ 1, unemployed households decide the
search effort level s they will exert in the labor market stage of time t+ 1 where the utility
cost of that search effort is incurred at time t.
It is important to discuss the reasons why this environment is useful in answering our
question. Beyond the obvious features of the presence of incomplete markets, a UI pro-
gram, and equilibrium unemployment, we would like to consider an equilibrium model of
the labor market in which firm and household decisions are affected by both aggregate
fluctuations and changes in UI policy. This way, we are able to incorporate the moral
hazard costs of generous UI policies on the job search intensity and wage choice behavior
of the unemployed, as well as changes in the vacancy creation incentives of firms over the
business cycle. Moreover, directed search is useful not only because of tractability reasons
but also because of its implications for equilibrium efficiency. In particular, under some
conditions, the equilibrium is efficient in the directed search model but not in a random
search model with Nash bargaining.14 Hence, in our framework, the government insurance
program aims to fix the inefficiencies caused by incomplete asset markets.
2.2.2 Household problem
A household’s state vector consists of current employment status l ∈ {W,UE,UI}, net
asset level a ∈ A ≡ [a, a¯] ⊆ R, the current wage level w ∈ W ≡ [w, w¯] ⊆ R+ if the
13The variable h encompasses both the value of leisure/home production and other income such as
spousal and family income and other transfers. Our results would be similar if h is a utility value instead
of a monetary value.
14See Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001), Shi (2001), and Menzio and Shi
(2011) for the efficiency of directed search equilibrium. As discussed by Menzio and Shi (2011), however, the
equilibrium of our baseline model does not maximize the joint value of a match (and thus it is not bilaterally
efficient) because of the limitations in the contract space. In Section 2.6.1, we extend our baseline model
to a model with endogenous quit decisions and show that the effects of inefficiencies present in the labor
market of the baseline model on our main results are negligible.
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employment status is W or the wage level from the previous job if the employment status
is UE, and the current discount rate β ∈ B ≡ [β, β¯] ⊂ (0, 1).
The aggregate state is denoted by µ = (p,Γ), where p ∈ P ⊆ R+ denotes the current aggre-
gate labor productivity and Γ : {W,UE,UI}×A×W×B → [0, 1] denotes the distribution
of agents across employment status, asset level, current/previous wage level, and discount
rate. The law of motion for the aggregate states is given by Γ′ = H (µ, p′) and p′ ∼
F (p′ | p).
The recursive problem of the worker is given by
V W (a,w, β;µ) = max
c,a′
u (c) + βE
[
δ
(
p′
) (
1− e (p′))V UE (a′, w, β′;µ′)
+δ
(
p′
)
e
(
p′
)
V UI
(
a′, β′;µ′
)
+
(
1− δ (p′))V W (a′, w, β′;µ′) ∣∣∣β, µ] (2.1)
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r) a+ w (1− τ)
a′ ≥ −a
Γ′ = H
(
µ, p′
)
and p′ ∼ F (p′ | p) .
Notice in the above problem that the worker may not qualify for UI benefits with probability
e after losing her job due to exogenous job separation, which captures both voluntary and
involuntary reasons for job loss in our model. This feature intends to capture the fact
that according to the current UI policy in the United States, not all workers transitioning
into unemployment qualify for UI benefits. In particular, individuals do not qualify for
benefits if they voluntarily quit their job or if they do not meet certain work/earnings
requirements.15
The unemployed directs her job search effort toward a wage submarket indexed by w with
an associated market tightness given by θ (w;µ), which is an equilibrium object defined
later. Let f (θ (w;µ)) be the job finding probability for the unemployed who visits sub-
market w when the aggregate state is µ. Then, we lay out the recursive problem of eligible
15The unemployed must meet requirements for wages earned or time worked during an established period
of time referred to as the base period. In most states of the United States, this is usually the first four out
of the last five completed calendar quarters prior to the time that a UI application is filed.
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unemployed as follows:
V UE(a,w, β;µ) = max
c,a′,s
u (c)− ν (s) + βE
[
max
w˜
{
sf
(
θ
(
w˜;µ′
))
V W
(
a′, w˜, β′;µ′
)
+
(
1− sf (θ (w˜;µ′))) (1− e (p′))V UE (a′, w, β′;µ′)
+
(
1− sf (θ (w˜;µ′))) e (p′)V UI (a′, β′;µ′)]}∣∣∣β, µ] (2.2)
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r) a+ h+ φ (p)w (1− τ)
a′ ≥ −a
Γ′ = H
(
µ, p′
)
and p′ ∼ F (p′ | p) .
where the eligible unemployed receives a fraction φ of her previous wage as UI benefits and
pays τ fraction as labor income tax. As described earlier, she may lose her eligibility with
probability e if she is unable to find a job during the labor market stage of the current
period. When choosing the wage submarket to search for jobs, the unemployed individual
faces the trade-off between the level of surplus from a possible match (i.e., the wage level)
and the probability of finding a job because of the lower number of vacancies posted for
high-paying jobs.
Finally, the recursive problem of the ineligible unemployed is given by
V UI(a, β;µ) = max
c,a′,s
u (c)− ν (s) + βE
[
max
w˜
{
sf
(
θ
(
w˜;µ′
))
V W
(
a′, w˜, β′;µ′
)
+
(
1− sf (θ (w˜;µ′)))V UI (a′, β′;µ′)}∣∣∣β, µ] (2.3)
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r) a+ h
a′ ≥ −a
Γ′ = H
(
µ, p′
)
and p′ ∼ F (p′ | p) .
Notice that in the above problem, the unemployed ineligible is unable to regain eligibility
for UI benefits if job search fails. This captures the fact that according to current UI
policy in the United States, the unemployed receive UI benefits only for a certain number
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of weeks - which varies over the business cycle - and once that threshold is reached, the
unemployed cannot continue to collect UI benefits.
2.2.3 Firm problem
Firms post vacancies offering fixed wage contracts in certain wage submarkets. The labor
market tightness of submarket w is defined as the ratio of vacancies v posted in the submar-
ket to the aggregate search effort S exerted by all the unemployed searching for a job within
that submarket. It is denoted as θ (w;µ) = v(w;µ)S(w;µ) . Let M (v, u) be a constant returns to
scale matching function that determines the number of matches in a submarket with S level
of aggregate search effort and v vacancies. We can then define q (w;µ) = M(v(w;µ),S(w;µ))v(w;µ)
to be the vacancy filling rate and f (w;µ) = M(v(w;µ),S(w;µ))S(w;µ) to be the job finding rate in
submarket w when aggregate state is µ. The constant returns to scale assumption on the
matching function guarantees that the equilibrium object θ suffices to determine job finding
and vacancy filling rates since q (θ) = M(v,S)v = M
(
1, 1θ
)
while f (θ) = M(v,S)S = M (θ, 1).
First, consider a firm that is matched with a worker in submarket w when the aggregate
state is µ. The pair operates under a linear production technology and produces p units
of output, and there is no capital in the economy. The worker is paid a fixed wage of w
and with some probability δ (p), the match dissolves. Hence, the value of a matched firm
is given by
J (w;µ) = p− w + 1
1 + r
E
[(
1− δ (p′)) J (w;µ′) ∣∣∣µ] (2.4)
subject to
Γ′ = H
(
µ, p′
)
and p′ ∼ F (p′ | p) .
Meanwhile, the value of a firm that posts a vacancy in submarket w under aggregate state
µ is given by
V (w;µ) = −κ+ q (θ (w;µ)) J (w;µ) , (2.5)
where κ is a fixed cost of posting a vacancy that is financed by risk-neutral foreign en-
trepreneurs who own the firms.
When firms decide the submarket in which to post vacancies to maximize profits, they face
the trade-off between the probability of filling a vacancy and the level of surplus from a
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possible match. This is because if a firm posts a vacancy in a low (high) wage submarket,
then the level of the surplus from the match in that submarket will be higher (lower) for
the firm, but the probability of filling the vacancy will be lower (higher) as less (more)
unemployed individuals visit that submarket to search for a job.
The free entry condition implies that profits are just enough to cover the cost of filling a
vacancy in expectation. As a result, the owner of the firm makes zero profits in expectation.
Thus, we have V (w;µ) = 0 for any submarket w such that θ (w;µ) > 0. Then, we impose
the free entry condition to Equation (2.5) and obtain the equilibrium market tightness:
θ (w;µ) =
q
−1
(
κ
J(w;µ)
)
if w ∈ W (µ)
0 otherwise.
(2.6)
The equilibrium market tightness contains all the relevant information needed by house-
holds to evaluate the job finding probabilities at each submarket.
2.2.4 Government policy
The UI policy is characterized by {φ (p) , e (p) , τ}, where φ (p) is the replacement rate
and e (p) is the expiration rate, both of which may vary with current aggregate labor
productivity p.16 A labor income tax τ is levied on the labor earnings of the worker
and on the UI benefits of the eligible unemployed in order to finance the UI program.17
The benefit expiration rate e (· ) is stochastic, as in Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001),
Albrecht and Vroman (2005), Faig and Zhang (2012), and Mitman and Rabinovich (2015).
This assumption simplifies the solution of the model because we do not need to carry the
unemployment duration as another state variable for the eligible unemployed.
16We restrict the UI policy to depend on the aggregate state of the economy µ only through the cur-
rent aggregate labor productivity p and not through the distribution of individuals across states Γ. This
restriction allows our model to retain the block recursitivity, which we will explain in Section 2.2.5.
17We focus on the optimality of government policies that can be conditioned on the employment status
of the individuals so that the government policies provide insurance against unemployment risk. Also, if
the government finds it optimal to make transfers (by reducing taxes) during recessions, it can obviously
do this by increasing the UI replacement rate and duration. For these reasons, we consider time-invariant
income tax schedules in our analysis.
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The government balances the following budget constaint in expectation:18
∞∑
t=0
∑
i
(
1
1 + r
)t
×
[
1{lit=W} × wit + 1{lit=UE} × witφ (pt)
]
× τ
=
∞∑
t=0
∑
i
(
1
1 + r
)t
× witφ (pt)× 1{lit=UE} (2.7)
where the left-hand side is the present discounted value of tax revenues collected from the
labor income of workers and the unemployed eligible, and the right-hand side is the present
discounted value of UI payments to the unemployed eligible.
2.2.5 Equilibrium
Definition of the Recursive Equilibrium: Given a UI policy
{
τ, φ (p) , e (p)
}
p∈P
, a
recursive equilibrium for this economy is a list of household policy functions for assets{
gla (a,w, β;µ)
}
l={W,UE}
and gUIa (a, β;µ), wage choices g
UE
w (a,w, β;µ) and g
UI
w (a, β;µ),
search effort gUEs (a,w, β;µ) and g
UI
s (a, β;µ), a labor market tightness function θ (w;µ),
and an aggregate law of motion µ′ = (p′,Γ′) such that
1. Given government policy, shock processes, and the aggregate law of motion, the
household’s policy functions solve their respective dynamic programming problems
(2.1), (2.2), and (2.3).
2. The labor market tightness is consistent with the free entry condition (2.6).
3. The government budget constraint (2.7) is satisfied.
4. The law of motion of the aggregate state is consistent with household policy functions.
Notice that in order to solve the recursive equilibrium defined above, one must keep track
of an infinite dimensional object Γ in the state space, making the solution of the model
infeasible. To address this issue, we utilitize the structure of the model and use the notion
of block recursive equilibrium developed by Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011).
18This assumption is motivated by the fact that according to the current UI system in the United States,
states are allowed to borrow from a federal UI trust fund when they meet certain federal requirements, and
thus they are allowed to run budget deficits during some periods.
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Definition of the Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE): A BRE for this economy is
an equilibrium in which the value functions, policy functions, and labor market tightness
depend on the aggregate state of the economy µ, only through the aggregate productivity
p, and not through the aggregate distribution of agents across states Γ.
Now, we prove that our model admits block recursitivity.
Proposition 1: If i) utility function u (· ) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and
satisfies Inada conditions; ν (· ) is strictly increasing and strictly convex, ii) choice sets W
and A, and sets of exogenous processes P and B are bounded, iii) matching function M
exhibits constant returns to scale, and iv) UI policy is restricted to be only a function of
current aggregate labor productivity, then there exists a Block Recursive Equilibrium for
this economy. If, in addition, M = min {v, S}, then the Block Recursive Equilibrium is the
only recursive equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix B.2
Proposition 1 is very useful because it allows us to solve the model numerically without
keeping track of the aggregate distribution of agents across states Γ. One should be careful
when interpreting this result. Even though we can solve for the policy functions, value
functions, and labor market tightness independent of Γ, it does not mean that the distri-
bution of agents is irrelevant for our analysis. Notice that the evolution of macroeconomic
aggregates such as the unemployment rate, average spell duration, and wealth distribution
of the economy is determined by household decision rules in the labor market and financial
market. These decisions, in turn, are functions of individual states whose distribution is
determined by Γ. Hence, the evolution of aggregate variables after a change in UI policy
will depend on the distribution of agents in the economy at the time of the policy change.
Notice that if the UI policy instruments were to depend on the unemployment rate of the
economy, then it would break the block recursivity of the model. This is because agents
would need to calculate next period’s unemployment rate to know the replacement rate
and UI duration next period. However, this requires calculating the flows in and out of
unemployment, the latter of which depends on the distribution of agents across states Γ.
Although the changes in UI policy are triggered by the changes in the unemployment rate
according to the current UI program in the United States, the assumption that UI policy
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depends on aggregate productivity is not too restrictive because of the strong correlation
between the unemployment rate and aggregate labor productivity in the model.
Job search decision rules We now characterize the job search behavior of the unem-
ployed. This will supplement our discussions of the main results of the paper in Section
2.5.
Figure 2.1 plots the labor market behavior of the eligible unemployed holding various levels
of wealth under a less generous UI policy and a generous UI policy. It shows that the search
intensity is decreasing in wealth, whereas the wage choice is increasing in wealth for any
UI policy.19
Moreover, similar to Krusell et al. (2010), the marginal effect of an increase in assets
on wage choice and search effort is relatively higher for the borrowing-constrained unem-
ployed.20 While this result is unsurprising and intuitive, it highlights the importance of
accounting for wealth heterogeneity across agents, since the aggregate search effort and
wage levels in the economy now crucially depend on the underlying wealth distribution.
An economy where agents are relatively wealthy is likely to exhibit lower levels of aggregate
search and higher wages, whereas the opposite is true when wealth levels are low. Since
business cycles induce changes in precautionary savings and thus variation in aggregate
search effort and wage choices, the optimal design of UI policy over the business cycle
must account for this channel. For instance, in a recession where many individuals deplete
their existing wealth, this channel exerts an upward pressure on search effort and downward
pressure on wage choices as agents seek to find jobs more quickly. This effect dampens the
moral hazard costs induced by introducing a more generous UI policy during recessions,
since poorer agents tend to ramp up job-finding efforts themselves.
Next, a comparison of the two policy functions across UI policies highlights two important
points. First, generous UI payments entail incentive costs because they lead the eligible
19Notice that there is little dispersion across wage choices of the unemployed holding different levels of
wealth. Hornstein et al. (2011) show that frictional wage dispersion - measured by the mean-min wage ratio
- is very small in a directed search model. When calibrated to match the empirical asset distribution and
salient features of the labor market prior to the Great Recession in the United States, our model generates
a mean-min wage ratio of 1.034, in line with their conclusion (less than 1.05).
20These patterns are also present for the ineligible unemployed.
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Figure 2.1: Search effort and wage choice policy functions of the eligible unemployed
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Note: These figures plot the search effort and wage choice policy functions of the eligible unemployed holding different
levels of wealth for average levels of labor productivity, discount rate, and previous wage under a less generous and
a more generous UI policy.
unemployed to decrease their search effort and increase their wage choices.21 The combined
effect of lower search effort and a shift toward higher-paying jobs, which are more difficult
to find, results in a lower aggregate job finding rate and prolonged unemployment spells.
Second, the unemployed holding different levels of wealth respond in varying degrees to
changes in UI policy. Similar to Chetty (2008), wealthier agents are less responsive to
changes in UI policy because the insurance value of a marginal increase in benefits is less
important to them. This implies that a model that abstracts from self-insurance altogether
overestimates the level of the moral hazard costs of introducing a more generous UI policy.
The assumption that agents have no access to asset markets effectively raises the aggregate
elasticity of search effort and wage choice to changes in UI policy, since the most responsive
agents are precisely those with the least available self-insurance. As a result, it is crucial
for the model to match the observed asset distribution in the data in order to generate the
21This result is also established in the previous literature. See Shavell and Weiss (1979), Hopenhayn and
Nicolini (1997), and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), among many others.
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true magnitude of moral hazard costs in the model.
2.3 Calibration
We calibrate the stochastic steady state of our model to match salient features of the labor
market and asset distribution of the U.S. economy prior to the Great Recession. In doing
so, we feed into the model a constant replacement rate and expiration rate, which we call
the acyclical/flat policy.
The model period is taken to be a week. We use the following separable functional form
for the period utility function:
u (ct)− 1U [ν (st)] = c
1−σ
t
1− σ − 1U
[
α
s1+χt
1 + χ
]
,
which is also used by Chetty (2008) and Nakajima (2012). We restrict the values of
discount rates to be symmetric around an average value β¯ with a difference of η between
two adjacent values. Moreover, we allow β to take five different values. In our simulations
of the model, we set 40 percent of the population to the middle discount rate value and 10
percent to each extreme point in any time period. The expected duration of being in the
extreme discount rate value is set to be 50 years, where transitions can only occur between
adjacent values.
The labor market matching function is M (v, S) = vS
[vγ+Sγ ]1/γ
as in den Haan et al. (2000).
This CES functional form of the matching function implies that both the job finding rate
f (θ) = θ (1 + θγ)−1/γ and the vacancy filling rate q (θ) = (1 + θγ)−1/γ are between 0 and
1.
Following Shimer (2005), we use a process for the job destruction rate that depends only on
labor productivity, δt = δ¯ × exp (ω (pt − 1)), where δ¯ is the average weekly exogenous job
destruction rate in the data. These separation shocks can be interpreted as idiosyncratic
match quality shocks that drive down the productivity of a match to a low enough level
so that the match endogenously finds it optimal to dissolve, as in Lise and Robin (2017).
Moreover, the probability of this idiosyncratic event is correlated with the aggregate state
of the economy. As a result, this specification allows the model to capture the cyclicality
76
of employment-to-unemployment (E-U) transitions.22 We then calibrate ω so that the
volatility of quarterly E-U transitions in the model matches its data counterpart, which
we calculate using E-U transition rates measured by Fujita and Ramey (2009) for the time
period 1976:I-2005:IV.23
The logarithm of the aggregate labor productivity pt follows an AR(1) process:
lnpt+1 = ρlnpt + σt+1.
We take pt as the mean real output per person in the non-farm business sector. Using the
quarterly data constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for the time period
1951:I-2007:IV, we estimate the above process at a weekly frequency and find that ρ =
0.9720 and σ = 0.0025.
Next, we calibrate the replacement rate and expiration rate of the acyclical/flat policy by
matching the long-run empirical averages of U.S. government policy. First, we discuss the
calibration of the replacement rate. Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016) measure
the mean of pretax benefits per recipient as 21.5 percent of pretax marginal product.24
Under a mean take-up rate of UI benefits among the eligible unemployed of 65 percent,
this implies setting the mean of pretax benefits per recipient to 14 percent, since we do not
model UI take-up decisions given the completixity of our framework.25 Second, we take
the UI benefit duration as 26 weeks (2 quarters), which is the standard benefit duration
22Empirically, Elsby et al. (2009), Fujita and Ramey (2006, 2009), Yashiv (2007), and Fujita (2011a)
show that the separation rate into unemployment is countercyclical.
23The model-implied Beveridge curve, which plots the relationship between unemployment and vacancies,
exhibits a negative slope as in the data. This is because when labor productivity declines, firms cut back
on vacancies, which translates to lower job finding rates and higher unemployment. Moreover, the rise in
separation shocks further amplifies the increase in unemployment. As a result, unemployment and vacancies
move in the opposite direction.
24This value is consistent with a replacement rate level that accounts for the difference between wage
and total compensation, the difference between compensation and the marginal product, and the gap in
productivity and compensation between those receiving UI and the economywide average. In our model,
wages are not exactly equal to marginal product because of frictions, but the difference between the two is
small.
25Estimates in the literature for the fraction of all eligibles who receive UI range from 50 to 77 percent
using Current Population Survey (CPS) data for different samples. Fuller, Ravikumar, and Zhang (2013)
find that during the Great Recession, only about 50 percent of those eligible collected their benefits. Vroman
(1991) uses CPS supplements from 1989 and 1990 and finds 53 percent. Blank and Card (1991) estimate
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without extensions. Under the stochastic steady state calibration of our model, these two
numbers require us to set φt = 0.14 and et = 1/26 ∀t as the acyclical/flat policy.26 Then, a
labor income tax rate of τ = 0.36 percent balances the government budget in equilibrium
when the unemployment rate is 4.8 percent.
Having specified functional forms, the law of motion of the productivity process, and UI
policy, we now calibrate several parameters outside of our model. We choose a coefficient of
relative risk aversion σ = 2 and set r = 0.095 percent, which generates an annual return on
assets of around 5 percent. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) estimate the combined capital
and labor costs of vacancy creation as 58 percent of weekly labor productivity. Following
their estimate, we set the cost of vacancy creation as κ = 0.58.
We measure the average weekly job separation rate δ¯ using data from the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP) for the time period between 2005 and 2007. The SIPP
comprises individual level longitudinal data in which each respondent provides information
on monthly income and government transfers as well as weekly labor force status. We
restrict our sample to individuals between the ages of 24 and 65 who do not own a business
or derive income from self-employment. We classify the individual as employed (E) if
he/she reports having a job and either working or not on layoff, but absent without pay.
We classify the individual as unemployed (U) if he/she reports either having no job and
actively looking for work or having a job but currently laid off. We then calculate the
average E-U transition rate in the data where we account for seasonality by removing
weekly fixed effects and obtain δ¯ = 0.0022.
This leaves us eight parameters to be calibrated: i) the average value of discount rates β¯,
ii) the difference between two adjacent discount rates η, iii) the borrowing limit a, iv) the
the take-up rate as 71 percent for the period 1977–1987. Auray, Fuller, and Lkhagvasuren (2013) estimate
the average take-up rate as 77 percent from 1989 to 2012 using detailed state-level eligibility criteria.
Meanwhile, Anderson and Meyer (1997) use administrative data between the late 1970s and early 1980s
and find that the take-up rate is 54 percent for a subsample that represents mainly separations from mass
layoffs. In our baseline calibration, we set the take-up rate as 65 percent, which is around the mean of the
above estimates in the literature.
26In Section 6.1, we also calculate the welfare gains from the optimal policy under 40 percent of the
replacement rate (i.e., φ = 0.4 ∀t), which is the unadjusted replacement rate value calculated by the
Department of Labor. We show that the optimal UI policy still yields significant welfare gains relative to
the benchmark policy under this alternative high calibration of the replacement rate.
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level parameter of the search cost function α, v) the curvature parameter of the search
cost function χ, vi) the matching function parameter γ, vii) the separation rate parameter
ω, and viii) the monetized value of non-market activity h. We jointly calibrate these
parameters to match the following eight data moments, respectively: i) the median value
of liquid asset holdings relative to weekly after-tax labor income distribution, ii) fraction
of the population with non-positive liquid wealth, iii) the median value of the credit limit
to labor income ratio, iv) the average unemployment rate, v) the response of the average
unemployment duration to changes in the replacement rate, vi) the standard deviation of
the unemployment rate, vii) the standard deviation of the job separation rate, and viii)
the level of the opportunity cost of employment.
The first two moments related to the asset-to-income distribution is calculated from SIPP
2004 data and details are given in Section 2.3.1. Kaplan and Violante (2014) calculate the
median value of the credit limit to quarterly labor income ratio for households aged 22 to
59 as 74 percent using Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data. We choose the borrowing
limit parameter a so that the median value of the ratio of a to after-tax quarterly labor
income in the model is 0.74.
The average unemployment rate and its standard deviation are calculated from U.S. data.
In our baseline calibration, we choose the curvature parameter of the search cost function χ
so that a 10 percentage point increase in the replacement rate generates an increase of 0.5
week in average unemployment duration among the UI eligible, which is within the range
of available empirical estimates.27 Hence, this parameter is important because it controls
the magnitude of the incentive costs associated with the increase in UI payments.
Finally, Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016) use a complete markets model and
estimate the level of the opportunity cost of employment as 47 percent of the marginal
product of employment under separable preferences. We choose the monetized value of non-
market activity h so that the opportunity cost of employment generated by our model is
0.47. Given the incomplete markets model we have, to make the calibration comparable, we
only simulate agents from the top 1 percent of the stationary asset-to-income distribution
27See Nakajima (2012) for the summary of empirical estimates. We evaluate the welfare gains from the
optimal policy under different values of χ that match other levels of the available estimates in the literature.
We find that the welfare gains from the optimal policy remain similar for different values of χ. These results
are available upon request.
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Table 2.1: Internally calibrated parameters
Parameter Explanation Value Target Model Data
β¯ Average discount rate 0.9986 Median asset-to-income ratio 6.17 6.22
η Deviation from β¯ 0.0005 Frac. of pop. with non-positive wealth 0.27 0.27
a Borrowing limit −8.25 Median credit-limit-to-income ratio 0.74 0.74
α Level of search cost 5.02 Average unemployment rate 0.048 0.048
χ Curvature of search cost 1.49
Response of average unemp. duration
0.5 0.5
to changes in replacement rate
γ Matching function parameter 0.217 Std. dev. of unemployment rate 0.10 0.12
ω Separation rate parameter −14.3 Std. dev. of separation rate 0.18 0.16
h Value of nonmarket activity 0.342 Level of opportunity cost of emp. 0.47 0.47
Note: The average unemployment rate is calculated using monthly data between January 2005 and December 2007
provided by FRED - Federal Reserve Economic Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The average
standard deviation of the unemployment rate is reported in logs as quarterly deviations from an HP-filtered trend
with a smoothing parameter of 1600, using quarterly data between 1951:I–2007:IV provided by FRED. The same
procedure is applied to obtain the volatility of separation rates using data from Fujita and Ramey (2009) from
1976:I–2005:IV. The rest of the data moments are discussed in the main text.
when calculating the opportunity cost of employment using our model. This is because
the behavior of the very rich agents in the incomplete markets model converges to the
behavior of agents in the complete markets model. Section 2.3.2 explains how we calculate
the opportunity cost of employment in our model. Later in Section 2.6.2, we target 0.955
as an alternative level of the opportunity cost of employment, which is the value calibrated
by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), and discuss its implications for our main results.
Table 2.1 summarizes these calibrated parameters and compares the model’s match to
these data moments.
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2.3.1 Asset distribution
In addition to monthly data on income and government transfers as well as weekly data on
employment status, the SIPP also contains data on respondents’ asset holdings. In each
SIPP panel, respondents provide information on various types of asset holdings during
two or three waves within the panel, usually one year or, equivalently, three waves apart.
We use Wave 6 of the 2004 panel of SIPP, which covers interview months October 2005 -
January 2006 and is the wave closest to the Great Recession that provides wealth holding
information. We restrict our sample to individuals ages 24-65 and to those who neither
own a business nor derive income from self-employment.
We use individual net liquid asset holdings as our primary measure of wealth because of
its immediate availability as a means to smooth consumption in the event of job loss. The
net liquid asset holdings of an individual are calculated by adding transaction accounts
(checking, saving, money market, call accounts) and tradable assets (mutual funds, stocks,
bonds), and then deducting unsecured debt. We follow Koehne and Khun (2015) and
include net vehicle equity when calculating net liquid asset holdings. The reason is that
income can decrease substantially upon unemployment, and some unemployed could resort
to liquidating other forms of assets (i.e., the sale of vehicles) to smooth consumption upon
job loss.
To normalize wealth and better capture the level of self-insurance, we compute respondents’
asset-to-income ratio by dividing net liquid assets by weekly after-tax labor income.28
We determine after-tax income using the statutory income tax codes. Table 2.2 shows
the computed quantiles of the asset distribution in the data and model. The calibrated
model comes close to matching the empirical asset distribution. In particular, our model
reasonably captures the left tail of the distribution and at the same time exactly matches
the fraction of the population holding non-positive liquid wealth. Matching the left tail of
the distribution matters for our analysis because agents in this region of the distribution
are the most affected by changes in UI policy. Job losers with low wealth have little to no
28We use weekly employment status information to obtain weekly labor earnings from monthly labor
earnings data. We simply divide the monthly labor earnings by the number of weeks with a job for that
month to obtain weekly labor earnings. Appendix B.1 provides more details on the calculation of the asset
holdings and after-tax labor income.
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Table 2.2: Percentiles of the distribution of liquid asset holdings relative to weekly after-tax
labor income
Quantiles Fraction of population
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th with non-positive wealth
Data −8.59 0.00 6.22 20.23 56.57 0.27
Model −3.84 −0.85 6.17 33.32 42.46 0.27
Note: This table shows the liquid asset to after-tax labor income distribution in both the data and the model. The
empirical distribution is calculated by the authors using the SIPP 2004 Panel. The main text provides the details of
the calculation.
capacity to self-insure or smooth consumption using their own liquid assets and are thus
very sensitive to changes in unemployment insurance generosity.
2.3.2 Opportunity cost of employment
To calculate the opportunity cost of employment across individual and aggregate states, we
first derive surpluses obtained from moving from eligible unemployment to employment,
and from ineligible unemployment to employment separately. Let SUE
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
be
the surplus derived by an unemployed eligible with state
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
who transitions
into employment in a job that pays her optimal wage choice w˜
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
. Similary,
let SUI (a, β; p) be the surplus associated with moving from ineligible unemployment with
state (a, β; p) to a job that pays the optimal wage choice w˜ (a, β; p). We can then write
SUE
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
= V W
(
a, w˜
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
, β; p
)− V UE (a,wUE , β; p) (2.8)
and
SUI (a, β; p) = V W (a, w˜ (a, β; p) , β; p)− V UI (a, β; p) . (2.9)
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Now consider the same individual who loses the aforementioned job that pays w˜
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
.
We can define the next period surplus of an eligible unemployed as
S
(
a′W , w˜
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
, β′; p′
)
= V W
(
a′W , w˜
(
a′W , w˜
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
, β′; p′
)
, β′; p′
)
− V UE (a′W , w˜ (a,wUE , β; p) , β′; p′) , (2.10)
where the right-hand side is the difference in the value of again finding a job that pays
optimal wage choice w˜
(
a′W , w˜
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
, β′; p′
)
and remaining as unemployed eligible.
Similarly, the next period surplus for the ineligible unemployed is given by
SUI
(
a′W , β′; p′
)
= V W
(
a′W , w˜
(
a′W , β′; p′
)
, β′; p′
)− V UI (a′W , β′; p′) (2.11)
Evaluating V W , V UE , and V UI at a′W in Equations (2.10) and (2.11) restricts the contin-
uation surpluses to only that part associated with entering next period in the employed
state. Next, substituting (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3) into (2.8) and (2.9), we obtain
SUE
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
λW
= w˜
(
a,wUE , β; p
)× (1− τ)− (zUEflow + zUEa + zUEw + zUEelg )︸ ︷︷ ︸
zUE
(2.12)
+ βE
[
λ′W
λW
× (1− δ (p
′)− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′)))SUE (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)
λ′W
]
and
SUI (a, β; p)
λW
= w˜ (a, β; p)× (1− τ)− (zUIflow + zUIa + zUIw + zUIelg)︸ ︷︷ ︸
zUI
(2.13)
+ βE
[
λ′W
λW
×
(
1− δ (p′)− sf (θ (w˜ (a′UI , β′; p′) ; p′)))SUI (a′W , β′; p′)
λ′W
]
,
where λW is the the marginal utility of consumption for the worker. The opportunity cost
of employment zl for each unemployed type l = {UE,UI} consists of four components:
zlf low is simply the flow utility difference between a worker and an unemployed type l, z
l
a is
the change in value due to differential asset accumulation between the employed and the
unemployed type l, zlw measures the change in value due to wage differences that result
from the possibility of losing a job the next period and finding another job with a different
wage as opposed to keeping the same job, and finally, zlelg represents the difference in
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value due to changes in the likelihood of ineligibility. Appendix B.2 provides derivations
of these terms in detail.29 This calculation yields the opportunity cost of employment
zUE
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
and zUI (a, β; p) for each state. As discussed above, we then simulate
agents from the top 1 percent of the stationary asset-to-income distribution and calculate
a weighted average of the opportunity cost of employment among this group. We then
choose the monetized value of non-market activity h so that the average opportunity cost
of employment for the richest agents in our model is 0.47.
The derivations above show that the opportunity cost of employment in our model is
beyond the flow utility difference between the employed and unemployed. Importantly, our
calculation takes into account the dynamic effects of one period of additional employment
on the opportunity cost of employment. Intuitively, one period of additional employment
causes a relative decline in the budget, since the employed typically accumulate more assets.
However, entering next period with higher levels of wealth creates an offsetting gain in the
continuation value. Moreover, higher wealth holdings encourage the unemployed to search
for higher wages and thus increase the possibility of higher labor income. Finally, one
extra period of employment decreases the probability of ineligibility because the worker
must separate from his job first before being subject to eligibility risk, as opposed to an
unemployed eligible who constantly faces the risk of losing benefits. As a result, these
dynamic benefits of employment measured respectively by zla, z
l
w, and z
l
elg jointly dampen
the flow opportunity cost of employment zlf low.
30
29Our calculation extends the opportunity cost of employment derivation in Chodorow-Reich and
Karabarbounis (2016). In addition to the asset differential za in the incomplete markets version of their
model, we account for the wage differential zlw and ineligibility probability differential z
l
elg in our opportunity
cost of employment formula for each unemployment type l. In addition, za varies for each unemployment
type l in our setup.
30In our model, zla + z
l
w + z
l
elg is small for the richest agents, and thus z
l approaches zlflow in the
calibration. This is because the dynamic benefits of one period of extra employment have little value for
this group of agents. While disregarding these benefits does not affect the calibration of value of non-market
activity h, zla+z
l
w+z
l
elg is relatively large for poorer agents. Thus, it is crucial to account for these dynamic
benefits when calculating the opportunity cost of employment across different agents in the economy so
that the insurance benefits and the incentive costs of any proposed UI policy are correctly measured.
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2.3.3 Testable implications
In this section, we discuss our model’s implications for several important untargeted mo-
ments of the data. First, we measure the economy wide size and cyclicality of marginal
propensity to consume (MPC) as well as the average consumption drop upon job loss pre-
dicted by the model. These are then compared to available empirical estimates in the
literature. It is important for the model to generate a reasonable level and cyclicality of
MPCs and average consumption drop in order to properly measure the insurance benefits
of any proposed UI policy. For example, if the consumption drop were very low, then the
insurance benefit of UI would be understated. Second, we present how the model com-
pares to the data on labor market transitions, survival probabilities into unemployment,
and the aggregate impact of UI extensions on the unemployment rate. Generating transi-
tion rates and unemployment survival functions, that are in line with the data is crucial
to understanding the individual labor market response (incentive costs) of the unemployed
to changes in UI policy, and generating a reasonable response of the unemployment rate
ensures that the aggregate effects of UI are well accounted for. The following sections
present the results of these exercises.
Marginal propensity to consume
Figure 2.2 qualitatively demonstrates the consumption choices of agents across different
asset holdings and employment states. The unemployed not only consume less than workers
but also exhibit higher marginal propensities to consume. The differences in MPCs between
workers and the unemployed is most evident for agents holding little wealth, but this
differential eventually diminishes as wealth increases.
In order to quantitatively understand how MPCs differ across heterogeneous agents in the
economy, Table 2.3 presents the average quarterly MPC of different asset-to-income and
employment groups based on the stationary distribution of the economy. We compute
the MPC of an agent by calculating the fraction of an unexpected transfer, scaled such
that it is equivalent to $500, that an agent spends on consumption. As in Kaplan and
Violante (2014), we implement a $500 rebate in order to ensure consistency with available
empirical estimates that study the impact of tax rebates on consumption. Noticeably, the
poor unemployed ineligible exhibit the highest MPC given the absence of both public and
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Figure 2.2: Consumption policy function
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Note: This figure plots the consumption choices of agents with different employment statuses and asset holdings.
The wages of workers and the unemployed eligible are set to be the economy’s mean wage. Productivity and discount
rates are also set to their means.
private insurance. Across employment states, the unemployed have significantly higher
MPCs than workers, especially for agents in the lower end of the wealth distribution.
Meanwhile, for any given employment status, the MPC is decreasing in wealth holdings.
The empirical literature documents two aggregate MPC data moments that we can use to
validate our model. To do so, we calculate two untargeted average quarterly MPC moments
in our model using the stationary distribution of agents across states and compare it to
these available empirical estimates. Results are summarized in Table 2.4.
First, we find that the average quarterly economy wide MPC is 8 percent in our model.
On the empirical side, Parker et al. (2013) measure that households, under different
specifications, spend between 12 and 30 percent of unexpected tax rebates in the quarter
that they are received. Thus, the fraction of borrowing-constrained individuals who have
large MPCs as shown in Table 2.3 is too small to generate a sizeable response in the
aggregate in our model.31 Second, Gross et al. (2016) measure the cyclicality of the
31Notice that since our model generates a lower average MPC than its empirical counterpart, the house-
holds spend a relatively lower fraction of UI receipt on consumption. However, even if this is the case, we
still find that the optimal policy is countercyclical. Thus, welfare gains provided by the optimal policy can
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Table 2.3: Heterogeneous MPCs
Asset-to-Income Groups
Employment a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
Worker 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.04
Unemployed Eligible 0.34 0.18 0.12 0.07 0.04
Unemployed Ineligible 0.64 0.20 0.12 0.06 0.04
Note: This table shows the average quarterly MPCs of various type-groups, where columns represent agents with
varying asset-to-income ratios and rows represent agents of differing employment statuses. Individual MPCs are
calculated by computing the fraction consumed out of an unexpected $500 transfer. Asset-to-income groups are
a1 < p (10), a2 ∈ [p (10) , p (25)), a3 ∈ [p (25) , p (50)), a4 ∈ [p (50) , p (75)), and a5 ≥ p (75), where percentiles are
from the stationary asset-to-income distribution.
Table 2.4: Model fit of average MPCs
Model Data
Economy wide MPC 0.08 0.12− 0.30
MPC difference of borrowing-constrained between 2008 and 2011 0.08 0.08
Note: This table shows the average quarterly economy wide MPC, and the average semiannual MPC of borrowing-
constrained individuals between 2008 and 2011 implied by the model’s simulations. Individual MPCs are calculated
by computing the fraction consumed out of an unexpected $500 transfer. These model-generated average values are
then compared to available empirical estimates in the literature.
MPC by exploiting the unexpected changes in credit card borrowing limits of previously
bankrupt individuals and find that the MPC is countercyclical over the Great Recession. In
particular, they show that the average semiannual MPC difference of borrowing-constrained
individuals between 2008 and 2011 is 8 percent. Using the Great Recession simulation of
our model, we calculate the same moment and find that it is also 8 percent.32 Hence, while
the economy wide average MPC in our model is lower than its empirical counterpart, our
model replicates the observed variation in the average MPC over the business cycle. This
implies that our model successfully generates cyclical variation in the insurance value of
be considered as a lower bound.
32Section 2.5.1 explains the details on how we simulate the Great Recession using the model.
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Figure 2.3: Model fit
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Note: This figure shows our model’s implications for several important untargeted moments of the data. The main
text discusses the details of this comparison.
UI, which is crucial when studying the optimal design of UI policy over the business cycle.
Average consumption drop upon job loss
First, we compare the model-implied value of the average drop in consumption upon ex-
periencing a job loss to the available empirical estimates in the literature. To do so, we
estimate the following distributed-lag regression using the simulation data:
log (cit) = αi + γt + βait +
36∑
k=−4
δkD
k,
it + it, (2.14)
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where the outcome variable log (cit) is the logarithm of consumption of individual i in week
t, αi are coefficients on individual fixed effects, γt are coefficients on week fixed effects, ait
is the net asset level of individual i in week t, and the error it represents random factors.
The indicator variables Dkit identify all individuals k weeks prior to or after a job loss,
where k = 0 is the week of job loss. For instance, D4it = 1 for individual i who experiences
job loss at time t− 4, and zero otherwise.
Our treatment group consists of individuals who experience at least one job loss during the
simulation period. Thus, the control group consists of individuals who never lost their jobs.
Thus, Dkit = 0 for all weeks t for individuals who belong to the control group.
33 Thus, the
coefficients {δk}k∈{−4,...,36} measure the effect of job loss on consumption k weeks prior-to
or after the incident relative to individuals who do not experience any job loss. Panel A of
Figure 2.3 plots the estimated values for {δk}k∈{−4,...,36}. It shows that in the week of job
loss, consumption drops 14 percent on average and then slowly recovers over time.
Several papers in the literature estimated the average consumption drop upon job loss from
various data sources. Gruber (1997) finds a decline in food expenditure of 6.8 percent using
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the period up to 1987. Saporta-Eksten
(2014) uses cross-sectional variation in the PSID and estimates an 8 percent decline in
consumption expenditure in the year during which a job loss occurs.34 Stephens (2004) es-
timates the average decline in food expenditure upon job loss in the Health and Retirement
Survey (HRS) and the PSID and finds that the decline is between 12 percent (PSID) and
15 percent (HRS) when an individual experiences a job loss between interviews. Browning
and Crossley (2001) report a 14 percent decline using Canadian Out of Employment Panel
(COEP) survey data. Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016) conduct an analysis of
the effects of job loss on consumption in both the PSID and the Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CE) and find that the decline in total food expenditure is between 14 percent
(PSID) and 21 percent (CE). Finally, Aguiar and Hurst (2005) report a 19 percent decline
in food expenditure among the unemployed using scanner data.
33Notice that since the job loss event is exogenous in our model, simulated groups should not exhibit
any selection bias.
34However, this estimate does not condition on the fraction of the year spent as unemployed. When
we assume an average unemployment duration of 17 weeks, this would imply a decline in consumption of
around 24 percent.
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In summary, our model generates an estimate for the average decline in consumption upon
job loss that is in line with available empirical estimates in the literature.35
Labor market transitions
We focus on the employment-to-unemployment (E-U) and unemployment-to-employment
(U-E) transition rates implied by the model during the Great Recession and how they
compare with the data. This way, we are able to evaluate the model’s implications for
the cyclical patterns of labor market transition rates. Since the timing of SIPP panels
misses the rise in the E-U rate and the decline in the U-E rate during the first months of
the Great Recession, the transition rates in Panel B and C of Figure 2.3 are taken from
Current Population Survey (CPS) data as calculated by Kroft et al. (2016).36 First, Panel
B shows that the model is able to generate the initial rise in the E-U rate due to the rise
in exogenous job separations in the model. It is also able to match the observed slow
decline throughout the recovery, although the model-implied E-U rate decreases relatively
earlier due to the recovery of aggregate labor productivity and the resulting decline in job
separation shocks. Second, Panel C reveals that the model generates a smaller decline
in job finding rates at the start of the Great Recession relative to the drastic decline in
the data, but the levels of the model and the data become similar afterward. This is
because in the model, when labor productivity decreases and firms do not post vacancies
in submarkets offering high wages, the unemployed optimally direct their search effort
toward submarkets offering lower wages where job-finding rates are relatively higher. As
a result, the magnitude of the drop in the average job finding rate of the model during
economic downturns is relatively smaller than its data counterpart. This, however, does
35Notice that the magnitude of the average consumption drop upon job loss in our model is largely
controlled by the value of non-market activity h, which is calibrated to match the level of the opportunity
cost of employment. Hence, the result that our model generates a similar magnitude of the average con-
sumption drop upon job loss to the data lends support to our baseline calibration of the level of the value
of non-market activity h.
36Kroft et al. (2016) report that CPS transition rates are not consistent with the stock levels of unem-
ployment, employment, and non-participation. Then, they describe a procedure to adjust these rates so
that the transition rates become consistent with observed changes in stocks between months. The data also
account for seasonality by residualizing out month fixed effects and are smoothed by taking three-month
moving averages.
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not mean that the model underestimates the costs of recessions. While not as drastic as
the Great Recession, the drop in the job finding rate is still sizeable and is accompanied by
a significant decline in offered wages. Furthermore, even if the model generates a smaller
drop in job finding rates in response to changes in aggregate productivity, it generates
the observed elasticity of average unemployment duration with respect to changes in UI
generosity, as this is one of the data moments in our calibration. This is also evident in
Figure 2.8, where we show the impact of a countercyclical UI policy on the job finding rate.
Unemployment survival function
In the model, the likelihood of exiting from an unemployment spell depends on the aggre-
gate labor productivity as well as the unemployed agent’s choice of search intensity and
wage submarket. A useful summary of how long individuals spend unemployed is given
by the unemployment survival function, which shows the probability that an agent will
remain unemployed beyond a given unemployment duration.
First, we use the SIPP 2008 panel to measure the survival function in the data. We
restrict our sample to working-aged individuals age 24 to 65 who do not own a business
or derive income from self-employment. As in Rothstein and Valletta (2017), we require
at least one quarter of employment prior to the spell in order to focus on individuals
who have sufficient attachment to the labor market. Spells that are left-truncated and
spells with missing information for which we cannot ascertain the employment status of
the respondents are dropped. Finally, we define spells to be uninterrupted months of
unemployment and thus do not consider time spent out of the labor force, since we do not
model the non-participation margin. Panel D of Figure 2.3 shows that the unemployment
survival function generated by the model under the baseline calibration is close to its data
counterpart. While survival data exhibit sharp drops during early months, the model
survival function decays in a smooth fashion given the probabilistic nature of eligibility
and job-finding rates in the model.
Impact of UI extensions on aggregate unemployment
In order to understand the model’s predictions about the aggregate effect of benefit exten-
sions on the labor market during the Great Recession, we simulate the model for the Great
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Recession period with and without UI benefit extensions and measure the time path of the
unemployment rate. Panel E of Figure 2.3 shows that during the depth of the recession,
the model-implied unemployment rate would have been 0.6 percentage points lower in the
absence of benefit extensions.
The body of work that studies the impact of UI on macroeconomic aggregates has found
mixed results. Rothstein (2011) exploits variation in UI benefits across states with similar
economic conditions, the behavior of UI ineligible as a control group, and several other
strategies to address endogeneity problems in measuring the impact of UI on labor market
conditions. Using CPS data, he finds that UI extensions raised the unemployment rate
in early 2011 by only about 0.1 to 0.5 percentage points. Consistent with this finding,
Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2017) implement a novel empirical strategy by using
exogenous variation coming from measurement error in real-time state unemployment rates
and find that benefit extensions increased the unemployment rate by at most 0.3 percentage
points. Coglianese (2015) uses a similar strategy and also finds small effects. Meanwhile,
Farber and Valletta (2015) use variation in individuals’ time-to-exhaustion and find that
extended benefits account for an increase of around 0.4 percentage points in the 9 percent
unemployment rate in 2010. Valletta and Kuang (2010) find that in the absence of extended
benefits, the unemployment rate would have been about 0.4 percentage points lower at the
end of 2009, while Marinescu (2017) also finds small effects due to the reduced congestion
resulting in a higher job-finding rate of any given job application.
On the other hand, Hagedorn et al. (2016) highlight that benefit extensions lead to higher
equilibrium wages and thus lower vacancies. They also emphasize the role of firm expec-
tations on future UI policies when making vacancy or hiring decisions. Accounting for
this additional channel, they find that UI generosity increased the unemployment rate by
2.0 to 2.7 percentage points. This result is consistent with the findings of Johnston and
Mas (2016), who find large effects of reductions in UI duration on unemployment. Fujita
(2011b) also finds that extensions led to a substantial 1.2 percentage points increase in
male workers’ unemployment rate.
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2.4 Welfare Calculation
We measure the welfare effects of any proposed UI policy by answering the following ques-
tion: how much additional lifetime consumption must be endowed to all agents in an
economy where some benchmark policy is being implemented so that average welfare will
be equal to an economy where the proposed policy is implemented? In effect, we are
evaluating whether an alternate UI policy will be welfare improving when compared to
a benchmark policy, a natural choice being the actual UI policy implemented during the
recession. Henceforth, we will refer to the UI policy implemented by the U.S. government
during the Great Recession as the benchmark policy.37
Let b denote the benchmark policy and n denote the new/proposed policy. We can compute
the additional percent lifetime consumption p¯i that makes the average welfare equal across
these two economies using the following equation:∫
i
[
E0
∞∑
t=0
βitU
(
cbit (1 + p¯i) , s
b
it
)]
dΓss (i) =
∫
i
[
E0
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t=0
βitU (c
n
it, s
n
it)
]
dΓss (i) (2.15)
where cjit and s
j
it denote the consumption and search effort levels of agent i at time t under
UI policy j ∈ {b, n}, and Γss is the stationary distribution of the economy.
One can interpret the welfare exercise in Equation (2.15) as follows. Consider two countries
populated by people with the same type-distribution. The only difference between both
countries is that the government of the first country changes UI policy to policy b, while
the second changes UI policy to policy n. The question is how much additional lifetime
consumption p¯i should the first government compensate an individual who is behind the
veil of ignorance (i.e., does not know her initial type in the stationary distribution) in order
to make her indifferent between being part of one of these two countries? Thus, the best
UI policy n that the second government can implement is the one that makes the first
37During the Great Recession, the U.S. government increased the duration of UI payments to as much
as 99 weeks in some states but kept replacement rates almost constant. We set a duration of UI payments
that increases from 26 weeks (2 quarters) to up to 90 weeks (7 quarters) over the decline in aggregate
productivity p, while the replacement rate of UI payments is kept fixed at its long-run average of 14 percent
for all levels of p. This policy closely mimics the UI policy in the United States during the Great Recession
and its recovery, assuming the United States as a single state.
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government pay the highest compensation p¯imax to weakly attract this prospective citizen.
This policy will be the optimal UI policy.
We restrict the class of candidate UI policies to be linear in current productivity level p
such that φ (p) = qφ + mφp and e (p) = qe + mep. Under this restriction of UI policy
instruments, we search over five UI policy parameters (qφ, mφ, qe, me, τ) to solve for the
optimal UI policy.
In order to obtain ex-ante welfare gains/losses p¯i for each policy n, we begin from the sta-
tionary distribution of our calibrated economy Γss where (1) aggregate labor productivity
is constant at its mean level and (2) the unemployment benefit policy is fixed at a 14 per-
cent replacement rate and 26 weeks expiration, which we call the acyclical/flat UI policy f .
In each economy, an unanticipated but permanent policy change toward benchmark policy
b and proposed policy n, respectively, is implemented. Given any guess of p¯i, we can now
compute for both sides of Equation (2.15) by integrating over the stationary distribution.
We then solve for the p¯i that equates both sides of Equation (2.15) and select the UI policy
that yields the highest welfare gain p¯imax as the optimal UI policy.
38
2.5 Main Results
We find that mφ = −6.44, qφ = 6.75, me = 0.34, qe = −0.32, and τ = 1.06 percent,
implying that the optimal UI policy should be countercyclical in both replacement rate
and duration. These values imply that the optimal policy offers a 30 percent replacement
rate for 4 quarters when aggregate labor productivity is at its mean value, and a 54 percent
replacement rate for 10 quarters when aggregate labor productivity is depressed by 3.5
percent. This means that the optimal policy offers a more generous replacement rate for a
longer duration compared to the U.S. government’s UI policy during the Great Recession,
which provided 14 percent of the replacement rate for around 7 quarters of payments for
the same drop in labor productivity. Compared to this benchmark policy, the optimal
policy increases welfare by 0.58 percent additional lifetime consumption for all agents.
Meanwhile, compared to an acyclical policy that offers 14 percent of the replacement rate
for 2 quarters for all levels of aggregate labor productivity, the optimal policy yields a
38Given the functional form of the utility function, there is no closed-form solution for p¯i.
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welfare gain equivalent to 0.74 percent additional lifetime consumption.39
These welfare gains from the optimal UI policy are much larger when compared to welfare
gains of eliminating the business cycle obtained by Lucas (1987), who finds that the welfare
of an infinitely lived representative agent increases by only 0.008 percent in consumption
equivalents for logarithmic preferences if cycles are removed. A more relevant comparison
to our model is Krusell et al. (2009), who extend this analysis in an incomplete asset
markets model with heterogeneous households and study the welfare effects of eliminating
both aggregate risk and its impact on idiosyncratic risk when there is a correlation between
these two shocks. They find that the welfare gains of eliminating the cycle and its effect on
idiosyncratic risk are as much as 1 percent in consumption equivalents for the same period
utility function. Importantly, they show that the effect of business cycles on idiosyncratic
risk has great quantitative consequences. Specifically, if one does not correctly integrate
out the effect of cycles on idiosyncratic risk, then the welfare gains of eliminating cycles are
only slightly larger than those calculated by Lucas (1987). Similar to Krusell et al. (2009),
our model features aggregate shocks and incomplete asset markets in which aggregate risk
significantly affects the magnitude of idiosyncratic risk, as job finding and job separation
rates are functions of aggregate labor productivity. Both models are also similar in that
households are heterogeneous in terms of their employment status, discount rates, and
wealth holdings. These similarities suggest that welfare results in their study are a useful
benchmark against our model. In our model, optimal UI smooths aggregate shocks by
introducing cyclicality into the generosity of benefits and also attenuates idiosyncratic
unemployment risk by providing higher benefit levels on average. Nonetheless, as the
optimal UI policy in our framework can only partially smooth the effect of cycles on
consumption, welfare gains are much lower than the upper bound provided by Krusell et
al. (2009).
The following discussions elucidate on the sources and distribution of welfare gains brought
about by the countercyclical policy. First, we simulate the Great Recession using our model
and compare how consumption patterns and labor market aggregates differ between the
optimal policy and an acyclical policy. This will provide useful insight about the insurance
39To obtain this number, we repeat the welfare calculation procedure in Section 2.4 where we set the
benchmark policy b as the acyclical/flat policy f . In this case, the first country continues to implement UI
policy f , while the second country changes it to the optimal UI policy.
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benefits and incentive costs of the countercyclical optimal policy, especially when a recession
triggers more generous benefits. We then proceed to quantitatively decompose ex-ante
welfare gains of the optimal policy attributable either to changes in consumption patterns
resulting from altered saving and wage choices, or to changes in the search intensity exerted
by the unemployed. Finally, we look at ex-post welfare outcomes among heterogeneous
agents in order to understand how welfare gains are distributed across agents with different
employment statuses and wealth holdings.
2.5.1 Great Recession exercise
We now use the Great Recession as an interesting test case that allows us to understand the
insurance benefits and incentive costs associated with the countercyclical optimal policy. In
order to discipline this exercise, we take as given the U.S. government’s UI extension policy
during the Great Recession and then pick the realizations of aggregate labor productivity
to match the unemployment rate from December 2007 to December 2013 – the period that
spans the beginning of the recession until the time when the Emergency Unemployment
Compensation Act of 2008 (EUC08) was no longer renewed. Matching the realized unem-
ployment rate by imposing that government policy mimics benefit extensions during the
Great Recession is important, since using the model’s aggregate labor productivity alone
to match the unemployment rate disregards the fact that more generous UI policies im-
plemented during the recession and recovery may have contributed to the heightened level
of unemployment. Thus, in this exercise, the drop in labor productivity triggers lower job
finding rates, higher separation rates, and longer benefit durations, all of which contribute
to the rise in unemployment. Figure 2.4A shows the realizations of the labor productivity
process that we obtain from this procedure, while Figure 2.4B compares the unemployment
rate generated by the model to its counterpart in the data.40
In this exericse, we consider two economies that both experience the Great Recession
between December 2007 and December 2013 but differ in the UI policy that is implemented.
40We acknowledge that labor productivity in the data during the Great Recession did not decline in a
similar way. However, given that labor productivity in our model is the only source of aggregate fluctuations,
we place more emphasis on matching the observed unemployment rate and less on the manner by which we
do it. While we call the decline in p “labor productivity shock”, it can stand in for other forms of shocks
such as TFP, aggregate demand, or financial shocks.
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Figure 2.4: Labor productivity and unemployment rate
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Note: Panel A shows the labor productivity series that we use in our model to generate the observed time series of
the unemployment rate in the data during the Great Recession. Panel B compares the paths of the unemployment
rate in the data and the model.
In both economies, the simulation begins under the stationary distribution.41 At t = 0, we
introduce a recession to both economies by feeding the labor productivity series into Figure
2.4A. It must be noted, however, that agents use the AR(1) process to take expectations on
labor productivity. One economy introduces the optimal policy o, and the other maintains
the less generous acyclical policy f . In both cases, the policy change is unanticipated by
agents. This is a reasonable assumption, as UI extensions during deep recessions (such
as the EUC08) are typically beyond the scope of pre-existing triggers that households are
aware of. This policy change is permanent and will thus apply the same UI policy to future
fluctuations of the same magnitude.
In the following sections, we separately analyze the consumption-smoothing benefits and
41We select the number of agents to simulate N to be large enough such that p¯i does not change with
further increases in N . We find that N = 120, 000 is sufficient for this goal.
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incentive costs of the optimal policy if it had been implemented during the Great Reces-
sion and compare them to that of the acyclical policy.42 We place emphasis on how the
cyclicality of these benefits and costs rationalizes a countercyclical optimal policy.
Insurance Benefits
Consumption Smoothing Upon Job Loss We first show the effect of the optimal UI
policy on the consumption drop experienced upon job loss. We ask what would happen to
the consumption profile of agents who experience a job loss in the economy that introduces
the optimal policy and the economy that remains under the acyclical policy. The compar-
ison of consumption profiles across these two economies will reveal the welfare benefits of
the generous optimal policy coming from smoothing consumption between E-U transitions.
Using model-generated data, we run the same distributed-lag regression in Equation (2.14)
for each economy.
Figure 2.5 compares the consumption drop upon job loss between an acyclical policy and
the generous optimal policy. On average, the consumption drop upon job loss is 15 percent
under the acyclical policy, and 9 percent under the optimal policy, implying that the decline
is 6 percentage points less under the optimal policy. This simply demonstrates the role
of UI in dampening large fluctuations in consumption when job loss occurs, an insurance
benefit on which the literature has traditionally focused. Moreover, this lower drop in
consumption upon job loss is enjoyed by a larger number of agents in a recession due to
the higher incidence of unemployment and longer spells during which wealth is depleted.
As a result, the insurance value of UI payments in smoothing consumption upon job loss
is larger in recessions.
Note that the reduction in the consumption drop is the net effect of two opposing forces: a
more generous UI policy (1) directly increases consumption upon job loss due to higher ben-
efits but also (2) indirectly crowds out precautionary savings. The first channel raises public
insurance and thus decreases the consumption drop, while the second channel decreases
self-insurance and thus increases the consumption drop as individuals enter unemployment
42Comparing the optimal and acyclical policies makes the illustration of the idea clear, as the acyclical
policy offers the same replacement rate and duration across different realizations of the aggregate state.
The intuition provided by the exercise also holds qualitatively when comparing the optimal policy with the
benchmark policy.
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Figure 2.5: Average consumption drop upon job loss
-4 0 4 12 20 28 36
0
5
10
15
20
25
Pe
rc
en
t 
D
ro
p
A. All
-4 0 4 12 20 28 36
Weeks
0
5
10
15
20
25
B. Poor
-4 0 4 12 20 28 36
0
5
10
15
20
25
C. Rich
Acyclical Policy
Optimal Policy
Note: Panel A plots the path of the average consumption drop upon job loss between 4 weeks prior to job loss
and 36 weeks after the job loss. Two different consumption profiles are obtained from a distribution-lag regression
in Equation (2.14) using model-generated data under the acyclical policy and the optimal policy. Panels B and C
repeat this exercise for poor and rich agents experiencing job loss. “Poor” refers to agents who enter unemployment
with an asset-to-income ratio below the 75th percentile of the stationary asset-to-income distribution, while “Rich”
refers to those above the threshold.
with less wealth. In addition, notice that the recovery of consumption is slightly faster
under the acyclical policy given how agents are forced to find jobs more quickly compared
to an economy where the optimal policy is implemented.
It is also insightful to understand the effect of the optimal policy on the consumption
drop upon job loss among rich and poor households. In Figure 2.5, we group individuals
based on their asset-to-income ratio at the moment of job loss when the acyclical policy
is implemented and then plot their consumption profiles. The first group consists of those
who enter unemployment with an asset-to-income ratio below the 75th percentile of the
stationary asset-to-income distribution, while the second group consists of those above that
threshold. Using the same grouping (and the same job destruction shocks), we calculate
the consumption drop that individuals would have experienced had the optimal policy been
implemented instead. Panels B and C of Figure 2.5 demonstrate substantial heterogeneity
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in the consumption-smoothing benefits agents derive from the optimal policy. Among the
poor, the consumption drop is reduced by around 12 percent, while for the rich, it is only
around 4 percent. This result highlights the need to carefully calibrate the model’s wealth
distribution to match the data in order to correctly evaluate the true magnitude of any
proposed policy’s insurance benefits.
In summary, the optimal policy provides substantial insurance against E-U transitions, the
magnitude of which varies significantly across the wealth distribution. More importantly,
these benefits are larger during recessions simply because more agents experience job loss
and remain unemployed for longer durations during which wealth declines.
Consumption Smoothing over the Business Cycle Although the insurance benefits
of UI are traditionally seen to accrue mostly to job losers, we show in this section that in the
presence of aggregate shocks and incomplete asset markets, UI also provides consumption-
smoothing benefits even to those who do not lose their jobs. Under this framework, UI
policy plays an important role in smoothing consumption over the business cycle. In order
to demonstrate this channel, consider for the moment a worker in an economy that does
not have a UI program. When a recession occurs, the worker anticipates that there is a
higher risk of losing her job and that the unemployment spell is likely to be prolonged
given the persistence of negative shocks. In the absence of government insurance, the
worker self-insures by cutting back on consumption in order to build a buffer stock of
savings that she could use to attenuate the impact of potential job loss. This means
that consumption fluctuates heavily with aggregate fluctuations even if job loss does not
actually occur. This reaction is simply a manifestation of the inefficiencies resulting from
over-saving in an incomplete markets model, relative to its first best. The government
then uses its UI program to reduce the excessive precautionary saving behavior of workers
by promising higher public insurance during times when the unemployment risk is large
in order to bring the economy closer to the efficient allocation. When UI is generous
during recessions, individuals are relieved of the burden to reduce consumption in order
to build savings, since UI makes the prospect of losing one’s job less painful. This further
contributes to the expansion of insurance benefits during recessions because it is precisely
during this time when excessive precautionary saving behavior is triggered. While this
channel is also present in previous models with incomplete markets, the literature on the
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optimal design of UI over the business cycle has not quantified the effect, possibly because
of computational difficulties, which we are able to overcome.
Panel A of Figure 2.6 demonstrates this channel by comparing the average consumption
of the economy during the Great Recession under the optimal and acyclical UI policies.
It reveals that average consumption is much smoother under the optimal policy. The
large drop in consumption at the onset of the recession when UI is acyclical is caused
precisely by agents diverting consumption toward savings. This is corroborated by Panel
A of Figure 2.7 which plots the average wealth of job losers during the first week of entering
unemployment. At the start of the recession when labor productivity starts declining, it is
clear that workers in the economy under the acyclical policy engage in precautionary savings
due to the higher risk of losing a job and staying unemployed for longer durations. Thus,
we see that average asset holdings upon entering unemployment rise during this period and
only begin to decline during the recovery. In the case of the optimal policy, however, the
need for precautionary saving is offset by the generous UI payments, implying that agents
enter their unemployment spell with less self-insurance compared to their counterparts
under the acyclical policy. The same idea is also apparent in Panel B of Figure 2.7, which
plots the evolution of various percentiles of the asset distribution when a recession hits both
economies. It shows that the level of precautionary savings under the generous optimal
policy is markedly muted. Furthermore, similar to the consumption-smoothing benefits
upon job loss, consumption smoothing through this channel is also cyclical. It is stronger
during recessions precisely because it is during this time when precautionary saving motives
are strong and thus significant cuts in consumption occur.
Next, we analyze the consumption-smoothing benefits of the optimal policy over the busi-
ness cycle for agents with varying wealth levels. To do this, we again group agents based
on their asset-to-income level at the start of the Great Recession. The first group consists
of agents whose asset-to-income level at the start of this period is below the 75th percentile
of the stationary asset-to-income distribution, while the second group comprises of those
above this threshold. Panels B and C of Figure 2.6 then plot the average consumption paths
of these two groups over the Great Recession. Comparing average consumption paths un-
der the acyclical and optimal policies shows intuitively that the consumption-smoothing
benefits of the optimal policy over the business cycle are largely different for poor and rich
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agents. While the optimal policy improves consumption smoothing for the poor, it does
not for the rich, as they are already well insured.
Incentive Costs
While the optimal policy provides consumption-smoothing benefits to a large fraction of
agents in the economy, it also induces certain moral hazard costs. This section discusses
the magnitude of these costs associated with introducing the optimal UI policy vis-a-vis the
acyclical UI policy. First, we look at how these costs manifest through lower job-finding
probabilities and thus longer durations in unemployment. Second, we discuss how the
magnitude of these moral hazard costs varies over the business cycle.
When a more generous UI policy is implemented, the unemployed eligible reduce their
search effort and ask for higher wages because of an increase in the opportunity cost of
employment. To provide a useful summary of the combined effects of both margins, in
Figure 2.8, we look at how job finding rates and survival in unemployment change between
the two economies. Panel A demonstrates that job finding rates during the recession shift
downward when the optimal policy is introduced. Meanwhile, Panel B plots the Kaplan-
Meier estimates of the unemployment survival function under both policies, as described in
Section 2.3.3. The lower job finding rates result in the outward shift of the unemployment
survival function under the optimal policy when compared to that of the less generous
acyclical policy. This simply means that the likelihood that a duration will last beyond
t months is always higher in the economy under the optimal policy. For instance, the
probability that an unemployment spell will last beyond one month is around 40 percent
under the acyclical policy, whereas it goes up to 60 percent under the optimal policy.
It is now evident that the optimal UI policy induces nontrivial costs through lower job-
finding rates and thus longer unemployment durations. However, what is key to determin-
ing the optimal policy over the business cycle is the cyclicality of the size of these moral
hazard costs, that is, how they expand and contract over the business cycle.
First, the value of job search is cyclical. A forgone unit of search during a recession is less
costly than a forgone unit of search during a boom because jobs are difficult to find during a
recession and conditional on finding a job, wages are likely to be lower as well. This means
that while an extra dollar of benefits received during a recession induces the unemployed
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to search less, this reduction in search effort is not as costly compared to when the same
dollar is received in an expansion during which firms are posting a lot more vacancies at
higher wages. The cyclicality of the value of search effort is evident in Panel A of Figure 2.9
which shows that the consumption value of a unit of search effort is markedly lower during
a recession compared to a boom. The same message is conveyed in Panel B, which shows
that the average value of job search drops during the Great Recession and rises during the
recovery for both eligible and ineligible unemployed, although the change is larger for the
eligible unemployed, as they are the direct recipient of UI payments.
Second, wealth effects that discipline job search are more likely to manifest during reces-
sions. For any given UI policy, recessions generally lead to prolonged unemployment spells
during which agents draw down their assets to supplement consumption. Getting closer to
their borrowing constraints, the unemployed have a higher incentive to ramp up their job
finding efforts through a combination of higher search intensity and lower wage choices,
as they seek to find work more quickly. This is evident in the household decision rules in
Figure 2.1, which shows that for every unit of the decline in asset holdings at the time
of unemployment, there is a disproportionate increase in search effort and decline in wage
choices as the unemployed get closer to becoming borrowing constrained. Simply put, the
presence of borrowing constraints acts like a self-disciplining device for job search efforts
of the unemployed during recessions. As a result, the moral hazard costs are dampened
by the fact that agents are more ill-prepared in terms of their own private savings during
recessions.
In summary, while a generous UI policy decreases the job finding rate and increases the
average unemployment spell duration, these moral hazard costs are partially offset in reces-
sions because the consumption value of job search is low during recessions, and the decline
in asset holdings in recessions incentivizes the unemployed to ramp up their job search.
This result is consistent with Kroft and Notowidigdo (2016), who empirically find that the
moral hazard cost of UI is procyclical.
2.5.2 Welfare decomposition
The Great Recession exercise in the previous section demonstrates the qualitative effects
of the optimal policy on individual decision rules as well as the aggregate outcomes. We
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now proceed to quantitatively decompose the welfare contribution of the aforementioned
changes. The ex-ante welfare gains of the optimal policy can be decomposed into either
its effects on consumption coming from changes in savings and wage choices or its effects
on the search intensity exerted by the unemployed. In order to isolate the welfare gains
attributable to changes in consumption from those attributable to search effort, we shut
down endogenous search decisions in the model.43 This version of the model is then re-
calibrated and used to evaluate the welfare gains coming from the countercyclical optimal
policy. When policy has no effects on search intensity, welfare increases by 0.56 percent of
additional lifetime consumption for all agents relative to the benchmark policy. Thus, the
welfare gains of the optimal policy attributable to changes in search effort are negligible.44
As a result, we conclude that the welfare gains come largely from changes in consumption
patterns.
Having isolated the welfare gains attributable to search, we then want to understand how
the optimal policy changes consumption patterns in the model without endogenous search
effort. Our first step is to disentangle welfare gains along the transition from the long-run
(steady state) gains. To do this, we make a slight but important modification in Equation
(2.15). In particular, we change Γss to Γb (where b denotes the benchmark policy) on the
left-hand side, and Γss to Γn on the right-hand side, where n is set to be the optimal UI
policy. This implies that the first economy has implemented the benchmark policy, while
the second economy has implemented the optimal policy for a very long time so that these
two economies are in their respective steady states. We then ask an unborn agent who does
not know her type within the respective stationary distributions which economy she prefers
to live in. The ex-ante steady state welfare gains/losses from the optimal policy piss are
then given by the percentage of additional lifetime consumption that the first government
43We do this by assuming that the unemployed searches for a job full-time, (i.e., s = 1), without incurring
a disutility from search effort, (i.e., α = 0).
44The result that changes in UI policy have small effects on the job search intensity of the unemployed
is consistent with previous empirical evidence in the literature. For example, Ashenfelter et al. (2005) find
that low job search effort is not a significant source of UI overpayments using evidence from randomized
trials in four U.S. sites. Recently, Hagedorn et al. (2016) carefully analyze the effect of changes in UI policies
on both the search intensity of unemployed workers (the micro effect), and the aggregate job finding rate
per unit of search effort through vacancy posting decisions of the firms (the macro effect). They also find
a small micro effect.
104
should compensate this agent in order to make her indifferent between being part of one of
these two economies. We find that piss = 0.18, which is smaller than the welfare gain with a
transition of 0.56. This result suggests sizeable welfare gains along the transition from the
economy under the acyclical policy to the economy under the optimal policy. We know from
our earlier analysis that the optimal policy reduces the precautionary saving motives, as
agents substitute away from self-insurance to public insurance for consumption-smoothing
purposes. As a result, agents decumulate savings and consume more of their labor income
along the transition path. This increase in consumption is enough to overcome any rise
in taxes brought about by the policy change, thus providing large welfare gains along the
transition.
Next, we decompose the steady state welfare gains of the optimal policy. In particular, un-
der a utilitarian equally weighted social welfare function as in Equation (2.15), the optimal
policy can increase steady state welfare for three reasons: (1) an increase in the average
consumption of the economy (the level effect), (2) a decline in the volatility of individual
consumption paths (the volatility effect), and (3) a decline in inequality across individual
consumption paths (the egalitarian effect). Following Floden (2001), the welfare gain from
the optimal policy under the steady state comparison can be decomposed approximately
into (1), (2), and (3):
piss = (1 + pilev) (1 + pivol) (1 + piegal)− 1. (2.16)
Comparing the average consumption level of economies under the optimal and benchmark
UI policies, we find that average consumption is 0.18 percent lower in the steady state of
the optimal policy, (i.e., pilev = −0.18). This is because once the economy converges to a
new steady state with lower wealth holdings and higher taxes, consumption levels decrease.
On the other hand, we find that the optimal policy significantly reduces the volatility of
average consumption and that there are sizeable welfare gains because of this channel.
On average, we find that pivol = 0.35, which implies that uncertainty gains overcome any
reduction in long-run consumption levels. This is again due to the endogenous response
of saving decisions to changes in UI policy over the business cycle. Recall from our Great
Recession exercise in the previous section that the government uses its UI program to
reduce the excessive precautionary saving behavior of workers by implementing a generous
UI during times when unemployment risk is large in order to bring the economy closer to the
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efficient allocation. Therefore, the impact of fluctuations in aggregate labor productivity
on the consumption path of individuals is lower under the optimal policy relative to that
under the benchmark policy. This smoother consumption profile over the business cycle
provides significant welfare gains. Finally, we find that piegal = 0.01, implying that there
are negligible welfare gains from the optimal policy due to equalizing the consumption
paths across heterogeneous agents. However, this result masks the two opposing effects
of the optimal policy on the inequality across individual consumption paths. On the one
hand, generous UI payments to the unemployed and higher income tax rates create more
equal consumption paths across heterogeneous agents and thus increase piegal. On the other
hand, the steady state asset distribution under the optimal policy is more unequal than
its counterpart under the benchmark policy. This is because while most of the individuals
in the economy under the optimal policy save less, the response of the agents in the top
percentiles of the distribution is very small. As a result, the Gini coefficient of the asset
distribution increases from 0.68 under the benchmark policy to 0.91 under the optimal
policy. This rise in the inequality of the steady-state wealth distribution in fact reduces
piegal, as it makes individual consumption paths across heterogeneous agents more unequal.
We find that these two opposing effects quantitatively cancel each other out, and thus on
average piegal is small.
45
2.5.3 Heterogeneous welfare effects
While the previous section decomposes the average ex-ante welfare gains into various mech-
anisms at work in our model, it is also insightful in understanding which type of agents
stand to gain or lose from the optimal policy compared to the benchmark policy. In order
to measure the ex-post heterogeneous welfare gains/losses from the optimal UI policy, we
group agents by their employment status and asset level based on the stationary distribu-
tion. We then calculate p¯i from Equation (2.15) for each group by only integrating over
agents that belong to each group.
45The welfare decomposition exercise presented here can be modified to incorporate the effects of tran-
sition on pilev, piunc, and piegal. The reason why we decompose the welfare gains across two different steady
states is to isolate the long-run effects of the optimal policy as the policy change is permanent. However, we
also did this exercise with transition and find that the level gains in consumption from the optimal policy
are large because of the decline in savings along the transition.
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Table 2.5: Heterogeneous welfare impacts of optimal policy
Asset Groups
Employment a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
Worker 0.73 0.67 0.58 0.53 0.52
Unemployed Eligible 1.89 1.55 1.28 0.96 0.84
Unemployed Ineligible 0.61 0.58 0.55 0.50 0.51
Note: This table shows the heterogeneous welfare gains from the optimal policy on various type-groups, where
columns represent agents holding various levels of assets and rows represent agents of differing employment sta-
tuses. Welfare numbers are in percent lifetime equivalent consumption terms. Asset groups are a1 < p (10),
a2 ∈ [p (10) , p (25)), a3 ∈ [p (25) , p (50)), a4 ∈ [p (50) , p (75)), and a5 ≥ p (75), where percentiles are from the
stationary asset distribution. Gains are calculated relative to the benchmark policy.
Table 2.5 shows the heterogeneous welfare impacts of the optimal policy on various type-
groups, where columns represent agents holding various levels of assets (set to be the
different ranges in the asset distribution) and rows represent agents of differing employment
statuses.
It is clear that the unemployed eligible stand to gain the most from the optimal policy.
This result is unsurprising, since the unemployed eligible are the direct beneficiaries of more
generous payments and durations, and thus enjoy the largest consumption-smoothing gains.
Intuitively, among the unemployed eligible, poorer individuals also enjoy larger welfare
gains compared to their richer counterparts, given how each additional dollar of benefit
payment is more valuable to them.
Consistent with our earlier discussion, the unemployment eligible are not the sole beneficia-
ries of the optimal UI policy. Workers also enjoy a sizeable welfare gain, albeit to a smaller
degree, because of two opposing effects. On the one hand, workers maintain smoother con-
sumption over the business cycle given the weaker need to engage in precautionary savings
afforded to them by optimal UI benefits; on the other hand, they are the primary financers
of the optimal UI policy and would thus face higher taxes and lower consumption levels.
Nonetheless, the ability to maintain smoother consumption during economic fluctuations
dominates the financing effect. Note that if we had not accounted for this benefit, then we
would expect workers to experience welfare losses, as they would be paying taxes without
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enjoying the benefit of being able to smooth consumption over fluctuations in aggregate
labor productivity. Unsurprisingly, welfare gains are also much larger among poor workers
for whom savings (and the corresponding forgone consumption) is most costly.
Meanwhile, the unemployed ineligible only receive the generous UI payments in the event
that they find a job, lose it, and become eligible, which is a small probability. While they
do not contribute to financing the optimal UI policy, they incur costs because of lower
job-finding rates resulting from the generous UI payments. Having to spend longer weeks
without benefits and being forced to exert more effort in finding a job results in this group
experiencing the lowest gains from the optimal policy.
2.6 Robustness
2.6.1 Welfare under different specifications
In this section, we compute the welfare gains or losses from the optimal policy relative
to the benchmark policy under different specifications of the baseline model. In these
exercises, whenever a change in parametrization is necessary, the model is recalibrated to
match the moments found in Section 2.3 and tax rates are adjusted under each UI policy
so that the government budget constraint holds in equilibrium. The nature of the first
three exercises in this section requires us to simulate a recession in order to compute the
welfare gains. To preserve consistency within this section, we report the welfare gains of
the remaining specifications under a scenario in which a recession occurs initially as well.
The results are summarized in Table 2.6.
First, in order to quantify how welfare gains change depending on the timing of the policy
change, we evaluate the welfare gains from the optimal policy when the policy change is
introduced at the onset of a recession. This exercise follows the Great Recession simulation
discussed in Section 2.5.1 where an unanticipated UI policy change is implemented. The
only difference here is that for the first economy, the benchmark policy b is introduced at
t = 0, whereas in the alternate economy, the optimal UI policy is implemented.
We modify the welfare criterion in Section 2.4 slightly, as we now require a simulation-
based welfare calculation. Additional details regarding the computational procedure are
provided in Appendix B.3. We compute for p¯i in Equation (2.15) modified to account for
108
the recession that occurs right at the same time the policy change is made and find that the
optimal policy increases ex-ante welfare by 1.25 percent additional lifetime consumption
relative to the benchmark policy. The welfare gains of the optimal policy are unsurprisingly
much higher when the policy is implemented right before a sharp drop in aggregate labor
productivity, since there is a frontloading of gains coming from large net insurance benefits
provided during the recession. At the onset of a recession, stronger precautionary motives
cause larger drops in consumption, and a larger pool of unemployed individuals experiences
the consumption drop upon job loss. This is in contrast to welfare gains of 0.58 when we
do not take a stance on the realizations of aggregate productivity.46
The second exercise we perform considers how welfare gains change if the policy were
temporary. While we study permanent changes in the UI benefit schedule, our framework
is also useful to assess the welfare effects of discretionary fiscal policies such as the one
implemented during the Great Recession. We now assume that the optimal policy is only
implemented during the period of the Great Recession, and it unexpectedly reverts back
to the acyclical policy f at the end of this period. This is to closely pattern the simulation
of the model to the events that occurred during the Great Recession where the EUC08
was completely terminated in December 2013 and UI policy returned to what it had been
prerecession. We find that the welfare gains from the optimal policy become 0.83 percent
additional lifetime consumption relative to the benchmark policy. The difference between
this value and welfare gains when the policy change is permanent (1.25 percent) reveals
that around 35 percent of the total welfare gains are attributable to the expectation of
generous UI payments during future economic downturns.
Third, we test the quantitative effects of assuming a time-invariant interest rate r on the
welfare gains from the optimal policy. In this exericse, we consider an interest rate that
varies with the state of the economy such that it is procyclical and closely mimics its data
counterpart during the Great Recession.47 Under this exercise, we find that the optimal
46Furthermore, when the government implements the optimal policy right before a boom, we find that it
increases ex-ante welfare by 0.23 percent additional lifetime consumption relative to the benchmark policy.
Given that the optimal policy raises welfare more when implemented right before a recessiom compared to
that of a boom provides strong evidence about the countercyclicality of insurance benefits net of incentive
costs.
47The weekly real interest rate reduces from its baseline value of 0.00095 to −0.0003 at the depth of the
Great Recession. This way, we are able to measure the quantitative effects of significant changes in the real
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Table 2.6: Welfare gains under different specifications
Exercise
Welfare gains (%)
from the optimal policy
Great Recession simulation 1.25
Temporary policy change 0.83
Procyclical interest rates 0.64
Endogenous quit decisions 1.10
Replacement rate φ = 0.4 0.77
UI eligibility requirements 0.94
Permanent discount factor 1.24
Note: This table shows welfare gains from the optimal policy under different specifications of the baseline model.
Welfare numbers are in percent lifetime equivalent consumption terms. Gains are calculated relative to the benchmark
policy under a labor productivity series that generates the observed unemployment rate time path during the Great
Recession.
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policy yields a welfare gain equivalent to 0.64 percent additional lifetime consumption
relative to the benchmark policy. The reason for the reduction in welfare gains from 1.25
percent to 0.64 percent is that the decline in the real interest rate reduces precautionary
saving motives during recessions, making agents’ consumption profiles relatively smoother
over the business cycle even under a less generous benchmark policy. This reduces the
welfare gains from the optimal policy. While the welfare gains under a recession are reduced
to half their original value, the countercyclical optimal policy still provides substantial
gains. Moreover, given that interest rate fluctuates drastically with the state of the economy
in this exercise, this result places an upper bound on the likely effects of endogenizing
interest rates.
Fourth, we address the feature of the baseline model where a matched worker receives the
same wage throughout her tenure within a firm. These fixed-wage contracts introduce “job
lock” since an unemployed individual who is desperate for work may land a low-paying
job during a recession but be unable to switch to a higher-paying job unless the match
exogenously dissolves. This feature of the model may be a source inefficiency that the op-
timal policy is trying to correct, since generous benefits during recessions can nudge agents
toward looking for higher-paying jobs. Hence, generous benefits during recessions not only
may be providing consumption insurance but also may serve as a means of convincing the
unemployed to look for jobs that will be paying higher even after the recession ends. In or-
der to understand whether the optimal UI policy is also correcting inefficiencies introduced
by the fixed-wage contract assumption of the baseline model, we solve for the welfare gains
of the optimal policy in an extended model that allows for endogenous quits.48 In this
extended model, workers can choose to quit their jobs in order to begin searching for a new
job. Under this setup, the artificial job lock problem is eliminated, as workers who place a
higher value on the option of becoming unemployed and looking for a higher-paying job can
actually leave their employer. The model details and a modified computational algorithm
can be found in Appendices B.4 and B.5, respectively. The welfare gains under the model
with endogenous quits is given by 1.10 percent when the optimal policy is implemented at
the onset of the Great Recession. Introducing endogenous quit decisions into the model has
interest rate.
48Without the fixed-wage contract assumption, solving for the optimal policy will be computationally
burdensome, as firms would now need to keep track of household decisions.
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a small effect because the option of quitting is not widely used by workers, given that the
value of becoming unemployed ineligible is very low. As a result, inefficiencies created by
fixed wage contracts in the baseline model have a small quantitative impact on the welfare
gains from the optimal policy.
The fifth robustness exercise considers the calibration of the replacement rate of the bench-
mark UI policy. Recall that our benchmark replacement rate of 14 percent takes into
account the effect of partial take-up among those eligible for benefits and adjusts for differ-
ences between wages and total compensation. To understand the effects of this adjustment,
we calculate the welfare gains from the optimal policy when the benchmark policy replace-
ment rate is set to 40 percent, (i.e., φ (p) = 0.4 ∀p), the (unadjusted) value calculated
by the Department of Labor. The goal of this exercise is to understand whether the
countercyclical optimal policy would still be welfare improving when compared to a new
benchmark policy that has a significantly higher but time-invariant level replacement rate.
We find that the optimal policy increases welfare by 0.77 percent relative to the new bench-
mark. This result implies that there are still sizeable welfare gains when the government
transfers funds from booms to recessions, as the insurance value of UI payments expands
and incentive costs contract during recessions. This also emphasizes that welfare gains
are not mostly driven by more generous benefits levels but by the introduction of cyclical
generosity.
The sixth exercise considers eligibility rules for workers at the moment of job loss. Ac-
cording to the UI program in the United States, workers have to satisfy some monetary
and nonmonetary requirements to be eligible for UI benefits.49 Under these requirements,
on average, around 75 percent of the workers are in fact eligible for UI benefits upon job
loss.50 When studying the optimal design of UI program, it will be interesting to consider
the welfare implications of treating these eligibility requirements as another policy instru-
ment. In our baseline setup, eligibility requirements upon job loss are controlled by the UI
expiration rate e. Thus, an extension of UI duration also implies a relaxation of UI eligi-
bility requirements for workers in our baseline model. In order to understand the effects
49For example, in terms of monetary requirements, workers must receive enough wages during the base
period to establish a claim. In terms of nonmonetary requirements, the reason for the workers’ job loss
must be through no fault of their own, and they must be actively looking for work while unemployed.
50See Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016).
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of this relationship, we change the problem of the worker in Equation (2.1) such that the
probability of being eligible upon job loss is fixed at 75 percent rather than controlled by
changes in e. We then evaluate the welfare gains from the optimal policy, and find that it
yields 0.94 percent additional lifetime consumption relative to the benchmark policy. Since
a lower fraction of workers are now eligible for UI benefits upon job loss relative to the
baseline model, the welfare gains from the optimal policy are slightly reduced under this
exercise.
Finally, we explore the implications of time-varying discount factors βt. The stochasticity of
discount factors introduces another idiosyncratic shock to households, and so one might be
concerned about the presence of an unintended role of UI payments as providing insurance
against the discount factor risk. In order to quantify this effect, we set discount factors to
be permanent and use an equally weighted social welfare function in computing the welfare
gains. We find that the optimal policy yields 1.24 percent additional lifetime consumption
relative to the benchmark policy, implying that the effect of time-varying discount factors
on welfare gains of the optimal policy is negligible. This result is expected given that
discount factors are calibrated to be highly persistent in our baseline calibration.
2.6.2 High level of opportunity cost of employment
We now explore the features of the optimal policy under a high level of opportunity cost
of employment calibration. In particular, we recalibrate our baseline economy so that the
model matches the same labor market and asset-to-income distribution moments as in our
baseline calibration, but the level of opportunity cost of employment is set to be 0.955, as
calibrated by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Next, we evaluate the welfare gains/losses
of the same set of linear policies and obtain the optimal policy for this case under the
welfare criterion in Section 2.4.
We find that the optimal policy is still countercyclical even under a high level of opportunity
cost of employment. Specifically, it features a 19 percent replacement rate for one quarter
when aggregate labor productivity is at its mean value, and a 59 percent replacement rate
for 4 quarters when aggregate labor productivity is depressed by 3.5 percent. Compared
to the U.S. government’s UI policy during the Great Recession (the benchmark policy),
this optimal policy increases welfare by 0.25 percent additional lifetime consumption for
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all agents. Relative to the optimal policy under the baseline calibration of opportunity
cost of employment, the optimal policy in this case offers a lower replacement rate for a
much shorter duration when labor productivity is at its mean, while the cyclicality of the
optimal policy remains roughly the same. This result is intuitive because when the value
of unemployment is close to the value of employment because of a high opportunity cost
of employment, the consumption drop upon job loss becomes less pronounced. Thus, the
government implements a low replacement rate for short durations under the mean level of
aggregate labor productivity. Moreover, consumption still fluctuates because of changes in
the saving behavior of agents as a response to fluctuations in aggregate labor productivity.
Hence, the government still finds it optimal to transfer funds from expansions to recessions.
However, the magnitude of these fluctuations in consumption is relatively smaller, as the
precautionary saving motives are not as strong under a high level of opportunity cost of
employment. For this reason, the welfare gains from the optimal policy in this case are less
than half of the welfare gains provided by the optimal policy under the baseline calibration
of opportunity cost of employment.
This exercise is also useful to compare our result to the findings of the previous literature.
As we discussed in Section 2.1, Mitman and Rabinovich (2015) also study the optimal
cyclicality of UI replacement rate and duration in an equilibrium search model in which
agents are not allowed to save/borrow. In their baseline calibration, the summation of
UI benefits b and the value of nonmarket activity h is equal to 0.984, implying that the
flow opportunity cost of employment is high. In this setup, they find that the optimal UI
policy is procyclical. Then, in Section 5.4 of their paper, they discuss the implications of
relaxing the no saving/borrowing assumption on their results. In this discussion, they also
acknowledge that when agents are allowed to save/borrow, fluctuations in agents’ wealth
holdings over the business cycle may create a force that has a potential to reverse the
cyclicality of their optimal UI policy. In our model, we allow agents to save/borrow through
incomplete asset markets and indeed show that this channel is strong enough to rationalize
the countercyclicality of the optimal policy even under a high level of opportunity cost of
employment.
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2.7 Evidence on the Mechanism: A First Pass
In this section, we empirically test the interaction between UI generosity and savings
decisions in order to check whether our main mechanism is also observed in the micro
data. This exercise builds on Engen and Gruber (2001), who find that UI benefits tend
to crowd out individual savings.51 We focus on the Great Recession period to understand
the impact of drastic changes in UI policy on the saving decisions of individuals. Using
the SIPP panel 2008 core data, we obtain household employment, labor income, and state
of residence information. Wealth data are once again obtained from the topical data of
the same panel, which is typically released on a yearly basis as opposed to the monthly
frequency of the core data. State-level UI duration data during the Great Recession consist
of maximum potential duration by adding up standard weeks, Extended Benefits (EB), and
EUC tiers 1-4 (when applicable).52 Meanwhile, the state-level replacement rate is defined
as either (1) the weighted average of the ratio of the weekly benefit amount and average
claimants’ wage or (2) the ratio of the weighted average of the weekly benefit amount and
the weighted average of claimants’ wage.53 To obtain the expected benefit receipt of a
worker, we compute the average weekly wage of the respondent for one quarter prior to the
wealth observation and multiply it by the replacement rate offered by her state of residence
during that time.
Our sample includes workers ages 24 to 65 who report not owning any business in part
or in full and has worked for at least one quarter prior to the first observation and are
always working in between observations. This more or less guarantees eligibility for UI
if the observed worker is displaced in the future. Moreover, focusing only on employed
individuals between observations eliminates other reasons for changes in asset holdings,
such as experiencing unemployment. We organize the data into person-time information
(where t = {2009, 2010}) and run the following regression:
ait = γbenbenefitit + γdurdurst + βXit + αi + αs + αt + ist
51While Engen and Gruber (2001) study the effect of the UI replacement rate on saving decisions, we
also include time- and state-varying UI duration in order to account for the effect of expected length of UI
receipts on wealth for the period of the Great Recession.
52We thank A. Yusuf Mercan for kindly sharing this dataset with us.
53See https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/ui replacement rates.asp for more details.
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where ait is the asset-to-income ratio of individual i at time t, benefitit is the expected
weekly benefit receipt of individual i at time t, durst is the maximum potential duration of
UI in state s during time time t, Xit is a set of controls which include education, martial
status, and age, and αj∈{i,s,t} are individual, time, and state fixed effects.54 The coefficients
of interest are the impact of the unemployment benefit level and duration on the asset-
to-income ratio given by γben and γdur. Note that a selection problem arises if there is a
systematic movement of a certain type of worker to states with high levels of UI generosity.
In order to control for this, we also expand the original regression to control for individuals
moving from one state to another.
Given that isolating the causal effect of benefit generosity on self-insurance is beyond the
scope of this exercise because of endogeneity, our intention is simply to provide correlational
evidence on this relationship. Table 2.7 shows that expected benefit receipt has a negative
and statistically significant impact on self-insurance. While the length of UI duration
has a negative coefficient, it is not statistically significant. For example, γben = −.0135
implies that a $100 increase in the expected benefit amount received each week should
unemployment occur results in a decrease in the asset-to-income ratio that is equivalent to
1.35 weeks’ worth of insurance. Alternatively, this would also imply a reduction in savings
by around $1124 for a worker earning the median weekly wage of $833. This relationship
is consistent with the crowding-out effect of UI on precautionary savings documented by
Engen and Gruber (2001). This result lends evidentiary support to the idea that the
insurance benefits of a generous UI policy during recessions are partially attributable to
the relief UI benefits provide workers who no longer need to experience sudden drops in
consumption in order to build a buffer stock of savings. Results in the second and fourth
columns also indicate that the issue of selection caused by state-to-state moves is not
consequential. Finally, comparing the first two columns with the last two reveals that the
relationship is robust to the manner by which replacement rates are calculated.
Motivated by the above empirical evidence, we revisit our welfare analysis in the model
to understand if the replacement rate is a more important instrument in providing welfare
gains relative to the UI duration. We find that a UI policy that consists of an optimal
54Notice that benefitit is affected by the replacement rate offered by the state s that individual i resides
in during time t.
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Table 2.7: Regression results
Benefit Calculation 1 Benefit Calculation 2
(1) (2) (1) (2)
benefit
−.0135*** −.0135*** −.0153*** −.0153***
(.0010) (.0010) (.0012) (.0012)
dur
−.0122 −.0123 −.0119 −.0119
(.0164) (.0164) (.0164) (.0164)
moving
−.0924 −.0933
(.2255) (.2254)
individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
state fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
observations 33, 012 33, 012 33, 012 33, 012
Note: The dependent variable is the asset-to-income ratio of individuals. “Benefit Calculation 1” uses a replacement
ratio calculated as the weighted average of the following ratio: weekly benefit amount (WBA) / weekly wage. “Benefit
Calculation 2” uses a replacement rate ratio calculated as the ratio of the weighted average of WBA and the weighted
average of the weekly wage. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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replacement rate but a UI duration of the benchmark policy, together with the tax rate
that balances the government’s budget constraint for this hybrid policy, yields an average
welfare gain that is equivalent to 0.46 percent additional lifetime consumption relative to
the benchmark policy. This implies that around 80 percent of the welfare gains from the
optimal policy are attributable to the optimality of the UI replacement rate, and the re-
maining 20 percent of the gains come from the optimality of UI duration. This is consistent
with the above empirical result that the changes in replacement rates significantly affect
the self-insurance decisions of individuals.
2.8 Conclusion
We study optimal UI over the business cycle using a tractable heterogeneous agent job
search model that features labor productivity driven business cycles and incomplete asset
markets. We find that the optimal UI policy is countercyclical. In particular, when ag-
gregate labor productivity is at its mean, it features a 30 percent replacement rate for 4
quarters, but when aggregate labor productivity is depressed by 3.5 percent, it offers more
generous benefits of a 54 percent replacement rate for a duration of 10 quarters financed
by higher labor income taxes. Compared to a UI policy that mimics the policy imple-
mented during the Great Recession by the United States government, the optimal policy
represents an average welfare increase of 0.58 percent additional lifetime consumption. We
show that incorporating the response of individual saving behavior to changes in UI policy
is quantitatively important in measuring the welfare benefits and costs of UI policy.
Insurance benefits are larger in recessions relative to expansions, while incentive costs
exhibit the opposite pattern. Insurance benefits expand during recessions because (1)
consumption insurance upon job loss is provided for a larger pool of unemployed and long
jobless spells, and (2) it attenuates the need to engage in precautionary savings by cutting
back on consumption at the onset of a recession. Meanwhile, incentive costs are also
relatively smaller in recessions because (1) jobs are difficult to find and forgone search is
not as worthwhile, and (2) borrowing constraints impose discipline on individual job search
behavior because of a wealth effect. As a result, the optimal policy is countercyclical.
A quantitative decomposition of ex-ante welfare gains reveals that in the long run, the
optimal policy provides a substantial reduction in consumption uncertainty at the cost of
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lower consumption levels. Along the transition, however, large consumption level gains are
enjoyed by agents as they decumulate savings in response to more generous public insurance
during recessions. Meanwhile, gains from reduced inequality and lower search effort are
present but limited. In addition, ex-post welfare gains are shown to be heterogeneous
across different types of agents. The unemployed eligible gain the most, but the employed
remarkably enjoy large gains as well because of the reduced precautionary motives during
recessions. Unsurprisingly, gains are largest for the poor across all employment types.
Our contribution to the existing literature lies in carefully accounting for the welfare effects
of endogenous interaction between savings and UI policy over the business cycle. The
natural extension of our analysis is to analyze how other sources of private insurance
(such as family labor supply) react to changes in UI policy and how this interaction would
affect the optimal policy. Another avenue for future research is to incorporate capital
accumulation in order to account for the effect of government programs on aggregate capital
stock. However, given the complexity of our current model, we leave these extensions to
future work.
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Figure 2.6: Average consumption over the business cycle
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Note: Panel A plots the percent deviation of average consumption’s trend during the Great Recession from its
steady-state level at the start of this period under the acyclical and optimal UI policies. Panels B and C repeat
this exercise for poor and rich agents. “Poor” refers to agents who enter unemployment with an asset-to-income
ratio below the 75th percentile of the stationary asset-to-income distribution, while “Rich” refers to those above the
threshold.
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Figure 2.7: Average assets upon job loss over the business cycle
Note: Panel A plots the trend of average asset holdings of the unemployed during the first week of entering un-
employment over the Great Recession under the acyclical and optimal UI policies. Panel B shows the evolution of
various percentiles of the asset distribution over the Great Recession under these two policies.
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Figure 2.8: Incentive costs of the optimal policy
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Note: Panel A shows the average job finding rates during the Great Recession under the acyclical and optimal UI
policies. Panel B plots the unemployment survival function under these two policies, which shows the probability
that an unemployment spell will last beyond t months.
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Figure 2.9: Value of job search
                
 $ V V H W
   
   
   
   
   
 & R
 Q V
 X P
 S W
 L R
 Q 
 9 D
 O X
 H
 $   9 D O X H  R I  - R E  6 H D U F K
 5 H F H V V L R Q
 % R R P
 ' H F     ' H F     ' H F     ' H F   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 %   9 D O   R I  - R E  6 H D U F K  R Y H U  W K H  5 H F H V V L R Q
 ( O L J L E O H
 , Q H O L J L E O H
Note: Panel A shows the consumption value of job search across different levels of asset holdings in recessions and
booms. Panel B plots the average consumption value of job search during the Great Recession for unemployed eligible
and ineligible.
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Chapter 3
What Do Survey Data Tell Us
about U.S. Businesses?
3.1 Introduction
Representative surveys of households and firms have become an important source of data
on business owners and their activities, and are now used extensively in studies of wealth
inequality and entrepreneurial choice. This paper examines the reliability of these data
for research on U.S. businesses, including pass-through entities and subchapter C corpo-
rations.1 Pass-through businesses account for roughly half of business net income in the
United States and have been a focus of recent tax reforms and debates about income
inequality.2 Subchapter C corporations account for the remaining half and include all
publicly traded firms. We document issues arising from nonrepresentative samples and
measurement errors in survey data and discuss the implications of the errors for economic
research.
1For tax purposes, pass-through entities classify themselves as sole proprietorships, S corporations, or
partnerships. They are called “pass-through” because the income earned by such businesses is taxed under
the owners’ individual income tax. In contrast, C corporations pay corporate taxes on income earned, and
individual shareholders pay dividend or capital gains taxes when profits are distributed.
2Smith et al. (2017) use tax audit data to conclude that rising business income accounts for all of the
growth in the top 1 percent income share since 2000. Furthermore, the majority of rising top business
income resulted from rising income of pass-through businesses.
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We start by examining the reliability of measures of business incomes, receipts, and val-
uations in the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which is a publicly
available and widely used triennial cross-sectional survey of U.S. households. Households
with actively managed businesses are asked to report business receipts and net income
from specific lines on their tax forms.3 This aspect of the survey design makes it easy for
us to compare the household responses with administrative data from the IRS Statistics
of Income (SOI).4 Averaging across survey years, we find that the SCF overstates pass-
through business income per tax return by 400 percent and business receipts per return by
169 percent. For C corporations, net income and receipts are on average understated in
the SCF by 26 and 21 percent, respectively, but the SCF does not include publicly traded
corporations, whereas the IRS does. Since publicly traded corporations have much higher
receipts and net incomes per tax return than private corporations, including them would
result in a significant overstatement for all business entities.
The overstatement of incomes and receipts in the SCF varies in the cross section and year
by year, making it difficult, if not impossible, to systematically correct for the errors. To
demonstrate this, we provide evidence of both sampling and measurement errors. Sam-
pling errors arise from an understatement or overstatement of the reported number of tax
returns in the SCF relative to the IRS. We find that the SCF significantly understates
the number of sole proprietorships, S corporations, and C corporations and significantly
overstates the number of partnerships, with the degree of under- or overstatement varying
across the income distribution. Looking at data in the cross section, our findings suggest
a significant underrepresentation of low-income businesses driving the overstatement of
business incomes. This may be attributable to measurement error resulting from how the
questions are framed. For example, there are many IRS businesses with net losses but few
in the SCF, possibly because the respondents answered that they had no net income rather
3Sole proprietors are asked to report business gross receipts and net income from Form 1040 Schedule
C (lines 1 and 31), shareholders of partnerships from Form 1065 (lines 1c and 22), shareholders of S
corporations from Form 1120S (lines 1c and 21), and shareholders of C corporations from Form 1120 (lines
1c and 30).
4The IRS compiles the SOI based on stratified probability samples of income tax returns and other forms.
We use information from the SOI Corporation Income Tax Returns, Individual Income Tax Returns, and
Partnership Returns that are available in the historical data tables from www.irs.gov/statistics.
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than a negative net income. Another measurement issue we document is that the frequency
of referencing supporting documents is strikingly low. For example, if we condition on all
business owners in the SCF, we find that 75 percent never referenced any tax document.
The SCF survey has also been used extensively to study the level and dispersion of busi-
ness wealth. Households with actively managed businesses are asked to assess the value
of their business, net of all loans, if they were to sell it. Since there are no measures
of total valuations for ongoing businesses other than publicly traded C corporations, we
construct net income-to-value ratios in the SCF and compare them to available income
yields from brokered private business sales recorded by Pratt’s Stats and publicly traded
companies, both small and large, recorded by the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) (merged with Compustat). For virtually all subsamples and all years, the SCF
income yields are significantly higher than comparable measures from the other datasets.
The overstatement in yields is even greater than for incomes, which is suggestive of an un-
derstatement in business valuations. For example, the SCF average value-weighted income
yield is 19 percent, much higher than the Pratt’s Stats estimates of 2 percent or the CRSP
estimates of 7 percent for all businesses, and −9 percent for those in the bottom quintile
when firms are ranked by total assets. We also find that the SCF distributions are more
right-skewed than those based on Pratt’s Stats or CRSP-Compustat data.
For unincorporated businesses, we can compare the SCF estimates of business incomes
per owner and, if available, income yields to those of three other widely used surveys:
the Current Population Survey (CPS), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).5 We show that all four surveys
overstate incomes per owner relative to the IRS data, but by differing amounts. Averaging
across survey years, business income per owner for unincorporated businesses is overes-
timated by 586 percent in the SCF, 179 percent in the CPS, 185 percent in the PSID,
and 34 percent in the SIPP. Average value-weighted income yields calculated for the PSID
and SIPP are high relative to Pratt’s Stats and CRSP data in all cases but are not very
different from those in the SCF. The main differences in yields across surveys are found
5We also compare the SCF results to the results of Gurley-Calvez et al. (2016), who match responses
of new businesses in the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) with IRS tax data and find that these firms under-
state business incomes. For some other surveys of businesses, such as the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial
Dynamics (PSED), we find the response rates of business-related questions to be too low to be reliable.
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when we compare the distributional statistics.
An overstatement of business incomes in the survey data relative to the IRS could be the
result of misreporting in the IRS or miscategorization of incomes by survey respondents.
To check misreporting, we use auxiliary tax audit data to adjust the IRS data but still find
a significant mismatch with the survey data. For example, for pass-through businesses, the
SCF overstates the average income per return by 178 percent relative to the tax audit data.
To check miscategorizations, we use a broader definition of business income. For exam-
ple, business owners might confuse business incomes on Schedule C, E, and F, overstating
one category and understating another. When we combine these categories into a broader
concept of business income, we still find incomes to be significantly overstated. Respon-
dents are not miscategorizing the incomes but rather are often overstating all categories of
business income. Other adjustments, such as correcting for within-survey inconsistencies
regarding business ownership and income and correcting for the fact that the survey only
includes individual owners, do not alleviate the measurement issues.
The inconsistencies across surveys and the conceptual measurement issues that we high-
light suggest that the “facts” about business income and wealth based on current survey
data should be treated with caution. Measurement problems related to business incomes
are surmountable given that respondents are asked about specific lines on the tax forms.
Measurement problems related to business valuations and returns may be insurmount-
able without data on actual business sales transactions. First, it is difficult for owners
to estimate business valuations when one considers that businesses are heavily invested
in intangible assets.6 Second, survey business owners answer questions separately about
income and valuations. For example, if the net incomes derive from both capital and labor
inputs, while the business valuations are based on fixed assets owned by the business, then
the estimated income yields from surveys may not be comparable across owners who in-
terpret the question differently. Interpreting survey-based measures of business returns or
valuations requires a consistent framework for true returns, stocks, and valuations. Given
current measurement issues, such interpretations may not be possible.
6McGrattan and Prescott (2010a,b) and Bhandari and McGrattan (2018) both find estimates of the
value for intangible assets to be close to estimates of tangible assets used by businesses. Intangible assets
come in the form of research and development, software, advertising, brands, and investments in customer
lists, goodwill, and other forms of investments in building organizations.
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the related literature and the im-
plications of our findings for theoretical and applied research on businesses. In Section 3.3,
we document that business incomes and receipts measured from the SCF survey data are
largely inconsistent, and we discuss problems regarding nonrepresentativeness and mea-
surement errors. Section 3.4 studies business valuations and rates of return. Section 3.5
presents robustness checks. Section 3.6 compares the SCF results with other widely used
surveys. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
Our findings have implications for three active areas of economic research. The first area is
the empirical literature that documents levels and trends in the dispersion of income and
wealth and emphasizes the role of entrepreneurs in wealth accumulation. The second area,
which is motivated by and builds upon the first, is the theoretical literature developing
models of entrepreneurial choice, which are specifically designed to fit the “stylized facts”
of the empirical literature. The third area includes quantitative policy analyses that use
the empirical findings and theoretical developments of the first two literatures as their
laboratory for the study of counterfactual policies. Our findings cast doubt on the facts
that have been uncovered in the empirical literature—specifically documenting that survey
data are unreliable for business-related statistics—and thus raise issues concerning the
theoretical developments and policy analyses that have been designed around them.
A large and burgeoning empirical literature documents trends in income and wealth and
has been particularly focused on increased dispersion over time. Greater dispersion is
attributed to top earners, and therefore researchers work primarily with survey data from
the SCF or administrative tax data from the IRS. For example, Kuhn and Rios-Rull (2016)
provide a nearly exhaustive summary of distributional facts about U.S. earnings, income,
and wealth based on the SCF. A starting point for several papers in this literature is the
observation that, for broad income categories, aggregated SCF responses match up well to
the aggregated IRS data. In Figure 3.1, we replicate the time series plot for adjusted gross
income (AGI) from the SCF and plot it against the corresponding data from the IRS. We
see that the SCF tracks the level and cyclical trends for AGI in the IRS.
Our focus is on measures that relate to business activity. Of particular relevance are the
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findings in Kuhn and Rios-Rull (2016) that business income is one of the main contributors
to income inequality and that business equity is one of the main contributors to wealth
inequality, which they document for the history of the SCF surveys between 1989 and 2013.
Bricker et al. (2016) also use the SCF to document the rise of the top share of wealth
holdings over time and find that the share of wealth attributable to the top 1 percent
rose from 30 percent in 1992 to 36 percent in 2013. Our paper exploits the fact that SCF
answers can be compared to administrative data from the IRS and finds that respondents
are not reliably or consistently answering questions about their business income or business
equity, and therefore we cannot trust the SCF distributions.
Given issues with measuring business incomes, researchers might be tempted to combine
all nonwage income into a residual “capital income” category, since SCF aggregates match
up well with aggregated IRS data. Here, we argue that this capital income measure would
not be appropriate for either research on U.S. businesses or research on U.S. capital. For
research on businesses, the residual income measure would be inappropriate because sig-
nificant nonbusiness income is included with interest payments, capital gains, pensions and
annuities, alimony, trusts, and government transfers. Furthermore, as we noted earlier,
there is evidence that owners are not miscategorizing income categories, and therefore us-
ing broader categories of income would do little to ameliorate the measurement issues.
For research on capital, the nonwage income in AGI would be inappropriate because a
significant fraction of capital income is untaxed and the corresponding assets are held by
fiduciaries. Furthermore, as we show later, the majority of respondents do not reference
financial documents, making it nearly impossible to have reliable estimates of their total
capital income or wealth.
Saez and Zucman (2016) document trends in wealth dispersion by capitalizing incomes
from administrative tax data. They compare their results to the SCF and find similar
levels and trends for wealth in the top 10 percent of the distribution but differences for
the top 1 percent.7 The Saez and Zucman (2016) capitalization method is inappropriate
for estimating wealth in business for several reasons. First, there is no way to validate
the procedure except by comparing to survey data, which we find are unreliable. Second,
7They also compare results to estate taxes and foundation records, but these data are not informative
about most businesses in the United States.
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the U.S. flow of funds aggregates used to compute capitalization factors include ad hoc
imputations made by the Federal Reserve for private businesses.8 Third, the assumption
that returns are the same for everyone and constant over time is hard to reconcile with
the fact that there is significant entry into and exit out of business (see Bhandari and
McGrattan (2018)).
Because of the problems with data from the SCF and the capitalized IRS incomes, the
main message of our findings for the theoretical literature is a cautionary one, namely,
that these data tell us little about business valuations or returns, and therefore theorists
should not insist on models that replicate “stylized facts,” which are not actually facts.
The most popular stylized facts are that entrepreneurs, as a group, own a substantial share
of household wealth and income, with shares increasing throughout the distribution, and
that entrepreneurs have high savings rates relative to the population, implying much more
dispersion in wealth than in income (see De Nardi, Doctor, and Karen (2007) and Gentry
and Hubbard (2004)). These findings have led researchers to model entrepreneurs as over-
coming significant market frictions to run highly risky businesses with the expectation of
earning high returns and amassing significant wealth (see, for example, Quadrini (2000),
Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), and Buera (2009)). Furthermore, the theoretical frameworks
parameterized to match the survey data have been used as a laboratory for policy work,
especially when considering tax policy reform (see, for example, Meh (2005), Kitao (2008),
Bohacek and Zubricky (2012), and Scheuer (2013)). Our results cast doubt on the sur-
vey data underlying the models of financial frictions and, hence, the subsequent policy
recommendations.
Our paper is also related to a second strand of the empirical literature, which reaches
8For example, when constructing capitalization factors, Saez and Zucman (2016) use aggregate flow
of funds wealth measures for closely held corporations (both subchapter C and S) and unincorporated
businesses. These businesses are not publicly traded and thus have no market valuations. The Federal
Reserve imputes market values for closely held corporations by taking a ratio of market value to revenues
for publicly traded companies and then applying that ratio to private businesses with similar industry,
employment, and revenue profiles—after arbitrarily adjusting the estimate downward by 25 percent to
reflect the lack of liquidity of closely held shares. Valuations for unincorporated businesses are based
on balance sheet data reported to the IRS, which are historical-cost accounting measures, not market
valuations.
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different conclusions about the payoffs to entrepreneurial activity.9 Hamilton (2000) uses
survey data from the 1984 SIPP and finds that self-employed individuals—who could be
running an incorporated or unincorporated business—have lower median earnings than
similar individuals in paid employment. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) extend
his analysis and work with SCF data, allowing for a more comprehensive treatment of equity
returns and including adjustments for firm entry and exit. They find that returns to private
businesses are no higher than returns to publicly traded firms and thus puzzlingly low given
the risks entrepreneurs face.10 Using PSED data, Hurst and Pugsley (2011) report that
more than 50 percent of new business owners cite flexible hours and being one’s own boss
as the primary reason for starting their own business. These findings have led researchers
to conclude that the nonpecuniary benefits of self-employment play an important role in
occupational choice.
We document that survey data overstate business incomes, and the overstatement leads
to income yields for private businesses that are significantly higher than those for publicly
traded companies. In other words, we find that the private returns computed with survey
data are puzzlingly high, not puzzlingly low. When comparing our results to Moskowitz
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), we find that the main difference is the concept of return:
they add an imputation for capital gains that drive their results. Regrettably, neither
the income yield nor the capital gain imputation are reliable estimates, leaving us with
little to say about whether private returns are low or high relative to public returns. This
finding is relevant for policy discussions related to business taxation and subsidization.
For example, Hurst and Pugsley (2017) followed up on the work of Hamilton (2000) and
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) by incorporating nonpecuniary benefits in a model
of entrepreneurship and then analyzed the impact of small business subsidies. Our results
cast doubt on SIPP and SCF survey data and hence on policy recommendations that arise
9Later, we document inconsistencies across surveys and across time that could lead to different empirical
insights.
10Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) used samples over the period 1989–1998. Kartashova (2014)
extended their analysis to 2010 and documented that for the longer sample, the private equity premium is
about 6 percent as compared to about 0 percent in the shorter sample. Since the difference in means is
swamped by the variability of the CRSP index returns, which has a standard deviation of 20 percent over
the period 1988–2015, we would argue that their estimated private returns are not significantly different.
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from frameworks that incorporate nonpecuniary benefits of business entrepreneurs.
3.3 Business Incomes
In this section, we compare SCF pretax business incomes that correspond to specific lines
on U.S. tax forms with incomes reported to the IRS. We first document that the SCF
responses—both in the aggregate and across the distribution—are statistically different
and argue that the magnitudes of the differences are economically important. We then
explore reasons for the mismatch.11
3.3.1 Aggregates
We start with aggregated business incomes and show that, while the SCF does well in
matching the IRS total AGI (as shown in Figure 3.1), there are large discrepancies between
the survey and tax data for businesses. For pass-through businesses, business income per
return is significantly and consistently overstated in the SCF relative to the IRS. For
C corporations, the average per-return business income in the SCF is not very different
from the IRS but should be much smaller given that the survey excludes publicly traded
companies.
To demonstrate that there is a significant discrepancy between SCF and IRS data, we
start by defining business income as gross receipts from sales minus expenses (including
depreciation) incurred in running the business. Information on business incomes is obtained
from the respective business tax forms: Form 1040, Schedule C (line 31) for sole proprietors,
Form 1065 (line 22) for partnerships, Form 1120S (line 21) for S corporations, and Form
1120 (line 30) for C corporations. In each survey year, we use the SCF sampling weights
and ownership information to compute the aggregate business income and the aggregate
number of business tax returns by legal form of the business.
Figure 3.2 plots aggregated business income divided by the number of business tax returns
using the SCF and the data actually reported to the IRS for tax years between 1988
11In Appendix C, cited henceforth as Bhandari, et al. (2019), we provide a comprehensive collection of
statistics for all survey years and subsamples.
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and 2015.12 All data are reported in thousands of current dollars. The shaded region
in Figure 3.2 shows the 90 percent confidence interval of the average per-return business
incomes.13 Panel A of Figure 3.2 shows the results for sole proprietorships. For this
group, average incomes reported in the IRS are about $8,000 per return in 1988 and rise
gradually to $12,000 per return by 2015. Average incomes per return reported in the SCF
are significantly higher, rising from $32,000 in 1988 to $40,000 by 2015, and display large
year-to-year variation. If we construct a percentage error (that is, 100(SCF−IRS)/IRS)
in each year, we find the average error is 289 percent and ranges from 158 percent to 384
percent across all years. We see a similar result in Panel B, which shows the data for S
corporations. The SCF S-corporation incomes per return are significantly higher than the
IRS analogues for the entire sample period. The errors in this case average 273 percent
and range from 142 percent to 387 percent.
In the case of partnerships, a sampling issue implies that the discrepancy between the
SCF and IRS income could be even larger than that shown in Panel C of Figure 3.2. The
SCF only surveys owners of partnerships who are individuals, whereas the IRS includes
information on partnerships owned by individuals and other legal entities such as corpora-
tions.14 The exclusion of corporate partners in the SCF should lead to an understatement
of aggregate business income but, in principle, should not affect the business income per
12In the SCF, we assume that a business owner who owns multiple sole proprietorships files one return.
This assumption is made to be consistent with IRS statistics that state: “For purposes of the statistics,
if a proprietor owned more than one business, the statistics for each business were combined with those
of the proprietor’s dominant business and included in the industrial group for that business activity” (see
Dungan (2017, p. 2)). For partnerships, S corporations, and C corporations, we calculate the number of
returns taking into account the ownership share of the family from each reported business.
13Standard errors are computed using a bootstrap method. For each survey year, the SCF provides a
set of 1,000 replicate weights. We use these weights to compute 1,000 values for the relevant statistic, for
example, business income per return, and then we compute the confidence intervals using the 5th and 95th
percentiles of these 1,000 draws.
14For the year 2011, Cooper et al. (2016) estimate that 32 percent of total business income from part-
nerships is generated by individual partners, who account for 73 percent of all partners.
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return.15 However, we find that both aggregate income and per-return income are over-
stated for partnerships. Aggregate business income from partnerships in the SCF is higher
than the IRS by 305 percent on average, with the range of errors between 52 percent and
889 percent across survey years. Per-return income is also overstated by 300 percent on
average, with errors between 31 percent and 837 percent, as shown in Panel C of Figure
3.2.
If we include all pass-through businesses in one category (using data in Panels A through
C of Figure 3.2), we find that the SCF error is 400 percent on average and ranges from 230
percent to 568 percent for business income per return. Contrast this with business incomes
per return for C corporations, shown in Panel D of Figure 3.2. For these businesses, we find
that in most years, the average SCF business income per return is actually understated by
about 26 percent as compared to the IRS data. However, the IRS data include publicly
traded corporations, whereas the SCF data do not. Publicly traded C corporations are
typically much larger than their private counterparts. If we could include the incomes
from these publicly traded corporations with the SCF estimates, we would find that the
SCF total incomes would be significantly higher than the IRS estimates, as is the case
for the pass-through businesses. Despite these measurement issues, we compare business
incomes of C corporations in the SCF with the IRS and interpret the results with the
understanding that the SCF will underrepresent large businesses.
While incomes per return are overstated in the SCF relative to the IRS, the number of
returns filed by businesses are significantly understated for sole proprietors and corporations
in all years. Figure 3.3 plots the number of business returns filed as reported by the IRS
and the SCF, over time and by legal entity, with shading marking the 90 percent confidence
interval. In the case of sole proprietors and S corporations shown in Panels A and B, the
understatement has worsened over time as the number of IRS filings has grown and the
number reported in the SCF has not. In Panel C, we see that the number of partnership
returns in the SCF is undercounted in only a few years and not by as much as in the case
of the other business types. However, as mentioned before, the SCF data only include
partners who are individuals, implying that the SCF significantly overstates the number
15Here, we are operating under the assumption that the SCF is representative and partnerships with
all corporate partners (which are entirely missed by the SCF) either are small in terms of their share of
aggregate business income or else are not systematically different from the rest of the partnerships.
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of returns for partnerships owned by individuals. The number of C-corporate returns is
shown in Panel D of Figure 3.3. In this case, part of the difference between the IRS and
SCF results is the exclusion of publicly traded companies in the SCF, but these businesses
only account for about 5,000 out of the roughly 1.6 million C corporations and therefore
cannot account for the large understatement of returns shown in the figure.
One possible reason for understated returns is that the SCF data may not include owners
that earn very little business income (for example, part-time Uber drivers or AER referees),
while the IRS includes all business tax filers. If this were indeed the case, then the aggregate
business incomes—found by multiplying values in Figure 3.3 by values in Figure 3.2—would
be similar for the IRS and SCF. We find that this is not the case: aggregate business
incomes are significantly overstated in the SCF. For example, in the case of pass-through
businesses, we find average overstatements of 34, 137, and 305 percent for sole proprietors,
S corporations, and partnerships, respectively, with a large range in the errors over time.
(See Bhandari et al. (2019) for details.) The large overstatement of aggregate incomes,
especially in S corporations and partnerships, is clearly inconsistent with the hypothesis
that nonactive business owners explain the differences between the SCF and IRS results.
Finally, we extend the analysis to business receipts and again find large and variable errors
in the SCF responses when compared to the IRS counterparts. (Full details are provided
in Bhandari et al. (2019).) For example, in the case of pass-through businesses, we find
that the average error in business receipts per return over the period 1988–2015 is 169
percent, with errors over the period in the range of 89 percent to 367 percent. Thus, our
main finding is an overstatement of aggregated business incomes and receipts in the SCF
across all legal forms, with large variation in the discrepancies across survey years.
3.3.2 Distributions
Next, we show that the overstatement of business income per return documented in the
previous section varies in the cross section and year by year, making it impossible to
systematically correct the SCF responses. The discrepancies between the SCF and IRS
statistics are so large and variable as to make the cross-sectional moments based on the
survey data unusable for applied work.
To demonstrate this, we compute percentage errors by grouping businesses in two different
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ways. First, we group those with positive business income (profits) separately from those
with negative business income (losses). For pass-through businesses, the SCF overstates
business income per return for those that have profits by 277 percent on average, with the
year by year errors in the range of 151 percent to 446 percent. The SCF understates the
business income per return for those that have losses by about 82 percent, with the errors
in the range of 66 percent to 94 percent. Both the overstatement of profits and the under-
statement of losses affect the errors in cross-sectional statistics in quantitatively important
ways. We demonstrate this in Table 3.1 for pass-through businesses by decomposing the
percentage errors in the aggregate business income into the fraction that arises due to
overstatement of profits and the fraction that arises due to understatement of losses. For
example, in tax year 1988, the overstatement of profits and understatement of losses each
account for about 50 percent of the aggregate error. In subsequent years, these fractions
vary but are nontrivial in both the overstatement of profits and understatement of losses.
(See Bhandari et al. (2019) for results across all legal forms and survey years.)
A second method of grouping businesses is by ranking them according to total income of
the owners. Here, we do this in the case of sole proprietorships since we have comparable
IRS data in all SCF survey years. (See Bhandari et al. (2019) for a more limited analysis
of S corporations.) Specifically, we rank sole proprietors in the SCF by their AGI and then
assign them to income brackets using the same bins as the IRS. In Figure 3.4, we plot the
fractions of business income for owners with below-median AGI and for those with AGIs
in the top 1st percentile. For most years, the SCF income shares for these two groups
are understated and display large year by year variation. For example, the share for those
with below-median AGI is nearly doubled or halved from one survey to the next. Since
the fractions sum to 100 percent across all AGI groups, the SCF must necessarily overstate
incomes for some bins. We find the largest overstatement of shares for those with AGIs
between the 50th and 75th percentile.
In Figure 3.5, we see that the overstatement of business income per return in the SCF data
also varies a lot across years and across AGI bins, with no systematic pattern. The panels
of this figure can be compared to the aggregate data for sole proprietorships in Panel A of
Figure 3.2. In contrast, the incomes per return in the IRS data show little variation over
time and vary similarly across AGI bins.
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3.3.3 Nonrepresentativeness and measurement error
We now investigate the reasons behind the discrepancies in business incomes between the
SCF and IRS and provide evidence for two types of errors in the SCF: nonrepresentativeness
of business owners and misreporting of business income by business owners. The evidence
of both types of errors again demonstrates that there is no easy correction for the survey
data.
To fix ideas, we decompose the difference between a survey aggregate, XS , and an IRS
aggregate, XI , for some measure into three terms as follows:
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where sums are taken over household types indexed by i. The average X for type i is
denoted by Xsi , and the population weight for type i is denoted by ω
s
i , with s ∈ {S, I}.
The first two terms capture differences in weights, ωSi 6= ωIi , which we refer to as “sampling
errors,” and the last term captures differences in averages, XSi 6= XIi , which we refer to as
“measurement errors.”
With linked survey-IRS data, one can fully decompose the difference on the left-hand side
of (3.1) into the sampling and measurement error components. For the SCF, we do not
have access to such linked data but can provide evidence that is strongly indicative that
both sampling and measurement errors are nontrivial. We start with evidence on the sam-
pling errors. Earlier, we provided evidence based on the total number of business returns
that the first term in (3.1) is significantly different from zero. Recall that we found a signif-
icant underrepresentation of sole proprietors and corporations and an overrepresentation
of partnerships, indicating severe sampling issues.
To shed light on the second term in (3.1), we analyze how the returns are distributed in the
cross section. We define the groups of businesses as we did previously in Section 3.3.2, first
on the basis of whether they earned profits or losses and second by ranking them according
to their owners’ AGI. We then compare ratios of population weights, ωSi /ω
I
i , across types
and across time. For example, if we compare these ratios for pass-through businesses that
have profits with those that have losses, we find significant differences in most years, with
the highest difference being 35 percentage points. Similarly, if we compare ratios for sole
proprietors in different AGI bins, we find significant differences across AGI bins. Figure
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3.6 shows this in the case of sole proprietors with AGIs per return below and above the
median. For businesses that have owners with below-median AGIs, the number of IRS
returns (ωIi ) has risen from about 5 million in 1988 to over 12 million in 2015, but the
SCF estimate (ωSi ) has remained at roughly 2 million for the entire period. For businesses
with above-median AGIs, the number of IRS returns has risen from a little over 8 million
to above 12 million, but the SCF estimate has hovered around 5 million. Comparing these
data to the full sample in Figure 3.6, we find that the share of sole proprietorship returns
below the median AGI is around 25 percent in the SCF and 43 percent in the IRS. These
findings suggest a significant underrepresentation of low-income businesses, which leads to
an overstatement of business incomes if business income is positively correlated with AGI.
Finally, we provide evidence on the last term in (3.1), which summarizes the measurement
error. As mentioned earlier, without linked records, it is impossible to directly validate
measurement errors, but we document several aspects of the SCF survey results that sug-
gest they are nontrivial. The first is related to the aforementioned observation that a
significant part of the overstatement of income is due to an understatement of losses. This
could arise from the framing of the question “What is your net income?” which could be
misinterpreted as being a question about positive net income. For instance, consider the
distribution of losses by AGI bins for tax year 2015 as shown in Table 3.2. We see that 10
out of 19 bins, which account for 23 percent of the total number of returns and 26 percent
of the total losses in the IRS, have an aggregate zero (that is, all respondents in those
income brackets reported a zero net income) in the SCF data.
A second reason to be suspicious about misreported incomes in the SCF is that a very
small fraction of respondents refer to their tax documents when responding to questions
about the specific line items on tax forms. At the end of the survey, SCF interviewers note
how frequently respondents accessed particular documents while answering questions and
the type of documents they referenced, if any. Using this information, we calculate the
frequency with which business owners referenced either tax or other financial documents
in tax year 2015.16 These tabulations are shown in Table 3.3. The first row shows that 75
percent of business owners in the SCF never referenced tax documents, 2 percent rarely
16 Other financial documents include account statements, investment and business records, loan docu-
ments, and pension documents. If any of these documents are referenced, we assume all are.
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did, 9 percent sometimes did, and 14 percent frequently did. The second row shows that
64 percent never referenced any other financial documents, 6 percent rarely did, 15 percent
sometimes did, and 15 percent frequently did.
To provide further evidence on measurement errors, we show that the SCF fails a simple
consistency check by comparing answers to two closely related questions. In the case of
sole proprietors, respondents are asked to report incomes listed on lines 12 and 18 of their
Form 1040, which correspond to Schedule C and F incomes, respectively. Separately, they
are asked about business income from a sole proprietorship and told it is listed on line
31 of Schedule C.17 By design, the difference in responses to these two questions must be
farm income from Schedule F. In Figure 3.7, we see that the differences across the two
answers vary between $17,000 and $40,000 per return, considerably more than could be
attributable to farm incomes. In a typical year, only 4 percent of business profits listed
on Form 1040 are farm income, and farm losses exceed profits in many of the years of our
sample.
A related exercise is to check whether there are SCF respondents who report that they
do not own or actively manage a sole proprietorship but still report nonzero income from
a sole proprietorship or farm. For example, in 2015, of the 16 million who reported a
nonzero income (coded as X5704), only 6 million reported that they actively manage a sole
proprietorship (coded as X3119, X3219, or X3319), while 10 million reported that they
did not. More importantly, the fraction of misreported income is significant. According to
SCF data, 65 percent of the business income from Schedule C and F was earned by those
reporting that they did not actively manage a sole proprietorship.
We turn next to measures of business valuations and rates of return, which are key for
measuring wealth inequality as well as disciplining theories of entrepreneurial activity.
3.4 Business Valuations and Rates of Return
A challenge in estimating valuations and returns for privately held businesses is that they
are not frequently traded, and for this reason, most researchers use the SCF to study the
17The first answer is coded as X5704 and the second as X3132, X3232, and X3332, combined with the
response to legal status of the actively managed business with codes X3119, X3219, and X3319.
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distributional aspects of business wealth and returns.18 SCF business valuations are self-
reported evaluations of the current net worth of the business if sold. We can use these
estimates along with net incomes to construct SCF income yields that are comparable to
available yields from brokered private business sales and publicly traded firms, both small
and large. We find that for virtually all subsamples and all years, the SCF yields are
significantly higher and more right-skewed than comparable measures from the brokered
sales and public firms. We relate this finding to a previous empirical literature that has
documented a puzzlingly small private equity premium and show that the earlier estimates
are driven by an inconsistent imputation of capital gains on private businesses.
We start by describing the measurement of SCF income yields, which will be compared
to yields based on broker data from Pratt’s Stats and public firm data from the CRSP-
Compustat merged database. The SCF income yield, which is computed for each business,
is the ratio of total pretax net income from businesses divided by the self-reported total
net worth of businesses. Let {ωi,t} be the SCF population weights for survey year t. We
compute an equally weighted and value-weighted mean yield for t, denoted as Rewt and
Rvwt , respectively:
Rewt =
∑
i
ωi,t
(
NIi,t
Vi,t
)
, Rvwt =
∑
i
(
ωi,tVi,t∑
i ωi,tVi,t
)(
NIi,t
Vi,t
)
, (3.2)
where NI is total pretax net income and V is the self-reported total business value. In
Figure 3.8, we plot time series of yields for all businesses by legal form across years. Across
SCF survey years 1989–2016, the average equally weighted yield, Rewt , is 102 percent for
all businesses, 104 percent for pass-through businesses, and 57 percent for C corporations.
The average value-weighted yield, Rvwt , is 19 percent for all businesses, 20 percent for pass-
through businesses, and 17 percent for C corporations. Yields vary significantly across
surveys. For example, in the case of C corporations, Rewt is in the range of 14 to 102
percent, and Rvwt is in the range of 11 to 28 percent.
Next, we compare the SCF income yields to comparable statistics from Pratt’s Stats and
show that the SCF yields are much higher and more right-skewed. The Pratt’s Stats
18Some studies use aggregate business valuations from the Federal Reserve’s flow of funds, which imputes
values for privately held businesses using estimates of private business revenues, publicly traded business
revenue-to-value ratios, and an estimate of the liquidity premium on public versus private business.
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database has transaction-level data on sales of private and public businesses over the period
1988–2017. The dataset includes financial information about the target business and other
attributes of the sale including payment terms, purchase price allocations, and employment
agreements. We compute the income yield in Pratt’s Stats by dividing the pretax income
earned by the business in the year before the sale by the sale price. The advantage of
Pratt’s Stats is that it records the price at which the business was actually sold, thus, it
is conceptually close to the ideal answer to the SCF question on business valuation. The
results of this comparison are shown in Table 3.4. In the first two rows and columns,
we report equally weighted and value-weighted mean yields for all businesses in the SCF
dataset and the Pratt’s Stats dataset. The differences are dramatic: the Pratt’s Stats
equally weighted yield is 27 percent as compared to 102 percent for the SCF, and the
Pratt’s Stats value-weighted yield is 2 percent as compared to 19 percent for the SCF.
The fact that there is a larger discrepancy in the equally weighted yield than in the value-
weighted yield suggests that there are also discrepancies in the distribution of yields. In the
last three rows of Table 3.4, we report percentiles of the income yield distribution across
data sources. Here, we see that the 75th percentile yield in the SCF is substantially higher
than the counterpart in Pratt’s Stats. This result suggests that the SCF overestimates the
right-skewness of the cross-sectional distribution of business returns.
An obvious concern about the broker data is its representativeness. There may be a bias
in business returns arising from the comparison of ongoing concerns (in the SCF) and
a possibly selected subset of businesses that were sold. For instance, if businesses with
higher rates of return also have a higher probability of finding potential buyers, then
Pratt’s Stats returns will be biased upward. On the other hand, there could be factors
that lead to a downward bias in the Pratt’s Stats returns. Sales triggered by distress, say
because of health-related issues facing the owner, would imply a lower yield. Similarly,
sales of technology- or research-intensive businesses would imply lower yields because of
the significant expensing done by these firms. We can partially correct for the downward
bias by ignoring transactions in which the target company is in technology- and research-
intensive sectors (that is, with NAICS codes 51, 5415, or 5417) and those for which the
stated reason for the sale was health related. In the third column of Table 3.4, we report
the data for this subset of firms and find the results are nearly the same as for all businesses.
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Next, we compare SCF income yields to those of publicly traded firms in the CRSP-
Compustat database. This comparison has the advantage that we have a sample of busi-
nesses that are active, but it has the disadvantage that the typical firm in CRSP is much
larger than the typical firm in the SCF. To address this issue, we restrict our attention
to larger firms in the SCF (S and C corporations) and compare them to both the full
sample of CRSP-Compustat firms and a subset of small firms. Our baseline definition of
“small” is a firm that belongs to the bottom quintile of firms ranked by the book value
of assets.19 The income yield for a firm in CRSP-Compustat is computed by dividing
business income (before taxes and retained earnings) by the firms’ market capitalization.
The equally weighted and value-weighted means are computed as in (3.2) where we use the
end-of-year market capitalization as a measure of business value. In Table 3.5, we see that
the equally weighted income yield is negative for both the full sample (−9 percent) and
the subsample of small firms (−27 percent) in the CRSP-Compustat database, whereas
the yield is large and positive for both C corporations (57 percent) and S corporations
(76 percent) in the SCF. Similarly, SCF value-weighted yields are significantly higher than
CRSP yields, although less dramatically different. Considering the distribution, we again
find that the SCF yields are more right-skewed than those in CRSP-Compustat. For ex-
ample, at the 75th percentile, the SCF C-corporate yield is 36 percent, while the CRSP
yield for all businesses is 10 percent.
Our results thus far would appear to be inconsistent with Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2002), who constructed private business returns using SCF data and concluded that they
were surprisingly low when compared to those of publicly traded firms. We use a longer
sample than they do, but we know from Kartashova (2014) that this would account for
only about a 6 percentage point difference in the SCF estimates. The more important
difference for the quantitative results is the concept of return. The earlier results are
based on a measure of return equal to the sum of a value-weighted income yield and an
imputed capital gain. In theory, one would need a panel of firm valuations to compute a
value-weighted capital gain, namely,
Rcgt+1 =
∑
i
(
ωi,tVi,t∑
i ωi,tVi,t
)(
Vi,t+1
Vi,t
)
, (3.3)
19In Bhandari et al. (2019), we also report results separately for each survey year and for different
definitions of “small,” for example, based on gross sales or market capitalization.
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using survey weights {ωi,t} and valuations {Vi,t} for each firm i in year t. Given that the
SCF survey is triennial with virtually no panel aspect (other than two surveys), there is no
way to compute Vi,t+1/Vi,t firm by firm. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) instead
compute their capital gains measure using the following annualized index:
R˜cgt+3 =
(∑
i ωi,t+3Vi,t+3∑
i ωi,tVi,t
) 1
3
− 1. (3.4)
Their concept of rate of return is given by Rvwt + R˜
cg
t , where R
vw
t is defined in (3.2).
They adjust the SCF net income by subtracting imputed measures of taxes and retained
earnings and compare their measure of return to the value weighted mean holding period
return on the CRSP index portfolio.20 This procedure generates private returns that
are similar in magnitude to the CRSP returns. Considering the higher risk for private
businesses, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) conclude that there is a puzzle as
to why individuals become entrepreneurs. Their preferred explanation is that there are
non-pecuniary benefits of running a business.21
Replicating the exercise of Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) for our full sample
with income yields and capital gains compared separately, we find that the capital gain
imputation drives the differences between our findings and theirs. The results are summa-
rized in Table 3.6. The first two columns show estimates of SCF and CRSP-Compustat
income yields, Rvwt , in all SCF survey years. The last three columns show estimates of R˜
cg
t
for SCF and both Rcgt and R˜
cg
t for the CRSP-Compustat sample. The table reveals several
noteworthy patterns. First, consistent with our findings for the average income yields, the
yearly SCF yields are substantially higher than the CRSP-Compustat counterparts for all
survey years. Second, the annualized SCF capital gains vary substantially less than those
for firms in the CRSP-Compustat gains Rcgt over the sample, which is not surprising given
the conceptual differences in the measures and the long interval between survey years.22 If
20Since the assumptions underlying the imputations of taxes and retained earnings are ad hoc, we
measure Rvwt using pretax income in both the SCF and CRSP samples.
21See also Hamilton (2000) and Hurst and Pugsley (2011), who reach a similar conclusion using data
from the SIPP and the PSED, respectively.
22Incidentally, the time variation in the capital gains components explains why Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2002) and Kartashova (2014) estimate different average returns for the different sample periods
they study.
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we were to add Rvwt plus R˜
cg
t for SCF and R
vw
t plus R
cg
t for CRSP-Compustat firms, we
would confound two discrepancies and conclude that the private and public returns are not
very different on average: 26 percent for SCF versus 21 percent for CRSP-Compustat. If
we were to restrict attention to comparable measures, either Rvwt or R
vw
t + R˜
cg
t , we would
instead conclude that the private business yields and the imputed total returns are rela-
tively high for private businesses when compared to public returns, not low as previously
thought.
As we discussed in Section 3.3.3, we find that SCF returns are relatively high because there
are significant measurement and sampling errors. In the case of self-reported business
valuations, respondents would understate values of intangible assets or nontransferable
human capital (for example, reputation of the owner). Given that the SCF incomes are
verifiably overstated, an understatement of business value would bias the SCF returns
upward even more. Furthermore, a rate of return is the ratio of two terms, both of which
have measurement errors. This injects a much larger error in the ratio and can cause
large discrepancies in the distribution of measured returns with no obvious correction. A
constructive way to deal with the measurement issues in the SCF and estimate aggregate
and distributional statistics for business valuations is to rely more heavily on a theory that
is disciplined by the flows measured from the IRS and business sales data such as Pratt’s
Stats. A theory featuring business sales would take a stand on the selection bias and also
provide a way to impute the valuations for ongoing concerns.23
3.5 Robustness
In this section, we show that the overstatement of business incomes in the SCF is robust to
potential misreporting in the IRS and to potential miscategorization by SCF respondents
across closely related categories of business income.
3.5.1 Adjusting for misreporting in the IRS
One explanation for the overstated business incomes in the SCF is that individuals might
report true incomes in the surveys but underreport their incomes to the tax authorities. In
23An attempt in this direction is some ongoing work in Bhandari and McGrattan (2018).
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principle, this should not be a concern for our analysis because the SCF specifically asks
them to report what they wrote on their tax forms. Nevertheless, we analyze data from
several sources on the extent of misreporting on tax forms to evaluate this hypothesis and
conclude that tax misreporting is far from sufficient to close the gap between the SCF and
IRS business incomes.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates tax misreporting for noncorporate in-
come (that is, incomes from sole proprietorships and partnerships) to reconcile the national
accounts with the data from tax audits. For the years 1988–2015, the BEA estimates that
reported noncorporate tax incomes are lower by roughly 50 percent because of misreporting.
These BEA estimates are in line with studies such as Johns and Slemrod (2010), who used
tax audit data for the year 2001 and document that Schedule C income is underreported
by 54 percent. For S- and C-corporate business incomes, measures of tax misreporting
are hard to obtain. Johns and Slemrod (2010) document underreporting of 18 percent for
Schedule E income, which includes all supplemental income from S corporations, partner-
ships, rental real estate, royalties, estates, trusts, and farm rentals. Based on reviews of
documents stemming from the National Research Program at the IRS, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) estimates net misreporting margins for S-corporate incomes
on the order of 15 to 20 percent. We construct a measure of adjusted IRS pass-through
income by adding back the BEA estimates of misreporting for noncorporate incomes, along
with an adjustment of 18 percent for income from S corporations based on the study of
Johns and Slemrod (2010) and the reports of the GAO. In Figure 3.9, we compare the SCF
business incomes per return to the adjusted IRS incomes per return and find that they are
still significantly higher. Computing the SCF errors as before, we find that the average
error with the tax audit adjustment is 178 percent, with a range of errors of 98 percent to
274 percent over the sample.
3.5.2 Adjusting for categorization of business income
Another source of measurement error in the SCF is the respondent’s possible confusion
about closely related categories of business income. For example, when asked about income
from a sole proprietorship appearing on line 31 of Schedule C, business owners might also
include income appearing on Schedule E, which includes income from real estate, royalties,
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partnerships, S corporations, estates, and trusts. From our previous analysis, we know
that business incomes from Schedule C are overstated in the SCF. If the overstatement
was due to classification errors, we should see an understatement in categories of income
corresponding to Schedule E. In Table 3.7, we report the percentage errors for Schedule E
income and document that they are overstated for most survey years.
Johnson and Moore (2008) conducted a similar exercise but constructed an even broader
category of business income by including capital gains and losses (lines 13 and 14 of Form
1040) to the incomes individuals report on Schedules C, E, and F. Neither the IRS nor
SCF data allow us to isolate the capital gains for business owners or for business-related
assets. Hence, we did not include these data in our baseline analysis of business income.
In Bhandari et al. (2019), we replicate the findings of Johnson and Moore (2008) and
extend them to all survey years. We find that, although the capital gains in the SCF are
lower when compared to the IRS gains, the Johnson and Moore (2008) measure of broader
business income in the SCF is still larger in all years than its counterpart in the IRS. The
average error is 47 percent, with a range of 18 percent to 115 percent across survey years.
3.6 Other Surveys
In this section, we review evidence from other surveys, namely, the CPS, PSID, SIPP, KFS,
and PSED. These surveys contain information about businesses and have been widely used
by researchers. When comparing business incomes and valuations across these surveys and
with the SCF, we find that there are significant inconsistencies but similar concerns related
to sampling and measurement.
We start with the CPS, PSID, and SIPP. All three surveys contain questions about business
incomes and organizational forms (that is, whether they are incorporated or unincorpo-
rated). The PSID and SIPP additionally contain self-reported estimates of business valu-
ations.24 Unlike the SCF, the surveys have less detailed information on the legal form of
the businesses. For example, these surveys do not distinguish among types of pass-through
businesses, and the questionnaires do not specifically connect responses to line items on
tax forms. In order to compare across surveys, we focus on business income per owner and
24See Bhandari et al. (2019) for more details.
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income yields for unincorporated businesses.
In Figure 3.10, we plot incomes per owner for four surveys (SCF, CPS, PSID, and SIPP)
and the IRS in Panel A and the number of owners for all surveys in Panel B.25 As with the
SCF, the CPS, PSID, and SIPP have higher business income per owner than is reported
by the IRS, but the magnitudes are statistically different across surveys. The SCF is
highest with estimates in the range of $29,000–$100,000, the PSID is next with a range
of $15,000–$55,000, the CPS after that with a range of $15,000–$35,000, and the SIPP
is lowest with a range of $13,000–$18,000. All are higher than the IRS, which has a
range of $5,000–$15,000.26 The inconsistencies between surveys are driven primarily by
differences in aggregate business incomes. The number of owners across these surveys are
not significantly different from each other—on the order of 10 to 13 million and stable
across years—but are far lower than the IRS, which reports roughly 35 million owners in
1988 and over 50 million by 2015.27
Next, we use the responses on self-reported business valuations to compute income yields,
as we did for the SCF in Section 3.4. In Table 3.8, we see that value weighted income
yields in the PSID and SIPP are comparable to the SCF even though business income
per owner is lower than that in the SCF by a factor of two or three. This implies that
average business values are even lower in these other surveys. However, if we compare
yields across the distribution, we see large differences, especially in the right tail. These
observations point to the lack of representativeness in the PSID and SIPP for the universe
of unincorporated businesses as well as their lack of comparability to the SCF.
25Our sample in the PSID starts in 1992 and provides annual data until 1996 and biennially after that
until 2014. The SIPP reports business incomes every four months for the years 2004–2006 and 2009–2012,
and valuations are reported once a year for 2004, 2005, and 2009–2011 depending on when the “topical”
modules are available.
26Hurst, Li, and Pugsley (2014) combine spending data from the Consumer Expenditure (CE) survey
with the PSID and estimate that self-employed individuals underreport income by about 25 percent relative
to an imputed measure of true income. The imputation relies on estimating the relationship between
expenditures and incomes for wage and salary workers and using it along with food expenditures for the
self-employed to infer “true” income of the self-employed. We instead compare survey responses directly to
IRS data.
27As in the SCF, these surveys only account for partners who are individuals. However, as we mentioned
before, using estimates from Cooper et al. (2016), this fact alone does not help to account for the massive
understatement in the number of owners.
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For KFS, Gurley-Calvez et al. (2016) compare responses about receipts, expenses, and
profits with matched tax forms for an eight-year panel of new businesses beginning in
2004. They match responses from Form 1040, Schedule C for sole proprietorships, Form
1065 for partnerships, and Form 1120S or 1120 for corporations. Eighty percent of firms
are matched to tax files, and the matched data file includes 3,940 firms. They find that the
businesses in the survey overstate receipts and overstate expenses by even more, implying
that the businesses understate profits across the distribution. These findings are for the
most part in contrast to the SCF and IRS comparison, as the SCF overstates business
income, while the KFS firms understate business income. We report estimates from their
study in Table 3.9 for ease of comparison.
The PSED provides information about business start-ups using a nationally representative
sample. However, from the perspective of our study, the PSED suffers from a critical
measurement issue: the response rates for business-related questions is very low in all
years of the survey. For example, among the 1,214 entrepreneurs in the 2005 panel, only
115 (that is, 9 percent) responded to the question that asks about calculated profits and
losses during a follow-up interview for tax year 2006. Thus, we would caution against any
use of statistics for quantitative research on entrepreneurial activity from this survey given
the small sample size.
In summary, we find severe measurement issues with other surveys currently being used
to study U.S. businesses. Key statistics drawn from these surveys are inconsistent with
administrative data from the IRS and are inconsistent with each other.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper has examined the reliability of widely used survey data for studies of U.S. busi-
nesses. We compared key statistics for net incomes and receipts to counterparts in ad-
ministrative data from the IRS and found large sampling and measurement errors. In
all surveys examined, we found that incomes are significantly overstated relative to IRS
data, even when respondents are asked to provide incomes from specific lines on their tax
forms. The errors we document are large on average and vary wildly across years and
across surveys. We provide evidence that the overstatements of income may be due to the
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nonrepresentativeness of business owners with lower incomes and to the fact that the ma-
jority of respondents do not reference any tax or financial documents. We also consider the
implications for key statistics used in economic research, such as the level and dispersion
of wealth and the return on businesses.
We hope and expect that our analysis will lead to improved measurement in future surveys.
Studies of wealth inequality, entrepreneurial choice, and business taxation are using current
surveys as predictive tests for economic theory. Our findings suggest that the current data
should be treated with great caution, but we hope improvements in sampling will lead to
improvements in quantitative predictions in the future. Attempts should be made to link
responses to administrative data where possible. Questions should be limited to queries
that are verifiable. In the case of businesses, care should be taken to ensure representative
samples of all types of legal organizations.
Table 3.1: Decomposition of SCF-IRS pass-through business income gap
Percentage of Gap
Tax SCF−IRS Overstatement Understatement
Year $ Bill. of Profit of Loss
1988 159 50 50
1991 307 64 36
1994 624 83 17
1997 386 63 37
2000 635 68 32
2003 785 71 29
2006 1,096 77 23
2009 750 41 59
2012 218 −56 156
Mean 551 51 49
Note: This table shows the difference (gap) between aggregated business income of all pass-through businesses in
the SCF and the IRS. The gap is then decomposed into the fraction attributable to an overstatement of profits or
that attributable to an understatement of losses.
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Table 3.2: Sole proprietorships with net losses in the IRS and SCF by AGI bins, 2015
IRS SCF
AGI Returns Losses Returns Losses
Bins ’000 $ Bil. ’000 $ Bil.
No adjusted gross income 426.0 12.2 91.4 0.2
$1 under $5,000 138.3 0.9 39.7 0.2
$5,000 under $10,000 185.7 1.5 33.3 0.0
$10,000 under $15,000 270.8 2.4 10.6 0.0
$15,000 under $20,000 344.3 3.5 47.9 0.0
$20,000 under $25,000 351.4 3.1 60.0 0.2
$25,000 under $30,000 316.8 3.0 77.5 0.2
$30,000 under $40,000 533.0 3.9 102.2 0.6
$40,000 under $50,000 469.3 3.4 62.8 0.0
$50,000 under $75,000 833.7 5.8 159.3 0.1
$75,000 under $100,000 626.4 4.3 199.5 0.8
$100,000 under $200,000 1047.9 7.7 216.2 0.8
$200,000 under $500,000 312.4 3.7 71.6 0.4
$500,000 under $1,000,000 50.4 1.3 0.0 0.0
$1,000,000 under $1,500,000 11.6 0.6 0.6 0.0
$1,500,000 under $2,000,000 5.3 0.4 0.0 0.0
$2,000,000 under $5,000,000 8.4 1.0 0.1 0.0
$5,000,000 under $10,000,000 2.3 0.5 0.7 0.0
$10,000,000 or more 1.8 1.3 36.6 0.0
Note: This table shows the number of business returns that report a net loss and the corresponding amount of these
net losses across various AGI bins for tax year 2015.
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Table 3.3: Percentage of respondents checking documents in SCF 2016
Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently
Income tax document 75 2 9 14
Other financial documents 64 6 15 15
Note: This table shows the fraction of business owners that refer to their income tax documents or other relevant
financial documents in varying frequency. A respondent who referred to account statements, investment/business
records, or loan documents is considered to have checked other financial documents.
Table 3.4: Net income yields in the SCF and Pratt’s Stats
SCF Pratt’s Stats
All All Non-tech &
Moments businesses businesses nondistressed
Equally weighted mean 102.5 27.4 29.3
Value weighted mean 19.1 1.9 3.5
p25 0.9 3.8 5.0
p50 17.6 21.7 23.1
p75 63.0 46.8 48.3
Note: This table shows moments of the net income yield distribution from the SCF and Pratt’s Stats. For Pratt’s
Stats, we also consider income yields for a subset of businesses that excludes those in technology- and research-
intensive sectors (NAICS codes 51, 5415, or 5417) and those for which the stated reason for the sale was health
related.
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Table 3.5: Net income yields in the SCF and CRSP-Compustat
SCF CRSP-Compustat
C Corps S Corps All businesses Small businesses
Equally weighted mean 56.8 76.4 −9.2 −26.6
Value weighted mean 16.9 15.2 7.3 −8.5
p25 1.3 2.2 −5.5 −29.0
p50 10.6 14.2 5.4 −7.7
p75 36.2 50.5 10.4 4.0
Note: This table shows moments of the net income yield distribution from the SCF and the CRSP-Compustat
database. For the CRSP-Compustat sample, small businesses refer to publicly traded firms in the CRSP database
that belong to the bottom 20 percent when ranked by total assets.
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Table 3.6: Net income yields and capital gains
Tax Year Net Income Yields Capital Gains
SCF CRSP SCF CRSP-Compustat
(t− 1)→ t (t− 3)→ t
1988 16.6 12.4 — — —
1991 20.7 6.2 0.2 26.9 13.2
1994 31.5 9.8 5.3 -3.2 8.5
1997 20.6 6.2 11.4 30.2 29.7
2000 22.6 4.6 11.7 3.7 13.8
2003 17.7 6.2 6.6 28.6 -4.8
2006 18.1 8.0 15.9 10.3 8.9
2009 14.8 5.7 −7.9 21.6 -8.6
2012 14.1 8.0 2.9 12.0 9.6
2015 14.6 5.4 12.8 -3.0 10.7
Mean 19.1 7.3 6.6 14.6 9.0
Note: This table shows estimates of income yields and capital gains for businesses in the SCF and CRSP-Compustat
firms. For the SCF, capital gains are computed using Equation 3.4 found in the main text, as in Moskowitz and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). For the CRSP-Compustat firms, we report two measures of capital gains. The column
(t − 1) → t measures the realized capital gains using Equation 3.3 for year t where t corresponds to the fiscal year
for which income is reported in the SCF. The column (t− 3)→ t measures a geometric mean of the capital gains for
the index over the past three periods using equation 3.4.
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Table 3.7: Schedule E income comparison
Tax Year IRS SCF Error
$ Bill. $ Bill. %
1988 57.3 116.1 102.6
1991 69.9 129.6 85.6
1994 133.0 121.8 −8.4
1997 195.3 147.0 −24.7
2000 249.0 180.3 −27.6
2003 292.7 427.1 45.9
2006 463.1 805.6 74.0
2009 380.8 720.7 89.3
2012 613.3 949.3 54.8
2015 713.2 1142.1 60.1
Note: This table shows aggregated Schedule E income from the IRS and respondents’ reported Schedule E income
in the SCF. Dollar amounts are in billions.
Table 3.8: Income yield distribution of noncorporate businesses in the SCF, SIPP, and
PSID
SCF SIPP PSID
Value-weighted mean 22.6 17.7 14.9
p25 0.8 2.2 3.2
p50 19.6 33.2 27.0
p75 70.6 230.1 114.9
Note: This table shows moments of the income yield distribution for noncorporate businesses for the SCF, SIPP, and
PSID. The columns average the income yields for all years that the data are available. The SCF is available triennially
between 1989 and 2016, the SIPP for the years 2004–2005 and 2009–2011, and the PSID biennially between 1988
and 2014.
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Table 3.9: Comparison of KFS and IRS business tax data, 2004–2011
Receipts Expenses Profit
KFS IRS Error KFS IRS Error KFS IRS Error
Statistic ’000 ’000 % ’000 ’000 % ’000 ’000 %
Mean 552 417 32 369 188 96 30 169 −82
Median 92 66 29 57 36 57 5 24 −79
p25 21 11 74 1 12 -1,400 -3 1 −700
p75 350 281 25 236 152 55 31 142 −78
p99 11,500 7,434 55 7,450 2,680 178 810 2,478 −67
Note: The source of statistics is Gurley-Calvez et al. (2016).
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Figure 3.1: Adjusted gross incomes: SCF vs. IRS
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Note: For the IRS, adjusted gross income is obtained from Form 1040. For the SCF, if AGI is not available, we
construct it by adding the appropriate income categories.
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Figure 3.2: Business income per return by legal entity: SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots business income per business tax return in the IRS and the SCF as reported on Form 1040
Schedule C for sole proprietorships, Form 1120S for S corporations, Form 1065 for partnerships, and Form 1120 for
C corporations. IRS data for partnerships, S corporations, and C corporations are available only until 2013. IRS
data for C corporations exclude data for those filing 1120A, 1120F, 1120L, 1120PC, 1120REIT, 1120RIC. Prior to
1990, only consolidated information is available and thus is not comparable to the series plotted here. The shaded
region for the SCF shows the 90 percent confidence interval.
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Figure 3.3: Number of returns by legal entity: SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the number of business returns of sole proprietorships, S corporations, partnerships, and C
corporations over time in the IRS and the SCF. IRS data for partnerships, S corporations, and C corporations are
available only until 2013, and C-corporation data are unavailable prior to 1990 when only consolidated information is
available and thus is not comparable to the series plotted here. The shaded region for the SCF shows the 90 percent
confidence interval.
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Figure 3.4: Proprietor income shares: SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the fraction of business income from sole proprietorships attributable to returns with AGI
below the median and above the 99th percentile.
Figure 3.5: Income per return, proprietors with below- and above-median AGI: SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots sole proprietorship business income per return for those with below- and above-median AGI.
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Figure 3.7: Comparing proprietors’ individual and business incomes, SCF
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Note: This figure plots business income per return in the SCF for questions that ask respondents to report individual
incomes listed on Form 1040, lines 12 plus 18, and business income on Schedule C of 1040, line 31.
Figure 3.6: Number of returns, proprietors with below- and above-median AGI: SCF
vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the number of sole proprietorship returns (Form 1040 Schedule C) filed by business owners
with below- and above median AGI.
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Figure 3.8: Equally and value-weighted average net income yields, SCF
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Note: This figure plots equally weighted and value-weighted average net income yields. The SCF sample includes
businesses with positive net worth and excludes the bottom 1st percentile of these businesses. The business income of
each business that the family members own in the SCF is obtained from SCF variables that correspond to information
on business tax forms.
Figure 3.9: Pass-through business income per return with tax misreporting adjustments,
SCF vs. IRS
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Note: In this figure, we use BEA estimates for misreporting of pass-through business incomes and reports from the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) on misreporting of S-corporation business incomes to adjust IRS pass-
through business income per return. We add these yearly adjustments to the sum of pass-through income in the
IRS, calculate total business income per tax return, and compare it with estimates from the SCF.
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Figure 3.10: Unincorporated business income per owner and number of owners
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Note: This figure plots the total business income per owner of unincorporated businesses (Panel A) and total number
of unincorporated business owners (Panel B) in the SCF, CPS, PSID, SIPP, and the IRS. Before 2004, the SIPP
does not provide information about an individual’s own share of business income from an unincorporated business.
Instead, it contains information about the total income of the business, which is not enough information to calculate
the total business income of unincorporated businesses.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Data
SIPP
I use the U.S. Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to
document information on wealth holdings, income, health insurance coverage, as well as
employment transitions. The SIPP is a longitudinal survey that follows individuals for
a duration of up to five years, with interviews being held in four-month intervals called
waves. Each respondent is then assigned to one of four rotation groups. The rotation group
determines which month within a wave a respondent is interviewed. Each interview covers
information about the four months (reference months) preceding the interview month. For
example, when a new SIPP panel starts and Wave 1 (the first four months of the new
panel) commences, the first rotation group is interviewed in the first month of Wave 1, the
second rotation group is interviewed in the second month of Wave 1, and so on. Once all
four rotation groups are interviewed at the end of the fourth month of Wave 1, Wave 2
begins with the second interview of the first rotation group. This way, all four rotation
groups, and thus all respondents, will have been interviewed at the end of each wave.
In each interview, respondents are asked questions about their income, labor force status,
health insurance information, as well as government transfer receipts over the previous
four months not including the interview month. The SIPP also contains information on
the asset holdings of the respondent. In each SIPP panel, respondents provide information
175
on various types of asset holdings at two or three waves of the panel, usually one year
or, equivalently, three waves apart. For documenting wealth holdings, I use the 2004
panel of the SIPP, which contains 12 waves covering information between January 2004
and December 2007. This particular panel allows us to observe data on asset holdings at
Waves 3 and 6.
Sample selection I restrict my sample to individuals between the ages of 25 and 64
who do not own a business or derive income from self-employment. Business ownership is
identified using variable EBUSCNTR which asks about the number of businesses owned
during the reference period. Self-employment earnings is identified using variable TBM-
SUM which asks respondents to report the amount of income received from any business
during the reference period.
Labor market transitions by health status In this section, I discuss the details
of calculating the age profile of quarterly job-finding rates by health insurance coverage
presented in the validation section using the SIPP 1996-2008 Panels.
The SIPP collects weekly information on employment status. Since I am interested in quar-
terly job-finding rates, I convert the data into a quarterly frequency, with the employment
status for any given quarter set as the employment status reported during the first week
of that quarter. A respondent is considered employed if he/she reports having a job and
either working or not on layoff, but absent without pay and as unemployed (U) if he/she
reports either having no job and actively looking for work or having a job but currently
laid off. An individual experiences a UE transition in a given month if he/ is unemployed
at the beginning of the month and employed at the beginning of next month.
I then classify the unemployed as either with health insurance or without health insurance.
Doing so requires keeping track of unemployment spells. I restrict the sample of unemployed
to those whom I observe both their entry into unemployment, exit back into employment,
as well as all periods of unemployment in between. I then further restrict unemployment
spells to those that commence because of firm distress (i.e. caused by a layoff, employer
bankruptcy, sale of employer’s business, or slack work/business conditions). The SIPP
also contains information on respondents’ monthly insurance status as well as the source
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of coverage.1 I consider the respondent uninsured during the reference period if he/she
indicates not being covered by either Medicare, Medicaid, military-related health insurance,
or any type of private health insurance. Individuals are considered to be without coverage
during their unemployment spell if the are uninsured for more than 50 percent of their
unemployment duration.
The job finding rate for any given age is then calculated by calculating the fraction of age
t unemployed individuals who transition into employment in the next quarter.
Asset to income distribution In this section, I describe in detail the calculation of
specific moments of the asset-to-income distribution. These moments are used as both
calibration targets (median asset to quarterly labor income, fraction with non-positive
wealth) and well as moments to validate the model against (percentiles).
I focus on assets that can be used to both insure against income risk and fund retirement
consumption. More formally, this encompasses net financial assets, net equity in vehicles,
as well as retirement accounts.
The SIPP contains individual level data on financial liquid assets such as interest-earning
financial assets in banking and other instutitions, amount in non-interest-earning checking
accounts, equity in stocks and mutual funds, and face value of U.S. savings bonds. More-
over, for married individuals, the survey asks about the amount of these assets in joint
accounts. Only one spouse is asked about joint accounts; the response is then divided by
two, and the divided amount is copied to both spouses’ records. The SIPP also contains
information about revolving debt on credit card balances at the individual level for both
single and joint accounts in the same fashion. The summation of the amounts in liquid
asset accounts net of revolving debt gives us the net financial asset holdings of the indi-
vidual. The SIPP also provides data on equity in cars at the household level. I split that
amount between the members of the household who are age 16 or older, and record that
value as the amount of equity in cars for each individual within the household. Finally,
the SIPP also collects information on the market value of retirement savings instruments
in the form of a 401k, 403b, thrift plan, Individual Retirement Account (IRA), or KEOGH
account. Respondents are asked to provide information about plans which are only under
1EHIMTH asks respondents if they have private health insurnace coverage during the month; ECDMTH,
Medicaid; ECRMTH, Medicare; and RCHAMPM, military-related health insurance.
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their name. My measure of wealth is thus the sum of net financial asset holdings, net
equity in vehicles, and the market value of retirement accounts.2
The SIPP also provides information about the monthly gross job earnings for each individ-
ual. I use this information to determine the monthly gross labor income of the individual.
If the individual is unemployed during the interview month, I use his/her gross labor in-
come associated with the last employment from earlier waves. The ratio of these wealth
and income thus measure the number of months an indivual’s wealth holdings can replace
earnings in the event of job loss. The asset-to-income distribution reported in Table 2.2
reports this measure in terms of quarters.
Joint distribution of wages and employer provided health insurance (EPHI)
The model is calibrated to match the joint distribution of wages and take-up of EPHI
calculated using the SIPP 2004 Panel. To calculate this, I first restrict the sample to
employed respondents and subsequently group them into wage quintiles. For each wage
quintile, I calculate the fraction of employed workers who report being under a private
health insurance plan and specifying that it is provided by a current employer.3 This
distribution is reported in Table 1.1 as the average across all months in the SIPP 2004
Panel.
2Asset holdings are calculated as follows by using the following variables in SIPP data:
Net financial assets = TALICHA+TALJCHA+TALSBV+TIMIA+TIMJA+TIAITA+TIAJTA+ESMIV+ESMJV-(EALIDAB+EALJDAB)
where TALICHA (TALJCHA) is the amount of non-interest-earning checking accounts in own name
(joint account), TALSBV is the face value of U.S. savings bonds, TIMIA (TIMJA) is amount of
bonds/securities in own name (joint account), TIAITA (TIAJTA) is the amount in interest earning
account in own name (joint account), ESMIV (ESMJV) value of stocks/funds in own name (joint account),
and EALIDAB (EALJDAB) amount owed for store bills/credit cards in own name (joint account).
Then, net equity in vehicles of the household is given by THHVEHCL. I divide this value among the
members of the household above age 16. Thus, I get the net liquid asset holdings of the individual as follows:
Net liquid assets = Net financial assets +THHVEHCL /number of persons within the household age 16 and above. Finally,
Retirement assets= TALTB + TALRB + TALKB
3EHIMTH asks respondents if they have private health insurnace coverage during the month. Respon-
dents who indicate having private health insurnace in any given month during a reference period are then
asked the source of health insurance by EHEMPLY.
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CPS and NBER Taxsim
I estimate the parameters of the piecewise linear tax function in Equation 1.11 using
the 2007 CPS March Supplement and the NBER’s tax simulation program (TAXSIM).
TAXSIM requires users to input cross-sectional data on marital status, dependents, state
of residence, and various sources of income among others. It then provides estimates of
average and marginal tax rates.
I use information on the filing status of each respondents in the CPS to determine whether
a person or married couple is filing separately or filing jointly. In cases when household
members file separately, I assume that the head of the household claims all dependents for
personal exemptions.
Taxable household income comprises of wages and salaries; income from self employment
(business or farm); income from interest, dividends, rent, and capital gains; income from
alimony; taxable pensions, social security benefits, and unemployment insurance receipts.
There are four main deductible expenses in the U.S. tax code, namely: medical expenses,
state taxes paid, mortgage interest, and charitable contributions. I use CPS data on
medical expenses and state tax liability (after deductions) for the first two categories; due
to data limitations, I set mortgage income and charitable contributions to zero.
After obtaining average and marginal tax rates for each household in the CPS sample using
TAXSIM, I compute bracket-specific income weighted average- and marginal tax rates.
A.2 Computation of Transitional Dynamics
Preliminaries
Before discussing the details of the computational algorithm, I will first outline some no-
tation. Let P ∈ {b, n} denote the policy being implemented, where b is the baseline policy
and n is the new (universal) policy. The transition begins at period j = 0 and ends at
period j = J tr. Let V Pt (s) and d
P
t (s) denote the value functions and policy functions of
an agent with age t and state s when the economy is in a steady state under policy P .4
Likewise, denote V Pt,j (s) and d
P
t,j (s) denote the value functions and policy functions of an
4For simplicity, the value function V and policy function d is used as a stand-in for the several value
functions and policy functions of households and firms alike in the model.
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agent when the economy is under policy P during period j of the transition.5 Let {rj , θj}
denote the interest rate and market tightness of the economy in transition period j.
The economy begins with stationary distribution µb under the baseline economy at tran-
sition period j = 0. For transition period j > 0, a universal healthcare system is intro-
duced in the following manner. First, the Medicaid asset-test amc and income-test zmc
are abolished while non-financial eligibility probability γn is set to 1. This implies that
households in the economy are unexpectedly and permanently enrolled in the government
health insurance program. Second, the firms no longer offer health insurance and wh = 0.
Finally, the additional payroll tax is phased-in, following a linear slope. In particular,
T pj (z) =
(
βTaxi + ξ
n × jJtr
)
z + αTaxi for all brackets i, where J
tr is the length of the
transition and ξn is the additional payroll tax required to finance the reform.
After having solved the stationary equilibrium under the baseline economy and the economy
with universal healthcare, the computational algorithm outlined below is used to solve for
transitional dynamics.
Computational algorithm
1. Guess a path of interest rates
{
roldj
}j=Jtr
j=0
and impose that r0 = r
b and rJtr = r
n.
Similarly, guess a path of market tightness
{
θoldj
}j=Jtr
j=0
and impose that θ0 = θ
b and
θJtr = θ
n.
2. Starting from value functions V nt,Jtr (s) = V
n
t (s), compute for the sequence of value
functions and policy functions
{
V nt,j (s) , d
n
t,j (s)
}j=Jtr−1
j=1
taking as given the path of
prices and government taxes.
3. Using the sequence of policy functions
{
dnt,j (s)
}j=Jtr−1
j=1
and distribution of agents
across states
{
µnj
}j=Jtr−1
j=1
, calculate capital supply Ks,j and demand Kd,j for j ∈{
1, . . . , J tr − 1}. Let
r,j = Ks,j −Kd,j
5The same notation is used for the value of a posting a vacancy and the value of a firm offering a or
matched with a worker.
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4. Using the sequence of job acceptance decisions rules, firm value functions, and dis-
tribution of agents across states for all j ∈ {1, . . . , J tr − 1}, check if the free entry
condition in Equation 1.9 holds ∀j. Let
θ,j =
∫
y
q (θj) 1
1 + r
∫
sU
da,t,j (sW ) J¯t,j (sU , y) dµ
U
j (sU )
 dµJ (y)− κ
5. (Updating interest rates) To update the guess of the path of interest rates, for each
period j, compute Knewj = χkKd,j + (1− χk)Ks,j , where 0 < χk < 1 is an updating
weight that aids in convergence. Then, set the new guess for interest rate to be rnewj
such that
Knewj =
∫
k∗
(
x, y; rnewj
)
µJj (x, y)
is satisfied, where k∗
(
x, y; rnewj
)
=
[
(1−ω)ψA(x,y)
rnewj
] 1
1−ψ
satisfies firm first-order con-
ditions, µJj is the distribution of firm-worker pairs (indexed by their skill x and
productivity y) in transition period j . This procedure yields an update of interest
rates
{
rnewj
}j=Jtr
j=0
6. (Updating market tightness) Set θnewj = χθθˆj+(1− χθ) θoldj , where 0 < χθ < 1. Here,
θˆj is such that the value of a vacancy in period j given by Equation 1.9 is 0. This
procedure yields an update of market tightness
{
θnewj
}j=Jtr
j=0
.
7. Using convergence criterion , check if max1≤j≤Jtr |θ,j | <  and max1≤j≤Jtr |r,j | < .
Otherwise, update prices
{
roldj , θ
old
j
}j=Jtr
j=0
=
{
rnewj , θ
new
j
}j=Jtr
j=0
and iterate until asset
markets clear and the free entry condition is satisfied for all periods in the transition.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Data
SIPP data
We use the U.S. Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
to document the liquid asset holdings of individuals. The SIPP is a longitudinal survey
that follows individuals for a duration of up to five years, with interviews being held
in four-month intervals called waves. Each respondent is then assigned to one of four
rotation groups. The rotation group determines which month within a wave a respondent
is interviewed. Each interview covers information about the four months (reference months)
preceding the interview month. For example, when a new SIPP panel starts and Wave 1
(the first four months of the new panel) commences, the first rotation group is interviewed
in the first month of Wave 1, the second rotation group is interviewed in the second month
of Wave 1, and so on. Once all four rotation groups are interviewed at the end of the fourth
month of Wave 1, Wave 2 begins with the second interview of the first rotation group. This
way, all four rotation groups, and thus all respondents, will have been interviewed at the
end of each wave.
In each interview, respondents are asked questions about their income, labor force status
and government transfer receipts over the previous four months not including the interview
month. In the end, the SIPP provides monthly data on income and government transfers
and weekly data on labor force status. Most importantly, the SIPP also contains data on
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the asset holdings of the respondent. In each SIPP panel, respondents provide information
on various types of asset holdings at two or three waves of the panel, usually one year
or, equivalently, three waves apart. We use the 2004 panel of the SIPP, which contains
12 waves covering information between January 2004 and December 2007. This particular
panel allows us to observe data on asset holdings at Waves 3 and 6. Since it is the closest
date to the Great Recession, we calculate the asset distribution using Wave 6.
Asset distribution
We focus on the liquid asset holdings of individuals. The SIPP contains individual level
data on financial liquid assets such as interest-earning financial assets in banking and other
instutitions, amount in non-interest-earning checking accounts, equity in stocks and mutual
funds, and face value of U.S. savings bonds. Moreover, for married individuals, the survey
asks about the amount of these assets in joint accounts. Only one spouse is asked about
joint accounts; the response is then divided by two, and the divided amount is copied to
both spouses’ records. The SIPP also contains information about revolving debt on credit
card balances at the individual level for both single and joint accounts in the same fashion.
The summation of the amounts in liquid asset accounts net of revolving debt gives us the
net financial asset holdings of the individual. Finally, the SIPP provides data on equity in
cars at the household level. We split that amount between the members of the household
who are age 16 or older, and record that value as the amount of equity in cars for each
individual within the household. Adding this value to net financial asset holdings of the
individual gives us the measure of liquid asset holdings for each individual.1
1Net financial asset holdings are calculated as follows by us-
ing the following variables in SIPP data: Net financial assets =
TALICHA+TALJCHA+TALSBV+TIMIA+TIMJA+TIAITA+TIAJTA+ESMIV+ESMJV-
(EALIDAB+EALJDAB) where TALICHA (TALJCHA) is the amount of non-interest-earning checking
accounts in own name (joint account), TALSBV is the face value of U.S. savings bonds, TIMIA (TIMJA)
is amount of bonds/securities in own name (joint account), TIAITA (TIAJTA) is the amount in interest
earning account in own name (joint account), ESMIV (ESMJV) value of stocks/funds in own name
(joint account), and EALIDAB (EALJDAB) amount owed for store bills/credit cards in own name (joint
account). Then, net equity in vehicles of the household is given by THHVEHCL. We divide this value
among the members of the household above age 16. Thus, we get the net liquid asset holdings of the
individual as follows: Net liquid assets = Net financial assets +THHVEHCL /number of persons within
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The SIPP also provides information about the monthly gross job earnings for each in-
dividual. We use this information to determine the monthly gross labor income of the
individual. If the individual is unemployed during the interview month, we use her gross
labor income associated with the last employment from earlier waves. Next, using the
weekly employment status of the individual for that month, we calculate the weekly gross
labor income of the individual by dividing monthly gross labor income by the number of
weeks with a job during the interview month.
We then calculate annual income and payroll tax rates using the statutory U.S. income
tax codes in the following steps. First, we calculate the annual income of each individual.
Annual income includes labor income, capital income, and all kinds of government transfers
including UI received in the fiscal year. Next, we apply the year-specific federal income tax
schedule to the annual income net of year-specific personal exemptions and deductions to
obtain the total annual income tax for each respondent. After that, we calculate the total
annual payroll tax (Social Security and Medicare tax) for each individual. We obtain the
total annual payroll tax for each individual by applying the year-specific Social Security
and Medicare tax schedule to the total annual labor income of the individual for the time
period. 2 Then, our measure for the tax rate is
τ =
Share of labor income×Annual income tax + Annual payroll tax
Annual labor income
,
where the share of labor income is the ratio of annual labor income to annual income. We
then apply the tax rate τ for each individual in our sample and obtain weekly after-tax
labor income. Last, dividing the liquid asset holdings measure to weekly after-tax labor
income gives us the asset-to-income ratio for each individual.
B.2 Proofs
Opportunity cost of employment
In this section, we show the derivations of Equations (2.12) and (2.13) in the main text.
the household age 16 and above.
2We also consider the fact that there is a maximum taxable annual labor income for Social Security
tax, while Medicare tax does not have such a limit. As a result, we get total annual tax as the sum of total
annual income and payroll taxes.
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First, substituting (2.1) and (2.2) into (2.8), we have
SUE
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
=V W (a, w˜ (·) , β; p)− V UE (a,wUE , β; p)
=u
(
cW
)− u (cUE)+ ν (s)
+βE
[
δ
(
p′
) (
1− e (p′))V UE (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)
+ δ
(
p′
)
e
(
p′
)
V UI
(
a′W , β′; p′
)]
+βE
[(
1− δ (p′))V W (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)]
−βE
[
sf
(
θ
(
w˜ (·) ; p′))V W (a′UE , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)]
−βE [(1− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′))) (1− e (p′))V UE (a′UE , wUE , β′; p′)]
−βE [(1− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′))) e (p′)V UI (a′UE , β′; p′)]
In order to obtain (2.12), we add and subtract terms, rearrange them, then use (2.10), and
divide both sides by λW . This yields
SUE
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
λW
=
u
(
cW
)− u (cUE)+ ν (s)
λW
+
β
λW
E
[
sf
(
θ
(
w˜ (·) ; p′))
× (V W (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)− V W (a′UE , w˜ (·) , β′; p′))]
+
β
λW
E
[(
1− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′))− δ (p′) e (p′))
× (V UE (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)− V UE (a′UE , wUE , β′; p′))]
+
β
λW
E
[(
1− δ (p′)− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′)))
× (V W (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)− V W (a′W , w˜ (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′) , β′; p′))]
+
β
λW
E
[(
1− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′))− δ (p′)) e (p′)
× (V UE (a′UE , wUE , β′; p′)− V UI (a′UE , β′; p′))]
+ βE
[
λ′W
λW
(1− δ (p′)− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′)))S (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)
λ′W
]
where the summation of the second and third terms on the right-hand side is −zUEa , the
fourth term is −zUEw , and the fifth term is −zUEelg . Given the form of the utility function,
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we cannot isolate zUEflow from the first term on the right-hand side. However, since we
know that the flow value of employment is w˜
(
a,wUE , β; p
) × (1− τ), we can numerically
calculate zUEflow using the above equation as follows:
zUEflow =
SUE
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
λW
− w˜ (a,wUE , β; p)× (1− τ) + zUEa + zUEw + zUEelg
− βE
[
λ′W
λW
(1− δ (p′)− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′)))S (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)
λ′W
]
.
This gives us the opportunity cost of employment for the eligible unemployed zUE =
zUEflow + z
UE
a + z
UE
w + z
UE
elg for each state
(
a,wUE , β; p
)
.
Second, substituting (2.1) and (2.3) into (2.9), we have
SUI (a, β; p) = V W (a, w˜ (·) , β; p)− V UI (a, β; p)
= u
(
cW
)− u (cUI)+ ν (s)
+ βE
[
δ
(
p′
) [(
1− e (p′))V UE (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)+ e (p′)V UI (a′W , β′; p′)]]
+ βE
[(
1− δ (p′))V W (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)]
− βE [sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′))V W (a′UI , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)]
− βE [(1− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′)))V UI (a′UI , β′; p′)]
Similarly, in order to obtain (2.13), we again add and subtract terms, rearrange them, then
use (2.11), and divide both sides by λW . This yields
SUI (a, β; p)
λW
=
u
(
cW
)− u (cUI)+ ν (s)
λW
+
β
λW
E
[
sf
(
θ
(
w˜ (·) ; p′)) [V W (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)− V W (a′UI , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)]]
+
β
λW
E
[(
1− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′))) [V UI (a′W , β′; p′)− V UI (a′UI , β′; p′)]]
+
β
λW
E
[(
1− δ (p′)− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′)))
× (V W (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)− V W (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′))]
+
β
λW
E
[
δ
(
p′
) (
1− e (p′)) [V UE (a′W , w˜ (·) , β′; p′)− V UI (a′W , β′; p′)]]
+ βE
[
λ′W
λW
(1− δ (p′)− sf (θ (w˜ (·) ; p′)))SUI (a′W , β′; p′)
λ′W
]
,
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where the summation of the second and third terms on the right-hand side is −zUIa , the
fourth term is −zUIw , and the fifth term is −zUIelg . Similarly, we numerically calculate zUIflow
as follows:
zUIflow =
SUI (a, β; p)
λW
− w˜ (a, β; p)× (1− τ) + zUIa + zUIw + zUIelg
− βE
[
λ′W
λW
(
1− δ (p′)− sf (θ (w˜ (a′UI , β′; p′) ; p′)))SUI (a′W , β′; p′)
λ′W
]
.
This gives us the opportunity cost of employment for the eligible unemployed zUI = zUIflow+
zUIa + z
UI
w + z
UI
elg for each state (a, β; p) .
3
Block recursive equilibrium
Proposition 1: If i) utility function u (· ) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and
satisfies Inada conditions; ν (· ) is strictly increasing and strictly convex, ii) choice sets W
and A, and sets of exogenous processes P and B are bounded, iii) matching function M
exhibits constant returns to scale, and iv) UI policy is restricted to be only a function of
current aggregate labor productivity, then there exists a Block Recursive Equilibrium for
this economy. If, in addition, M = min {v, S}, then the Block Recursive Equilibrium is the
only recursive equilibrium.
Proof: The proof presented here follows from Karahan and Rhee (2013) and Herkenhoff
(2017), which are extensions of Menzio and Shi (2010, 2011). We extend the former’s proof
to a model in which government finances the time-varying UI benefits and show that the
model still admits block recursivity. We then use the model to study how UI policy must
vary over the business cycle. In doing so, the additional assumption we make here is to
restrict the class of UI policies to be a function of current aggregate labor productivity.
Existence: We prove the existence of the BRE in two steps. In the first step, we show
that the firm value functions and the corresponding labor market tightness depend on
the aggregate state of the economy only through the current aggregate labor productivity.
Then, in the second step, given that UI policy instruments are restricted to be a function
3In this numerical calculation, we calculate the opportunity cost under fixed wages and disregard zUEw
and zUIw .
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of the current aggregate labor productivity, we show that the household value functions do
not depend on the aggregate distribution of agents across states. As a result, we show that
given the UI policy, the solution of the household’s problem together with the solution of
the firm’s problem and labor market tightness, constitute a block recursive equilibrium.
Let J (W,P) be the set of bounded and continuous functions J such that J :W×P → R
and let TJ be an operator associated with (2.4) such that TJ : J → J . Then, using
Blackwell’s sufficiency conditions for a contraction and the assumptions of the boundedness
of sets of exogenous processes P and B, and choice setsW and A, we can show that TJ is a
contraction and has a unique fixed point J∗ ∈ J . Thus, the firm value function satisfying
(2.4) depends on the aggregate state of the economy µ only through the aggregate labor
productivity p. This means that the set of wages posted by the firms in equilibrium W
is determined by the aggregate labor productivity p as well. Then, plugging J∗ into (2.6)
yields
θ∗ (w; p) =
q
−1
(
κ
J∗(w;p)
)
if w ∈ W (p)
0 otherwise
Notice that, as explained in the main text, the constant-returns-to-scale property of the
matching function M is crucial here so that we can write the job finding rate and vacancy
filling rate as a function of θ only.4 Hence, we show that equilibrium market tightness does
not depend on the distribution of agents across states as well.
Next, using this result and the assumption that the UI policy only depends on p, we show
that the household value functions do not depend on the aggregate distribution of agents
across states. To do so, we first collapse the problem of households into one functional
equation and show that it is a contraction. Then, we show that the functional equation
maps the set of functions that depend on the aggregate state µ only through p.
Let Ω denote the possible realizations of the aggregate state µ and define a value function
R : {0, 1} × {0, 1} × A×W × B ×Ω → R such that
R (l = 1, d = 0, a, w, β;µ) = V W (a,w, β;µ)
R (l = 0, d = 1, a, w, β;µ) = V UE (a,w, β;µ)
R (l = 0, d = 0, a, w, β;µ) = V UI (a, β;µ)
4The free entry condition (2.6) is also important to pin down market tightness.
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Then, we define the set of functions R : {0, 1} × {0, 1} ×A×W ×B ×P → R and let TR
be an operator such that
(TRR) (l, d, a, w, β; p) =l
[
max
c,a′
u (c) + βE
[
δ
(
p′
) (
1− e (p′))R (l = 0, d = 1, ·)
+δ
(
p′
)
e
(
p′
)
R (l = 0, d = 0, ·) + (1− δ (p′))R (l = 1, d = 0, ·)]]
+ (1− l) d
[
max
c,a′,s
u (c)− ν (s) + βE
[
max
w˜
{
sf (θ (·))R (l = 1, d = 0, ·)
+ (1− sf (θ (·))) (1− e (p′))R (l = 0, d = 1, ·)
+ (1− sf (θ (·))) e (p′)R (l = 0, d = 0, ·)}]]
+ (1− l) (1− d)
[
max
c,a′,s
u (c)− ν (s)
+ βE
[
max
w˜
{
sf (θ (·))R (l = 1, d = 0, ·)
+ (1− sf (θ (·)))R (l = 0, d = 0, ·)
}]]
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r) a+ lw (1− τ) + (1− l) d [φ (p)w (1− τ) + h]
+ (1− l) (1− d)h
a′ ≥ −a
p′ ∼ F (p′ | p)
where we use the result from above that market tightness does depend on Γ.
Assuming the utility function is bounded and continuous, R is the set of continuous and
bounded functions. Then, we can show that the operator TR maps a function from R into
R (i.e., TR : R → R). Then, using Blackwell’s sufficiency conditions for a contraction and
the assumptions of boundedness of sets of exogenous processes P and B, and choice sets
W and A, we can show that TR is a contraction and has a unique fixed point R∗ ∈ R.
Thus, the solution to the household problem does depend on Γ. This constitutes a BRE
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along with the solution to the firm’s problem and the implied labor market tightness that
does not depend on Γ, given that the UI policy is a function of p only.
Uniqueness: We know that policy functions of the household do not depend on Γ. Now,
we prove the uniqueness of the policy functions for assets
{
gla (a,w, β; p)
}
l={W,UE}
, and
gUIa (a, β; p), wage choice g
UE
w (a,w, β; p) and g
UI
w (a, β; p), and search effort g
UE
s (a,w, β; p)
and gUIs (a, β; p).
Wage policy function: Under the assumptions on u (· ) and ν (· ) together with the
assumptions of boundedness of sets of exogenous processes P and B, and choice sets W
and A, value functions V l are strictly concave in w for l = {W,UE} and V UI is constant
in w. For simplicity, assume that p is non-stochastic and δ (p) = δ. We then obtain the
equilibrium value of a matched firm using Equation (2.4) as follows:5
J∗ (w; p) =
p− w
r + δ
(1 + r)
Then, we can write the equilibrium labor market tightness as
f (θ∗ (w; p)) = θ∗ (w; p) =
J∗ (w; p)
κ
where the first equality uses the assumption that M = min {v, S}, and the second equality
uses the free entry condition. Using the expression for J∗ (w; p) gives
f (θ∗ (w; p)) =
1 + r
κ (r + δ)
[p− w] > 0.
This implies that the job finding rate f (· ) is linear and decreasing in w. Then, rewriting
the objective function for the wage choice of eligible unemployed, we have
max
w˜
sf (θ (w˜; p))V W
(
a′, w˜, β′; p
)
+ (1− sf (θ (w˜; p)))
× [(1− e (p))V UE (a′, w, β′; p)+ e (p)V UI (a′, β′; p)]
Using the result that V l is strictly concave in w for l = {W,UE} and V UI is constant in w,
and that f (· ) is linear and decreasing in w, it is easy to show that the objective function
5The following results can be obtained under N state Markov process assumption for p and no restric-
tions on the job destruction rate.
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above is strictly concave in w. This implies that the wage policy function gUEw (a,w, β; p)
is unique.
Similarly, rewriting the objective function for the wage choice of ineligible unemployed
yields
max
w˜
sf (θ (w˜; p))V W
(
a′, w˜, β′; p
)
+ (1− sf (θ (w˜; p)))V UI (a′, β′; p) ,
and using the same reasoning implies that the wage policy function gUIw (a, β; p) is also
unique.
Asset policy function: Under the assumptions on the utility functions u (· ) and ν (· )
and choice sets A, W and exogenous proceses B, P, value functions V l are strictly concave
in assets. This implies that the objective functions for the asset choice of each employment
status are strictly concave in a′, and thus asset policy functions gla (a,w, β; p) are unique
for l = {W,UE,UI}
Search effort policy function: Using the same reasoning, objective functions for search
effort choice of eligible and ineligible unemployed are strictly concave in s. This implies
that the search effort policy functions gUEs (a,w, β; p) and g
UI
s (a, β; p) are unique.
B.3 Welfare Calculation for Great Recession Simulation
First, we focus on individual i. Let t = 0 be December 2007 and let T be December
2013. For ease of exposition, we discuss the calculation of welfare in two separate parts:
let period (A) include any time t ∈ [0, . . . T ] during the Great Recession and recovery and
(B) represent the terminal time period post-December 2013 t > T .
Let cji (xt, pt) and s
j
i (xt, pt) denote the consumption and search effort policy functions of
individual i with individual state xt at time t when aggregate productivity is pt and UI
policy is j ∈ {b, f, n}, where b denotes the benchmark policy, f denotes the flat policy,
and n denotes the new/alternative policy.6 To evaluate the welfare gains from the optimal
policy in this exercise, we set policy n to be the optimal policy.
6Notice here that we are using the result that policy functions of the agents in our economy depend on
the aggregate state of economy only through p as a result of block recursivity.
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First consider welfare in period (A). Under the benchmark policy b, the utility of individual
i during period (A) when endowed with additional p¯i percent of consumption for her lifetime
is given by
T∑
t=0
(βi,t)
t U
(
cbi (xt, pt) (1 + p¯i) , s
b
i (xt, pt)
)
,
where U
(
cbi (xt, pt) (1 + p¯i) , s
b
i
)
=
[cbi (xt,pt)(1+p¯i)]
1−σ
1−σ − 1U
[
α
sbi (xt,pt)
1+χ
1+χ
]
. Note that in the
above expression, {pt}Tt=0 represents the labor productivity that is fed into the model during
the recession, while {βi,t}Tt=0 represents the realized values of discount factor β. Agents,
however, take expectations on aggregate labor productivity using the AR(1) process.
Now consider period (B). The continuation value of the individual post-December 2013 is
given by
ET+1
∞∑
t=T+1
(βi,t)
t U
(
cji (xt, pt) (1 + p¯i) , s
j
i (xt, pt)
)
,
which recursively can be written as (βi,T+1)
T+1 V li,jp¯i (aT+1, wT+1, βT+1, pT+1) where V
li,j
p¯i
denotes the value of individual i with labor force status li ∈ {W,UE,UI} under the
policy j when consumption is multiplied by 1 + p¯i every period from t = T + 1 onward.
Computationally, we can find V lip¯i once we have obtained the policy functions associated
with the underlying value function V li . We do this recursively by policy function iteration
with the difference being that consumption is multiplied by (1 + p¯i) at every iteration.
Under the original exercise where the policy is permanent, we set j = b, while under the
exercise when the policy is discretionary/temporary, the government reverts back to the
flat policy postrecession and thus j = f .
Hence, the welfare of agent i who is endowed with an additional p¯i percent of lifetime
consumption over periods (A) and (B) under the baseline policy b can be written as
T∑
t=0
[
(βi,t)
t U
(
cbi (xt, pt) (1 + p¯i) , s
b
i (xt, pt)
)]
+ (βi,T+1)
T+1 V li,jp¯i (aT+1, wT+1, βT+1, pT+1) .
Now, aggregating across individuals at each point in time, we can write the left-hand side
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of Equation (2.15) as
T∑
t=0
[∫
i
(βi,t)
t U
(
cbi (xt, pt) (1 + p¯i) , s
b
i (xt, pt)
)
dΓbt (i)
]
+
∫
i
(βi,T+1)
T+1 V li,jp¯i (aT+1, wT+1, βT+1, pT+1) dΓ
b
T+1 (i) , (B.1)
where Γbt is the distribution of the economy at time t under policy b.
Similarly, the right-hand-side of equation (2.15) is computed by solving
T∑
t=0
[∫
i
(βi,t)
t U (cni (xt, pt) , s
n
i (xt, pt)) dΓ
n
t (i)
]
+
∫
i
(βi,T+1)
T+1 V li,j (aT+1, wT+1, βT+1, pT+1) dΓ
n
T+1 (i) , (B.2)
where Γnt is the corresponding distribution under policy n and the superscript j of the
value function in (B) depends on whether the policy is permanent (j = n) or temporary
(j = f).
Under a temporary policy, we emphasize that even if the policy reverts to the flat policy
f after December 2013, the terminal value will be different for policy b and n because the
distribution of each economy at t = T + 1 is going to be different from each other (i.e.,
ΓbT+1 6= ΓnT+1).
Then, we simply use a zero-finder to find p¯i that makes equations (B.1) and (B.2) the
same.7
B.4 Model with Endogenous Quits
In this section, we present the extended model that incorporates the endogenous quit
decisions of workers.
Worker’s problem
Under the model with quits, workers matched with a firm can decide to leave employment.
After the separation shock realizes, a firm-worker pair that is not dissolved exogenously
7Note that there is no closed-form solution for p¯i given the functional form of the utility function.
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may endogenously be separated if the worker chooses to quit. The worker’s problem is now
given by
V W (a,w, β;µ) = max
c,a′
u (c) + βE
[
δ
(
p′
) (
1− e (p′))V UE (a′, w, β′;µ′)
+δ
(
p′
)
e
(
p′
)
V UI
(
a′, β′;µ′
)
+
(
1− δ (p′)) max
d∈{0,1}
{
dV UI
(
a′, β′;µ′
)
+ (1− d)V W (a′, w, β′;µ′)}]
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ (1 + r) a+ w (1− τ)
a′ ≥ −a
Γ′ = H
(
µ, p′
)
and p′ ∼ F (p′ | p) .
Firm’s problem
The value of a matched firm is modified to account for the possibility of a quit. Even if a
match is not dissolved by the exogenous shock δ, it can be dissolved if the worker’s decision
to quit is gd = 1:
J (a,w, β;µ) = p− w (B.3)
× 1
1 + r
E
[(
1− δ (p′)) (1− gd (a′, w, β′, µ′)) J (a′, w, β′;µ′) ∣∣∣β, µ]
subject to
Γ′ = H
(
µ, p′
)
and p′ ∼ F (p′ | p) ,
where a′ = ga (a,w, β, µ).
So, the value of posting a vacancy is given by
V (a,w, β;µ) = −κ+ q (θ (a,w, β;µ)) J (a,w, β;µ) (B.4)
and market tightness can be obtained by solving
θ (a,w, β;µ) =
q
−1
(
κ
J(a,w,β;µ)
)
if w ∈ W (µ)
0 otherwise.
(B.5)
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Notice that the value of a firm J depends on individual states x = (a,w, β, b) because
heterogeneous workers will have different quit thresholds. This would then imply that
market tightness θ is also a function of these states.
Unemployed’s problem
The unemployed’s problem remains unchanged, except that market tightness is now a
function of other individual states x = (a,w, β, b) for reasons stated in the firm’s problem.
B.5 Computational Algorithm
Solving the baseline model
The model is solved using the following steps:
1. Solve for the value function of the firm J (w, p).
2. Using the free-entry condition 0 = −κ+q (θ (w, p)) J (w, p) and the functional form of
q (θ), we can solve for market tightness for any given wage submarket w and aggregate
productivity p:
θ (w, p) = q−1
(
κ
J (w, p)
)
,
where we set θ (w, p) = 0 when the market is inactive.
3. Given the function θ, we can then solve for the household value functions V W , V UE ,
and V UI using standard value function iteration. In order to decrease computation
time, we implement Howard’s improvement algorithm (policy-function iteration).
4. Once household policy functions are obtained, we are able to simulate aggregate
dynamics of the model.
Extended model with endogenous quits
Solving the model will require modifying the baseline algorithm above as follows:
1. Guess a market tightness function θ0 (a
′, w, β′, p′).
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2. Taking θ0 as given, solve for the household’s problem.
3. Using the household’s policy function gWd (θ0) and g
W
a (θ0), solve for the firm’s prob-
lem.
4. After obtaining J0 (a,w, β, p), use Equation B.5 to back out the implied market tight-
ness θ1 (a
′, w, β′, p′).
5. If convergence criterion ‖ θ1 − θ0 ‖≤ θ is not satisfied, use θ1 as a guess and repeat
the steps outlined above.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
In this appendix, we provide details on the data sources and construction of variables for
our analysis in “What Do Survey Data Tell Us about U.S. Businesses?” We also include
the auxiliary tables and figures omitted from the main text.
C.1 Data Sources
The main data sources are:
• Statistics of Income of the Internal Revenue Service (SOI);
• Survey of Consumer Finances of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (SCF);
• Survey of Income and Program Participation of the U.S. Census Bureau in the De-
partment of Commerce (SIPP);
• Panel Study of Income Dynamics of the Survey Research Center, Institute for Social
Research, University of Michigan (PSID);
• Current Population Survey at the Bureau of Labor Statistics (CPS);
• Center for Research in Security Prices and Compustat (CRSP);
• Pratt’s Stats (now renamed as DealStats) from Business Valuation Resources.
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Besides the main data sources listed above, we also use information from the national
income and product accounts and fixed asset tables of the Bureau of Economic Analysis;
financial accounts of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Panel Study
of Entrepreneurial Dynamics of the Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research,
University of Michigan; and the Kauffman Firm Survey of the Kauffman Foundation.
We construct business incomes and numbers of returns and owners by using variables
from the IRS, SCF, SIPP, PSID, and CPS. In addition to these variables, we use BEA
estimates of income misreporting by noncorporate businesses and General Accountability
Office (GAO) estimates of income misreporting by S corporations to adjust IRS pass-
through business income. BEA estimates of income misreporting over time are obtained
from NIPA Table 7.14 (line 2). The GAO estimates are taken from reports GAO 14-453
and 10-195, which summarize the progress of the tax compliance studies conducted by the
IRS through the National Research Program.
To verify the consistency of sole proprietorship income in the SCF, we compared two
measures of net income from a sole proprietorship or a farm. Results of the comparison
were reported in the main text. The first uses pretax net income variables (coded by
X3132, X3232, and X3332) from Form 1040, Schedule C (line 31). The second is X5704,
which measures net annual income from a sole proprietorship or a farm before deductions.
Specifically, this variable codes responses to the question asking for combined incomes
appearing on lines 12 and 18 of IRS Form 1040.
Finally, to verify whether respondents in the SCF check documents, we use variable X6536,
which provides information on the frequency of checking any documents when answering
interview questions. Variable X7451 informs us about whether the respondent referred
to income tax documents, and variables X7452 through X7455 inform us about whether
the respondent referred to other financial documents, namely, pension documents, account
statements, investment or business records, and loan documents, respectively. If a respon-
dent says that he or she checked the income tax document (X7451=1), we use his or her
answers to X6536 to obtain the frequency of checking this document. The respondent
did not check the income tax document if either (X7451=5 or X7451=0 or X7451=-7) or
(X6536=4). We use the same steps to check referencing of other financial documents by
using X7452–X7455 instead of X7451. We classify a respondent who checks at least one of
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these four documents as someone who refers to any other tax documents. We then obtain
the weighted fraction of the group of respondents who check these two types of documents
frequently, sometimes, rarely, or never. Roughly 4 percent of all respondents have nonap-
plicable responses (NaN). We adjust for this nonresponse rate in the results of the main
text so that our fractions sum to 100 percent.
C.2 Additional Results
Next, we report on our auxiliary tables and figures that relate to our findings on business
incomes, receipts, and returns.
Business income
Aggregate
In Section 3.3.1 of the main text, we discussed business income per return and the number of
returns across years and legal forms. In Figure C.1, we report aggregate business incomes
and show that they are overstated for all pass-through businesses. In Figure C.2, we
compare the aggregate business income from the SCF with other surveys, namely, the
SIPP, PSID, and CPS, and extend the analysis from Section 3.6 of the main text.
Distribution
In Section 3.3.2, we discussed the distribution of business income by splitting pass-through
businesses into two categories: those that make profits and those that make losses (or no
income). In Figures C.3 and C.4, we plot business income per return by legal status for
those making profits and losses, respectively. In Figures C.5 and C.6, we plot the number of
returns for the same sets of businesses. In Table C.1, we extend the analysis of decomposing
the total percentage error into the overstatement of profits and understatement of losses.
In Figure C.7, we report the distributional statistics for S corporations. As we noted in
the main text, the data for S corporations are only available for limited years, namely
2003–2012, but these data show similar inconsistencies between SCF and IRS data, as was
found with sole proprietorships.
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Broad business income
In Figure C.8, we extend the analysis of Section 3.5.2 in the main text by replicating the
analysis of Johnson and Moore (2008) for all years. As we noted in the main text, the
SCF estimates are still larger in all years than the IRS counterpart even with the broader
concept of income.
Business receipts
In Section 3.3.1 of the main text, we reported that business receipts per owner are over-
stated. In Figures C.9 and C.10, we corroborate that finding by showing aggregate business
receipts and business receipts per return across legal forms and across years.
Business returns
In this section, we provide additional details for the comparison of the income yields in
SCF to CRSP-Compustat, Pratt’s Stats, and other surveys to augment the analysis in
Section 3.4 of the main text.
In Table C.2, we provide several additional moments for the distribution of income yields
in the SCF. In the main text, we showed evidence that the SCF income yields are high
when compared to CRSP-Compustat or Pratt’s Stats. The additional moments show that
this is true regardless of year or legal structure.
In the main text, we compared the income yields for S and C corporations in the SCF
to small firms in CRSP where we defined “small” as corporations that are in the bottom
quintile of the size distribution as measured by the book value of total assets. In Table C.3,
we extend the analysis to two alternative definitions of “small”: (i) those in the bottom
quintile by market value and (ii) those in the bottom quintile by gross sales. Although there
are some differences in the magnitudes, the equally weighted and value-weighted yields are
negative in all years, regardless of how we classify the small firms.
In Table C.4, we report income yields from Pratt’s Stats for all legal forms. We see that sole
proprietors have higher yields than other pass-throughs and C corporations. However, since
these businesses have much smaller valuations, the value-weighted yield for all businesses
is relatively low when compared to SCF data.
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Finally, in Tables C.5 and C.6, we report the income yields in PSID and SIPP for all
years that the data are available. As we noted in the main text, the average yields are
comparable across the SCF, PSID, and SIPP, while the distributions are not. These tables
more clearly demonstrate this finding.
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Table C.1: SCF-IRS business income gap by legal structure
Tax SCF-IRS Percentage of Gap from
Year Gap ($) Overstatement of Profits (%) Understatement of Losses (%)
Sole Proprietorship
1988 67.09 58 42
1994 5.44 -515 615
2000 168.09 75 25
2006 91.66 29 71
2012 -28.22 359 -259
Partnership
1988 56.28 37 63
1994 500.59 92 8
2000 261.03 56 44
2006 724.62 83 17
2012 205.51 0 100
S Corporation
1988 35.78 57 43
1994 118.07 74 26
2000 206.06 78 22
2006 279.35 77 23
2012 41.06 -53 153
C Corporation
1994 -244.42 148 -48
2000 -57.00 670 -570
2006 -859.87 123 -23
2012 -747.36 138 -38
Note: This table shows the difference (gap) between aggregated business income by legal structure in the SCF and
IRS. The gap is then decomposed into the fraction attributable to an overstatement of profits or an understatement
of losses. Dollar amounts are in billions. The table shows results for every six years. See my website for the complete
results.
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Table C.2: Net income yields in the SCF by legal structure
Sole Proprietorship Partnership
Value- Equally
p25 p50 p75
Value- Equally
p25 p50 p75Tax Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted
Year Mean Mean Mean Mean
1988 19.9 105.0 3.2 20.0 80.0 13.6 111.4 0.0 8.0 50.0
1994 19.1 97.8 2.0 24.0 74.0 74.1 49.1 0.3 10.7 42.3
2000 26.6 89.8 0.9 25.5 75.0 24.5 203.1 0.1 11.9 40.0
2006 25.0 254.8 2.3 32.0 100.0 18.8 84.4 0.1 10.0 40.0
2012 24.7 87.4 0.0 23.2 82.4 11.5 36.8 0.0 5.4 33.7
S Corporation C Corporation
1988 12.7 23.5 0.5 6.0 37.5 17.8 101.7 3.2 16.7 30.5
1994 14.3 38.1 0.9 11.7 40.0 28.3 73.9 0.4 8.0 41.1
2000 16.1 120.7 4.4 18.4 40.0 26.5 90.8 2.9 15.8 46.0
2006 15.4 75.1 3.8 16.7 80.0 16.3 44.4 0.0 7.5 36.0
2012 14.4 57.6 2.7 15.2 52.2 15.4 55.4 0.0 9.0 41.3
All Pass-throughs All Businesses
1988 16.1 101.3 1.2 13.3 62.5 16.6 101.3 1.3 14.3 57.0
1994 32.2 80.8 1.1 20.0 64.0 31.5 80.8 1.1 19.0 62.9
2000 21.3 113.9 1.3 21.0 62.9 22.6 114.4 1.6 20.0 62.3
2006 18.4 183.7 2.0 22.0 80.0 18.1 171.7 1.6 20.0 73.3
2012 13.9 67.1 0.0 15.0 60.0 14.1 66.2 0.0 15.0 60.0
Note: This table shows moments of the net income yield distribution of businesses in the SCF by legal structure.
The sample includes businesses with positive net worth and excludes the bottom 1st percentile of these businesses.
The business income of each business that the family members own in the SCF is obtained from SCF variables that
correspond to information on business tax forms. The table shows results for every six years. See my website for the
complete results.
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Table C.3: Income yield for small firms in CRSP
by Market Capitalization
Tax Year EW VW p25 p50 p75
1988 −43.6 −27.0 −52.3 −14.3 6.1
1991 −72.9 −49.0 −72.4 −15.9 5.1
1994 −23.3 −14.2 −34.1 −4.1 9.3
1997 −29.9 −19.2 −43.2 −8.5 7.1
2000 −104.1 −71.8 −103.4 −16.4 10.4
2003 −14.2 −9.2 −21.0 −0.9 7.8
2006 −12.1 −8.1 −20.8 −0.2 7.6
2009 −65.0 −47.3 −72.4 −22.5 4.7
2012 −22.7 −12.6 −35.6 −3.8 10.4
2015 −59.6 −35.6 −55.4 −11.5 6.3
Mean −44.7 −29.4 −51.1 −9.8 7.5
by Sales
EW VW p25 p50 p75
−27.2 −8.8 −26.3 −8.6 1.1
−31.7 −6.0 −23.3 −5.6 1.5
−18.1 −9.2 −24.8 −6.6 4.0
−21.1 −8.5 −25.4 −8.0 2.7
−52.8 −12.4 −42.2 −10.7 2.2
−9.5 −7.2 −15.2 −3.3 5.5
−11.9 −8.6 −18.6 −5.1 4.7
−32.6 −11.0 −34.6 −10.8 3.0
−17.1 −5.7 −22.7 −5.4 6.7
−37.6 −11.5 −35.8 −11.9 1.9
−25.9 −8.9 −26.9 −7.6 3.3
Note: This table shows estimates of income yields for small businesses in CRSP-Compustat firms.The column “EW”
reports the equally weighted average, the column “VW” reports the value-weighted average, the column “p25” reports
the 25th percentile, the column “p50” reports the 50th percentile, and the column “p75” reports the 75th percentile.
Table C.4: Income yield from Pratt’s Stats
Legal Form EW VW p25 p50 p75
Sole Proprietorship 41.3 31.6 13.3 36.7 61.5
Partnership 26.6 4.8 2.7 20.5 48.8
S Corporation 30.3 6.9 6.5 23.3 47.8
C Corporation 6.8 -2.1 -2.3 6.5 29.8
Note: This table shows estimates of income yields from the Pratt’s Stats database.The column “EW” reports the
equally weighted average, the column “VW” reports the value-weighted average, the column “p25” reports the 25th
percentile, the column “p50” reports the 50th percentile, and the column “p75” reports the 75th percentile.
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Table C.5: Net income yields of unincorporated businesses in the PSID
Tax Year Value-Weighted Mean Equally Weighted Mean p25 p50 p75
1998 5.2 136.4 0.0 12.5 75.0
2000 21.7 182.4 0.0 7.5 73.3
2002 21.8 187.0 0.0 33.3 139.5
2004 22.2 287.7 3.9 36.9 140.0
2006 20.6 630.1 10.0 42.5 222.2
2008 10.9 175.8 2.7 28.8 125.0
2010 13.9 110.3 3.9 25.0 75.9
2012 10.7 90.8 3.3 23.0 83.3
2014 6.9 182.9 4.8 33.3 100.0
Mean 14.9 220.4 3.2 27.0 114.9
Note: This table shows moments of the net income yield distribution of unincorporated businesses in the PSID. The
sample includes businesses with positive net worth and excludes the bottom 1st percentile of these businesses.
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Table C.6: Net income yields in the SIPP
Value- Equally
Tax Weighted Weighted p25 p50 p75
Year Mean Mean
Sole Proprietorship
2004 20.2 545.0 6.8 44.8 240.0
2005 19.4 727.7 4.5 41.2 240.0
2009 13.0 3043.1 0.2 24.0 203.3
2010 15.8 5916.6 0.2 31.0 240.0
2011 14.9 8878.2 0.5 29.2 188.0
Mean 16.7 3822.1 2.4 34.0 222.3
Partnership
2004 25.1 605.9 0.6 29.2 220.0
2005 19.9 1271.2 0.3 22.6 189.1
2009 17.4 853.4 0.0 7.4 108.0
2010 21.3 2128.0 0.0 22.5 204.0
2011 18.9 1551.7 0.0 11.8 190.7
Mean 20.5 1282.0 0.2 18.7 182.4
Unincorporated
2004 22.0 2936.2 6.4 45.7 260.0
2005 19.8 12590.7 4.0 40.4 250.0
2009 14.0 15353.1 0.1 22.5 202.5
2010 17.2 38737.5 0.1 30.8 240.0
2011 15.3 7971.4 0.3 26.7 197.8
Mean 17.6 15517.8 2.2 33.2 230.1
Note: This table shows moments of the net income yield distribution of sole proprietorships, partnerships, and
unincorporated businesses in the SIPP 2004 and 2008 panels. Statistics are calculated for years where asset topical
modules are available. The sample includes businesses with positive net worth and excludes the bottom 1st percentile
of these businesses.
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Figure C.1: Business income by legal status, SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the total business income by legal status in the SCF and the IRS. Business income refers to
income reported on Form 1040 Schedule C for sole proprietorships, Form 1065 for partnerships, Form 1120S for S
corporations, and Form 1120 for C corporations. IRS data for partnerships, S corporations, and C corporations are
available only until 2013, and C-corporation data start from 1990 because data for Form 1120 are not available for
1988 and 1989.
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Figure C.2: Total unincorporated business income in SCF, SIPP, PSID, and CPS vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the total business income of unincorporated businesses in the SCF, SIPP, PSID, CPS, and
IRS. Before 2004, the SIPP does not provide information about an individual’s own share of business income from
an unincorporated business. Instead, it contains information about the total income of the business, which is not
enough information to calculate the total business income of unincorporated businesses.
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Figure C.3: Business income per tax return by legal status for businesses with net income,
SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the business income per tax return by legal status for businesses with net income in the SCF
and IRS. Business income refers to income reported on Form 1040 Schedule C for sole proprietorships, Form 1065 for
partnerships, Form 1120S for S corporations, and Form 1120 for C corporations. IRS data for sole proprietorships,
partnerships, S corporations, and C corporations are available only until 2013, and C-corporation data start from
1990 because data for Form 1120 are not available for 1988 and 1989.
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Figure C.4: Business income per tax return by legal status for businesses with net loss,
SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the business income per tax return by legal status for businesses with net loss in the SCF
and IRS. Business income refers to income reported on Form 1040 Schedule C for sole proprietorships, Form 1065 for
partnerships, Form 1120S for S corporations, and Form 1120 for C corporations. IRS data for sole proprietorships,
partnerships, S corporations, and C corporations are available only until 2013, and C-corporation data start from
1990 because data for Form 1120 are not available for 1988 and 1989. Businesses with zero net income are included
with those that have net losses.
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Figure C.5: Number of returns by legal status for businesses with net income, SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the number of business tax returns by legal status for business with net income in the SCF
and the IRS. Business income refers to income reported on Form 1040 Schedule C for sole proprietorships, Form 1065
for partnerships, Form 1120S for S corporations, and Form 1120 for C corporations. IRS data for sole proprietorships,
partnerships, S corporations, and C corporations are available only until 2013, and C corporations data starts from
1990 because data for Form 1120 is not available for 1988 and 1989.
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Figure C.6: Number of returns by legal status for businesses with net loss, SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the number of business tax returns by legal status for businesses with net loss in the SCF
and IRS. Business income refers to income reported on Form 1040 Schedule C for sole proprietorships, Form 1065 for
partnerships, Form 1120S for S corporations, and Form 1120 for C corporations. IRS data for sole proprietorships,
partnerships, S corporations, and C corporations are available only until 2013, and C- corporation data start from
1990 because data for Form 1120 are not available for 1988 and 1989. Businesses with zero net income are included
with those that have net losses.
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Figure C.7: Distribution of S-Corporation business income per return, SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots S-corporation business income per return for those with below- and above-median business
receipts.
Figure C.8: Broad business income, SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure compares a broader measure of business income in the SCF and IRS. Broad business income is
defined to be income derived from a business or profession (Form 1040 Schedule C) or farm (Form 1040 Schedule F);
income from rental real estate, royalties, partnerships, S corporations, estates, trusts (Form 1040 Schedule E); and
income from gains from the sale of capital and other property (Form 1040, lines 13 and 14).
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Figure C.9: Business receipts by legal status, SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the total business receipts by legal status in the SCF and IRS. Business receipts refers to
gross sales reported on Form 1040 Schedule C for sole proprietorships, Form 1065 for partnerships, Form 1120S for
S corporations, and Form 1120 for C corporations. IRS data for partnerships, S corporations, and C corporations
are available only until 2013, and C-corporation data start from 1990 because data for Form 1120 are not available
for 1988 and 1989.
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Figure C.10: Business receipts per tax return by legal status, SCF vs. IRS
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Note: This figure plots the business receipts per tax return by legal status in the SCF and IRS. Business receipts
refers to gross sales reported on Form 1040 Schedule C for sole proprietorships, Form 1065 for partnerships, Form
1120S for S corporations, and Form 1120 for C corporations. IRS data for partnerships, S corporations, and C
corporations are available only until 2013, and C-corporation data start from 1990 because data for Form 1120 are
not available for 1988 and 1989.
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